Bridging Classical Pragmatism and Classical Realism:A Critical Evaluation of the Potential for Dialogue between Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Dewey by Emmett, Alastair D
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Bridging Classical Pragmatism and Classical Realism
A Critical Evaluation of the Potential for Dialogue between Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and John Dewey
General rights
Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License.   A
copy of this may be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode  This license sets out your rights and the
restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of
a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity,
defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
•	Your contact details
•	Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
•	An outline nature of the complaint
Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible.
 1 
 
Bridging Classical Pragmatism and Classical 
Realism: A Critical Evaluation of the Potential for 
Dialogue between Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and John Dewey. 
 
 
                             By Alastair Emmett 
  
A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol 
in accordance with the requirements for award of 
the degree of Philosophy Doctorate in Politics in 
the Faculty of Social Science and Law,  
 











This thesis addresses the need to extend the depth and scope of Realism as a normative 
theory in International Relations by means of a dialogue between the Pragmatism of John 
Dewey and the tragedian approaches of Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. The 
research investigates the degree to which John Dewey’s understanding of the metra of things 
offers an alternative perspective of the tragic nature of world politics, i.e. those measures of 
life which in tragedy is used to illustrate the limitations and insufficiencies of the self. 
Through the employment of the hermeneutic notion of a “fusion of horizons” our dialogue 
produces a “tragic Deweyanism” which not only assimilates many metra-driven insights of 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr but also advances an international political thought that stresses the 
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Section One: Pragmatism, Realism and Tragedy 
 
The thesis posits that integrating the Pragmatism of John Dewey with 
Classical Realist approaches, also “tragedian”, which remain untouched by the 
contemporary International Relations and tragedy debate, will be useful for 
extending the depth and scope of realism as a normative theory in International 
Relations. The thesis offers an original and valuable contribution to knowledge 
by synthesising the insights obtained from the two positions. 
The methodology adopted is inspired by the Philosophical Hermeneutics 
of Hans-George Gadamer. The primary instrument used for advancing the thesis 
is Gadamer’s conception of a “fusion of horizons”. The researcher fuses their 
“horizon”, which is deliberately embedded within concepts drawn from tragedy, 
principally the notion of measures or metra, with the “horizons” which arise 
from scholarly texts analysed in the thesis. This process of “bringing a personal 
horizon to bear” upon pre-existing text is the mechanism through which 
interpretations are produced in the research. Essentially the tragic concepts 
within the researcher’s own horizon are applied to the texts in order to fully 
“grasp” (and attain an understanding of) the texts.  
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Engaging with the legacy texts and integrating the different layers of 
interpretation resulted in inductively produced conclusions through a process of 
shaping and reshaping the researcher’s “horizon”. The thesis, therefore, 
develops through the enrichment of several horizons. Essentially, the results of 
the dialogue between the three principle approaches analysed in the text are 
established within the researcher’s own horizon. 
Realism as a normative approach is often considered in existing literature 
as being an inappropriate addition to the International Political Thought (IPT) 
literature owing to what can be referred to as an ideological opposition to 
realism, which casts the approach as amoral and overly concerned with 
questions of power politics. Recent scholarship on the topic suggests that 
realism has a profoundly ethical dimension which has not earned the tradition 
thus far, a position that is up-front and centre in IPT theories. This is 
unfortunate as significant approaches, such as those advanced by Molloy 
Cochran, demonstrate that the effective means of pushing beyond impasses in 
IPT by a refocusing upon epistemological issues suffer from an overly 
optimistic reading of politics. Cochran demonstrates that Pragmatism can have 
great potential within IPT, and would benefit greatly if a tragic vision of life 
were applied to it in order to better capture the insufficiencies and limitations of 
the self. By integrating into productive dialogue, an approach which embraces 
pragmatism, inclusivity and dialogue with realist tragedian approaches, this 
research opens up the possibility of creating an approach which synthesises 
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insight from both traditions. It also produces an approach which belongs to the 
IPT tradition specifically, not just International Relations or the realist tradition 
in general.  
The existing debate on tragedy and International Relations is profoundly 
influenced by liberal ethical priorities which view tragedy as an instrument for 
advancing the understanding of normative dilemmas in world politics, the hope 
being that institutional reform such that liberal progress can be advanced. 
Tragedy, however, does not necessarily suggest a theoretical insight into how 
particular ethical contingencies can find their realisation in world politics. 
Tragedy is primarily concerned with an explanation for the impact of the metra 
of things and the measures of life, which in turn expose humans to both the 
limits of their intellect and the ability to control their own destinies. Hubris may 
occur from overshooting our legitimate measures, but there equally exists 
measures which cannot be overshot even if so desired.  
The human knowledge, ethics and lives have profound limitations which 
render the human race unable to resolve tragic antagonisms or to overcome the 
limitations of the self’s finiteness. Tragedy is not an antidote to hubris as many 
contemporary International Relations scholars maintain. Rather, it offers an 
explanation and rationalisation for the importance of learning the measures of 
things and the regrettable but sometimes unavoidable impact of being blind to 
the importance of the measures of things. To put tragedy to use as an instrument 
for the advancement of any particular ethical and political priorities is to miss 
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the point of tragedy, which is to indicate how the self is a limited being that 
must cope with its insufficiencies and limitations the best way it can in an 
existence where life’s riddles ultimately become impossible to solve.  
In order to select realist tragedian approaches, the researcher considered 
approaches which were unaffected by the contemporary tragedy and 
International relations debate. Eventually, we selected the realist tragedians of 
Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr as these approaches are realist and 
tragedian and have not been impacted by the contemporary debate. They, 
therefore, do not view tragedy as some sort of means for providing an antidote 
to hubris or as an instrument of advancing liberal ethical priorities. This is 
further discussed in the literature review chapter.  
The pragmatism selected is that of John Dewey’s. This is due to the fact 
that within Deweyan studies, there have already been arguments made as to 
Dewey’s own relationship with tragedy, notably by Sidney Hook. It was, 
therefore, a logical choice as it offered hope of there already being some 
measure of a dialogue between Dewey and tragedy.  
The research addressed these gaps in the literature simultaneously as 
further explained in the literature review. The question as to whether or not 
Dewey’s pragmatism understands the metra of things as the researchers do in 
their horizon is addressed, and subsequently, the research establishes the degree 
to which Deweyan pragmatism, in particular Dewey’s understanding of the 
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“metra” of things, offers an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the 
“tragic” nature of International Relations. 
The rationale for this question is that the research aims to fill gaps in the 
literature that are being established in the literature review simultaneously. A 
dialogue between a pragmatism, which is inclusive and dialogical (thereby 
retaining the advantages of pragmatism to IPT), and realist approaches, which 
are also largely tragedian (and thereby advancing a needed account of the self as 
defined by limitations and insufficiency), must naturally avoid the error of the 
contemporary tragedy and IR debate by focusing on the metra of things. 
By demonstrating that Dewey’s thought is consistent with the 
researcher’s own horizon’s understanding of the metra of things, the research 
opens up the possibility of synthesising insight from both traditions. Indeed, the 
research demonstrates that Dewey’s thought is consistent with individual 
understanding of the metra of things in the horizon and, in turn, offers a (tragic) 
understanding of world politics. However, the research also indicates that there 
are several similarities between the researcher’s reading of Dewey and the 
Classical Realists of Morgenthau and Niebuhr. Hence, the research maintains 
that an alternative can only be developed to an extent through this analysis/ 
interpretation. Nonetheless, by assimilating the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian 
approaches into Dewey’s own dialogical and inclusivist form of inquiry, the 
research produces an alternative tragedian approach which does indeed 
synthesise the insights of both traditions by creating a “tragic Deweyanism” 
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which is at once a tragedian and metra oriented approach, as well as a 
pragmatist approach which is consistent with both the principle of inclusivity 
and dialogue.  
 
Section Two: Structure of Thesis and Rationale   
 
The structure of this thesis reflects the hermeneutic methodology 
employed throughout the thesis. The thesis begins by establishing the gaps in 
existing literature in chapter one. Chapter one also outlines the rationale for the 
research question. The chapter discusses how establishing that Dewey’s 
approach does indeed understand the metra of things, positions the research to 
then ask if such an alternative understanding offers an alternative to the kind of 
tragedian approaches which are developed by Niebuhr and Morgenthau. 
Chapter two develops the methodology of the research, which is inspired, 
but not a clone of, the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-George Gadamer. The 
researcher establishes the importance of the concept of the fusion of horizons. It 
becomes evident that, as consistent with Gadamer’s view that realities are 
constituted in language, the researcher’s own horizon as a hermeneutician can 
be brought to bear upon the texts of the three scholars. Through fusing two 
horizons, the researcher interprets the meaning of the horizons that are 
embedded within the text and, thus, provide them with renewed meaning 
reflected within the researcher’s horizon. The rationale here is that the 
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researcher’s horizon becomes increasingly enriched as the research proceeds 
from a chapter interpreting Dewey, to one interpreting Niebuhr, to one 
interpreting Morgenthau. The researcher’s horizon is, thus, enriched throughout 
the research process: one interpretation builds upon another in an inductive 
manner.  
Chapter three explores Dewey. The chapter interprets his approach 
employing three themes (a) the metra of the self (b) ethical and political 
imperatives and (c) application to world politics. The interpretation of the 
approach as one consistent with the metra of things (as well as the typical 
features of pragmatism such as dialogue and inclusivity) and thus the 
researcher’s horizon is enriched by this interpretation. 
Chapter four focuses upon Niebuhr and the same themes applied in 
chapter three are applied here. Methodologically, the research is now in a 
position to interpret not only Niebuhr’s thought, but also to assess it in relation 
to the prior interpretation of Dewey. This assessment further enriches the 
researcher in line with the methodology established in chapter two.  
Chapter five focuses upon Morgenthau and employs the same themes as 
in the previous two chapters. In this chapter, the research is not only positioned 
to interpret Morgenthau by bringing the researcher’s horizon to bear upon 
Morgenthau’s texts, it also able to assess Morgenthau’s thought in relation to 
both Dewey and Niebuhr. At this point, the researcher’s horizon has become 
fully enriched through a fusion of horizons between the three scholars. 
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Essentially, each engagement with the texts per chapter further enriches the 
researcher’s own horizon in line with the fusion of horizons. By the time the 
study progresses to chapter six, addressing the research question becomes 
feasible.  
Chapter six outlines how the various threads of the three themes across 
the three chapters have come together to form a new “tragic Deweyanism”. It 
becomes evident how the fusion of horizons has sufficiently enriched the 
researcher’s horizon, and the research is in a position to illustrate what is 
produced through this dialogue. Tragic Deweyanism is an answer to the 
questions posed by grasping the metra of things including the self (theme one) 
the ethical and political imperatives needed in order to manage such metra 
(theme two) and to put such priorities into practice in world politics (theme 
three). The research views tragic Deweyanism as being able to assimilate the 
realist approaches as hypothetical models which play an important role in 
Dewey’s form of inquiry which is at once pragmatic, inclusive and dialogical as 
well as consistent with the researcher’s understandings of the concept of metra.  
 
Section Three: General Points 
 
Our thesis is that the tragic nature of world politics is best understood 
using the concept of “metra” or measures. This concept relates to the notion of 
fundamental limitations to human abilities: both practical and intellectual. The 
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concept is not exclusively tragedian – one that is derived from Classical 
Tragedy – however; for analytic purposes it helps explain the central role that 
“the furies” play in tragedy. Metra is a special kind of boundary, one which is 
impossible for human beings to cross. There is metra in all things which human 
beings cannot truly master. For example, our measures are insufficient in terms 
of our capacity to resolve value conflicts which take place within our own 
ethical space. In the famous example of the two brothers made by Mervyn 
Frost, he advances a view of tragedy that leaves open the possibility that ethical 
dilemmas can become undone as a result of changes in the contingencies that 
give rise to such dilemmas. The intractability of these sorts of dilemmas is well 
illustrated (Frost, 2012: 35-39). Frost employs metra as a concept implicitly. In 
our thesis, we focus on metra and make it explicit in our understandings of 
tragedy. 
The understanding of the metra/measures of things, which can be seen as 
implicit within Frost’s position, is to a very great extent both an enormously 
significant aspect of tragedy and yet also frequently left implicit. Even in Frost, 
there is an overemphasis on what is “mutable” in tragedy. As such, the role that 
tragedy can play in the study of International Relations (IR) is explained as a 
way of deepening our understanding of dilemmas in the hope that such 
knowledge may help us resolve them once cultural and historical circumstances 
have changed. New social practices can reorient and transform social meanings 
and language, dissolving value antagonisms so that they no longer have any 
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disruptive ethical impact (Frost, 2012: 35-39). Yet Frost's thesis does not 
adequately explore either the role that metra plays in tragedy or within 
contemporary IR debates such as those pertaining to non-positivist Classical 
Realism, or IR and tragedy.  
In our view, metra is of great importance in how we theorise the 
intellectual capacity of the self. The notion of metra roughly translates into 
English as measures and denotes a sense of proportions. The measures of the 
self in terms of its intellectual capacity can be “maxed out” before the self has 
found answers to questions of supreme importance. That is, the intellect of the 
self has a certain “ceiling” it cannot exceed owing to its animalistic limitations. 
Implicit in this thesis is the view that the measures of the self, and indeed of 
things in general, not only expose the ceiling of human intelligence, but also 
have epistemological and normative implications for how we theorise world 
politics. Some of the consequences of human metra/measures are found in the 
manner in which the self is left ignorant of the answers to questions that cannot 
be answered owing to the ceiling on the capacity of human beings to exercise 
their intelligence. In our understanding of tragedy, the central figures of 
tragedies answer riddles that confront them, only for new harder riddles to 
emerge subsequently. In the end, the questions prove too hard for human beings 
to answer. As a consequence, humans must learn to cope with their ignorance 
and the insecurity which arises from being ignorant of these answers. This is 
what gives tragedy its bite. In the cases of Oedipus and Antigone, neither figure 
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could cope emotionally with their ignorance of how to live properly in the 
situations they found themselves in. Consequently, both became self-
destructive. In our view, the central lesson of tragedy is to learn the measures of 
things and to make choices which are consistent with an understanding of these 
measures. Therefore, in our view, the self, either in its individual or its 
collective form, must adapt to its “situation” or suffer the consequences.  
On the stage of world politics, international actors must find ways to 
manage the implications of their ignorance of the answers they need to know. 
They must also ensure that policy is made consistent with the measures/metra of 
things, including the self.  
As we will demonstrate, the standpoint of Hans J. Morgenthau, to whom 
our understanding of tragedy in IR is deeply indebted, is consistent with our 
view of tragedy and how it ought to shape our understanding of how to act on 
the world stage. In our thesis, we establish, through the application of the 
hermeneutic methodology and in particular the fusion of horizons, that 
Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Dewey are all very much alert to the metra/measures 
of things; and we make this explicit. Our horizon is enriched through our 
dialogue with these texts which, through our interpretation, also come into 
dialogue with each other. Through the fusion of horizons, we reach a point 
where the insights of our three scholars can be analysed simultaneously. In our 
view, all three scholars can be interpreted as tragedian. Applying Dewey’s 
Classical Pragmatism renders all models of politics into hypotheses which form 
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part of a grand dialogue involving the widest possible demos. We argue that 
Deweyanism can assimilate the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian approaches. It is 
through this assimilation that our perspective is formed – a view that we call 
Tragic Deweyanism.  
 
Tragedy advocates implicitly that there is no vantage point from which 
life can be cast either in an optimistic or pessimistic light. We are part of the 
tragedy of things because we are limited beings with a delimited measure of 
intelligence and thus confront dilemmas for which there can be no answers 
arrived at dialogically through human means. Riddles rearrange the meanings 
expressed in language in such a way as to pose a question requiring a measure 
of intelligence to arrange them back into an answer. However, where the 
meanings become so extreme and so in contradiction with each other, the self's 
measure of intelligence is simply insufficient to rearrange them into an answer. 
Therefore, the answers to many of life’s hard questions are left unanswerable.  
The political and ethical implications of this are that we are reduced to 
managing the consequences of the self’s ignorance for our social world. 
Understanding the consequences of our metra/measures on our intelligence 
suggests political and ethical imperatives do not abandon hope of institutional 
or political reform, but rather suggest that if such reforms are possible then it 
must be consistent with an understanding of the self’s delimited intelligence. 
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By drawing attention to the metra of things, the social scientist is in a 
position to understand the nature of our tragic existence and thus to advocate an 
understanding which emphasises the measure and limits of human intelligence 
as well as the consequences of not grasping the consequences of metra. 
Overstressing the extent of the measures of human intelligence creates an overly 
optimistic account, whereas under-emphasising generates a false pessimism. All 
three scholars studied in this thesis took the world that is grasped to be one 
constituted by historically and culturally contingent fallible knowledge that 
understood the metra/measures of the self and its concomitant delimited 
intelligence.  
By examining the impact of metra upon the thought of our three scholars, 
it is possible to understand how their political and ethical approaches were, in 
one fashion or another, designed to manage the metra of things. The 
Morgenthau/Niebuhr iterations of non-positivist realism have much to say about 
how to manage the consequences of metra in world politics, such as by 
advocating ethical and political imperatives designed to promote normative 
values of liberal democracy. Our reading of Dewey similarly advances ideas 
about how best to manage the consequences of the metra of things. Prosaically, 
Dewey could be said to advocate the notion that many heads are better than one 
when it comes to solving ethical and political problems in world politics. 
However, on closer inspection, our methodology exposes in Deweyan thought a 
deep concern with the metra of things. Dewey understood the consequences of 
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our delimited intelligence even if he did not overly emphasise its limits. Thus, 
when it came to inquiry Dewey understood the importance of engaging the 
widest number of contributors in a dialogue that aimed at addressing the ends-
in-view, i.e. pressing practical and concrete problems of the day. This would be 
of greater value than reliance upon a dialogue of the few. Dewey is inclusive in 
terms of his approach. He advocates the aggregation of the fruits of experience, 
through dialogue, that aims to be inclusive of the widest possible community. 
On the scale of world politics, the global “demos” becomes part of Dewey’s 
epistemological approach and thus aims to address “the problems of mankind” 
at the level of supranationalism. The same can be said of Morgenthau, for 
whom the functionalism of David Mitrany is understood to ideal in modern 
conditions.  
The logic of our thesis is to advance a tragic Deweyanism that looks 
towards establishing the ethical and political imperatives necessary to cope with 
the consequences of the metra of things and the delimited measures of the self’s 
intelligence. These imperatives are best managed through an inclusive and 
productive dialogue with the widest possible demos. Although this does not 
provide an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of international 
relations, it does provide a complementary approach which bridges the gap 
between the IR sub-fields of the IPT tradition (emphasising the centrality of 
inclusivity) and the Realist tradition of IR (stressing the insufficiencies and 
limitations of human nature). 
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As such, we extend and deepen the scope of realism as a normative 
theory of IR by bringing it into dialogue with the Deweyan approach as we 




Chapter one Literature Review:  
 
Section One: Introduction 
 
IPT tradition stresses inclusivity, whereas realism, in particular non-
positivist classical realism, stresses the insufficiencies and limitations of human 
nature. These two traditions meet on the terrain of the tragedy. There is an IR 
debate which focuses both on human nature as defined by tragedy and the 
ethical and political questions arising out of this nature. This is an excellent 
place to build an alternative approach to IR which emphasises inclusivity 
alongside an understanding of the insufficiencies of human nature and the 
delimited measure of human intelligence.  
In our view, contemporary IR tragedian approaches focus too heavily on 
the concept of hubris. This is particularly true of Lebow. Such approaches are 
insufficient in their understanding of tragedy, since they omit a central concept 
within it: the notion of metra/measures and the downstream consequences of 
such measures. By focusing on metra we reinvigorate the tragedy and IR debate. 
We also open up dialogues with IPT standpoints which stress inclusivity, such 
as the work of John Dewey. Dewey takes an unconventional approach in 
advancing his of human nature, focusing on the epistemological mutability of 
assertions about the nature of human beings. Can such an understanding of 
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human nature be reinterpreted as an understanding of the metra/measures of 
things? And if this is the case, does Dewey’s understanding of the metra of 
things provide us with an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of 
international relations?  
Our reason for employing Dewey in this thesis is because his thought has 
been invoked in relation to tragedy in scholarship (see Hook, 1974; Rogers, 
2009). To my knowledge, this is not the case with other Classical Pragmatists 
such as James. 
Into dialogue with Dewey we place two (non-positivist) realist scholars 
who engaged seriously with tragedy and for whom human beings are defined by 
their insufficiencies: Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. Both of these 
scholars have well developed ethical and political thought, are concerned with 
human nature, and have engaged seriously with tragedian thinking. No attempt 
has thus far been made within the tragedy and IR debate to expose the role of 
metra/measures in the thought of such realist scholars, still less to put them into 
dialogue with a pragmatist in the hope of extending realism in a more explicitly 
ethical (IR) direction.  
 
 
Section Two: The International Political Tradition and Realism 
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We begin this section with a brief overview of the nature of the IPT 
tradition. As Jørgensen argues, Normative IR scholars may not be numerous, 
but they have formed a “critical mass” and thus have become a tradition in their 
own right (Jørgensen, 2010: 33, 39). As such, this tradition cannot be 
overlooked; its contribution to the wider discipline is significant:  
 
“The contours of a theoretical tradition have emerged on the horizon, 
characterised by most of the characteristics of an intellectual tradition. The 
emerging research community engages in reconstruction of the tradition, 
including reflections attempting to span the classical cannon of political 
theorists and contemporary issues. Leading exponents of the tradition have 
imported important strands of thought - for example, cosmopolitanism, 
liberalism, and communitarianism - from political theory, and they have 
considered their relevance and usefulness for our understanding of 
international relations. Furthermore, they engage in enquiries of 
contemporary issues in world politics, ranging from just war doctrine and 
humanitarian interventions to international order and justice” (Jørgensen, 
2010: 39). 
 
Brown’s definition of “normative” International Relations Theory (IPT) 
is sufficiently broad so as not to exclude realist IR contributions from IPT 
debates (potential or actual):  
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“By normative international relations theory is meant that body of work 
which addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the 
wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the discipline. 
At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the relations between 
communities/states, whether in the context of the old agenda, which 
focussed on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda, which mixes these 
traditional concerns with the modern demand for international distributive 
justice” (Brown, 1992: 3). 
 
Nor does Cochran’s definition of IPT exclude realism: IPT research, he 
argues, often takes place through “moral-philosophical reasoning about right 
and wrong”. This creates “ideal-theoretical” conceptions and reasoning against 
which we may judge international life (Cochran, 2016: 85). This literature, 
furthermore, creates a resource to make “a set of systematic reflections on the 
normative or ethical dimensions that are present in other theoretical traditions” 
(Jørgensen, 2010: 33).  
With this in mind, we can see that IPT is broad enough in terms of the 
definition of the field to include realism as part of its framework. However, 
despite this, realism is largely seen as the straw-man against which IPT stands. 
Indeed, developments in the field of the study of realism and realist ethics have 
yet to encourage a reconsideration on the part of IPT theorists or its 
incorporation into the tradition. Thus, the general antipathy towards realism 
from within the IPT tradition remains.  
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Such an exclusion is unwarranted. For many non-positivist realists, such 
as Niebuhr or Morgenthau, there is considerable importance attached to 
questions of international ethics and normative matters in general. Indeed, 
realism in general has built thematic equivalents to debates that happen within 
the field of Political Theory in International Relations (Jørgensen, 2010: 33). 
The suggestion that realism does not concern itself with ethics is repudiated by 
the volume of research illustrating how realist scholarship engages with ethical 
questions (see: Bell, 2009; Cox, 2007;  Dienstag, 2009; Frost, 2012; Lebow, 
2003; Lebow, 2007; Lebow, 2009; Lebow, 2012; Turner, 2009; Lang, 2007; 
Little, 2007; Molloy, 2006; Murray, 1997; Neacsu, 2010; Scheuerman, 2009; 
Scheuerman, 2010; Rengger, 2012; Williams, 2007). Intra-Realist debates 
frequently reflect themes such as what is just/unjust, good/evil, valid/invalid, 
right/wrong at the international level (Jørgensen, 2010: 33). Therefore, the sharp 
distinction often drawn between the realist tradition of International Relations 
and the International Political Theory tradition is unjustified.  
 
Indeed, the supposed incommensurability between these traditions has 
broken down in recent years as more research is conducted into Realism’s 
ethical dimension. These boundaries were historically never as sharply defined 
as they seemed. Historical scholarship maintained a keen interest in world 
politics long before the development of International Relations as a unique and 
separate discipline, and it was within this scholarship that discussions pertaining 
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to the ethics of realism arose (see: Behr, 2010; Boucher, 1998; Keene, 2005). 
The ethics of realism has a very long history. This reflects the dimension of 
political thought which takes seriously the intellectual and ethical 
insufficiencies of human beings, and aims to advocate ethical positions which 
adequately manage the consequences of these limitations.  
However, more jaundiced views as to the relevance of ethics in realism 
remain very much evident. The long-standing view advances Machiavellian-
Hobbesian stereotypes that affirms the priority of power politics over ethics. 
This branch of scholarship posits profound doubts about the mitigating effect of 
ethics upon the exercise of power politics (see: Beitz, 1979: 15; Coady, 2008: 
54-55; Walker, 1993: 32).  
This long-standing view of realism arises in part because of the 
contributions of certain important International Political Theorists such as 
Charles Beitz. Indeed, Beitz is typical in his view of realism. Using Hans 
Morgenthau's realism as a template, Beitz argues that realism represents a 
cynical and non-normative approach that echoes the amorality of Niccolo 
Machiavelli (Beitz, 1979: 20-21). Generally speaking, Betiz views realism as 
intrinsically sceptical of ethics. As a mitigating factor to the exercise of power, 
ethics is understood to have minimal impact. Morgenthau is presented as an 
anti-ethical theorist when nothing could be further from the truth (Beitz, 1979: 
15).  
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This long-standing view is further reinforced by the scholarship of Rob 
Walker, for whom Morgenthau offers little more than “banalities” regarding the 
nature of world politics. In Walker's view, Morgenthau's thought advances 
positivistic ideas which likewise aim at the full insulation of politics from ethics 
(Walker, 1993: 32, 119, 180). Even the highly influential IR ethical theorist 
Chris Brown juxtaposes the ethical and supposedly “legitimate” Communitarian 
standpoint against the supposedly amoral realist for whom the outcomes of 
world politics can be expressed as the consequences of the exercise of might 
(Brown, 1992: 66-67). Similarly, even the more sympathetic view of 
Morgenthau advanced by Molly Cochran, which acknowledges Morgenthau’s 
advocacy of an ethic of responsibility, still finds his approach to lie outside the 
field of International Politics. For Cochran, realism’s ethical stance is best 
understood as a preference for the alignment of national interests between 
states, something she argues falls short of a genuine ethical theory of 
International Relations (Cochran, 2016: 92). 
 
Consequently, given the privileged position that the long-standing view 
of realism holds in International Political Thought, no amount of research into 
the ethical dimensions of realism has so far been able to challenge the 
conventional view. It holds, therefore, that if we desire to see IPT find space for 
some form of realism in IPT ethical debates, then we require a standpoint which 
extends the depth and scope of realism as a normative approach to IR.  
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In this thesis, we intend to develop such an approach. And in the 
following sections, we assess further how a leading IPT theorist, Cochran, who 
adopts a pragmatist view of international ethics, succeeds in transcending IPT 
heritage approaches, such as cosmopolitanism, through the development of a 
dialogical and inclusivist approach to IR. However, notwithstanding its 
accomplishments, such an approach still does not adequately grasp the 
implications of human insufficiencies. As such, we argue that a gap opens up in 
this literature which embraces both a pragmatist view of dialogue and 
inclusivity (which we take to be an advance upon the heritage IPT approaches) 
as well as a more “tragic vision” of world politics. This is fruitful to our wider 
purposes because of the historical engagement of realism with tragedy, such as 




Section Three: The Importance of the Notion of Inclusivity within 
International Political Theory; from Cochran to Tragedy? 
 
IPT scholars are united by the fact that they are all engaged in a field that 
strives to create “shared principles for extending moral inclusion and social 
reconstruction in international practice” (Cochran, 1999: 2). Indeed, as Cochran 
argues, the goal of IPT in a discreet and principled sense is to strive towards and 
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defend inclusion as an ethical principle and outcome in international practice 
(Cochran, 1999: xix). The practical impact of such a definition is that it shapes 
the conception of the purpose inherent within the IPT tradition. Moreover, IPT 
theories can be judged as to whether or not they advance this overall goal. Thus, 
if a theory does not meet this goal it ought not to be considered within the 
boundaries of the tradition. Were we to develop a realist approach which is 
more firmly located within this tradition, it would hold that such an approach 
would foreground the principle of inclusion as well as dialogue in a manner not 
that dissimilar to Cochran’s own position.  
Cochran’s thesis is perhaps more radical than the mainstream approaches 
within IPT insofar as she argues from an epistemological perspective that the 
conceptual frameworks within IPT advance “universalising tendencies” which 
do harm by restricting dialogue with those who might conceive of ethics 
differently (Cochran, 1999: xix). Cochran's conception of IPT foregrounds the 
principle of inclusivity at the epistemological level and in turn exposes the 
limitations of various standpoints in light of that principle.   
The great significance for IPT of Cochran’s contribution is the extent to 
which she grasps the typology of the various standpoints within the field, and in 
turn shows how these approaches are epistemologically impregnated with 
“universalising tendencies” which underline their limitations as ethical 
approaches. In Cochran's view, such tendencies indicate an unwillingness to 
engage in what we suggest could be called dialogical openness when engaging 
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with identities grounded in distinctly different socio-historical and cultural 
worlds; the net effect being that such righteousness creates “possibilities for 
oppression and moral exclusion” (Cochran, 1999: xix).  
Cochran’s approach, which she describes as pragmatic, does succeed, 
however, in stressing how dialogue is central to inclusive international ethics. 
For Cochran, her “pragmatic” approach puts her in a position to examine her 
own cultural and historical contingencies as well as to expose how various 
ethical commitments and positions retain a measure of value even though they 
are grasped as contingent positions (Cochran, 1999: 273). Understanding the 
diversity of ethical positions in world politics requires an approach sensitive 
enough to grasp such diversity but not so sensitive as to undermine any ethical 
priority on the part of any one agent (Cochran, 1999: 278, 279). The key is to 
engage openly and in a spirit of acceptance and consolidation of norms so that a 
shared ethical world becomes possible. 
We maintain that Cochran’s contribution is very significant in terms of 
IPT insofar as it departs from the sort of ideal-theorisation found amongst 
scholars such as Beitz or Frost. It also retains a level of abstraction needed in 
order to speak coherently about ethics. Cochran’s turn towards a more sustained 
discussion of the epistemology of international ethical views is farsighted and 
provides a renewed way of thinking about ethical questions that is inherently 
pragmatic, dialogical and inclusive. By exposing how the sensitivities of diverse 
ethical and normative standpoints are often excluded from mainstream IPT, 
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Cochran illustrates how pragmatism contrasts favourably with heritage 
approaches. 
However, in a review of Cochran’s work, Hutchings argues that 
Cochran’s approach is contradictory insofar as she stresses the need for 
inclusivity and respecting the sensitivities of various ethical views while at the 
same time calling for power political and institutional reform at the level of 
world politics (Hutchings, 2000: 309). The only way in which such things could 
occur simultaneously is if an “optimistic reading of history” were to be correct 
(Hutchings, 2000: 310). We would put this in a different way: Cochran 
underplays the finiteness and insufficiencies of the self in relation to its capacity 
to generate shared ethical priorities amongst ethical traditions however diverse 
they are. There are limits to the extent to which moral imagination or dialogical-
engagement can put us in a position to unify around shared normative priorities.  
 
Such an approach lacks a “tragic vision” of life or world politics. 
Although a form of pragmatism based on dialogue and inclusiveness is 
desirable in principle owing to the advance that such an approach offers to IPT, 
it is profoundly lacking in its omission of tragedy from its theorisation.  
  A “tragic vision” of life, which stresses the need to learn our measures 
and the implications of our human insufficiencies, includes being able to 
reconcile differing accounts of what is right or good, (Mayall, 2012: 45; 
Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). It is completely unwarranted to engage in ethical 
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theorisation without a keen alertness about such limitations. Tragedy cannot be 
overlooked – and as Chris Brown argues passionately, IPT scholars such as 
Beitz entirely overlook the possibility that their normative theorising may 
involve contradictions within their shared ethical space (Brown, 2012: 82-83):  
 
“What to me, is important, is that we do not adopt Agamemnon’s solution to this 
dilemma and turn our backs on the tragic element of human existence. Instead, an 
awareness of tragedy ought to cause us to act modestly, to be aware of our limitations 
and to be suspicious of grand narratives of salvation which pretend that there are no 
tragic choices to be made” (Brown 2012: 83). 
 
Although perhaps not grand narratives, scholars like Walker, Beitz and 
Cochran typically involve themselves in the advancement of ethical and 
political priorities which do not engage in tragic reflections. The suggested 
priorities are not qualified by the context of contending values. They also fail to 
stress the insufficiencies of the self as tragedy does and as would seem to be 
warranted in a human existence defined by finiteness.  
As such, tragedy is a necessary part of ethical reflection. Thus, in order to 
address the limitations of Cochran’s otherwise excellent thesis, tragedy must 
play a role in the development of a form of pragmatism which is dialogical and 
inclusive if it is to address what is missing from this approach: i.e. an adequate 
appreciation of the insufficiencies of the self and the consequences of those 
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limitations for the realisation of ethics. Only then can its reliance upon an 
optimistic reading of history be overcome.  
 
Section Four: A Metra-focused Tragic Vision vs IR Tragedy 
 
A significant gap in the IPT literature is found in the absence of a 
dialogue between approaches which are similar to Cochran’s, i.e. pragmatic, 
dialogical, inclusivist and tragedian approaches to IR such as those advanced by 
Niebuhr or Morgenthau. In our view, contemporary tragedian approaches, such 
as those advanced by Richard Ned Lebow, are deficient in a very important 
aspect. They are either: (a) hubris-centred accounts, or they stress the value 
conflicts within one’s own ethical space, i.e. between good and good, but 
without adequately making it explicit that human insufficiencies prompt such 
conflicts; (b) they advance an understanding that tragedy serves an instrumental 
purpose in enabling the possibility that the consequences of human limitations 
can be transcended. In both these cases, they stand in contrast to an 
understanding of tragedy that focuses upon the metra of things and, in 
particular, the metra of the self. We explain below what we mean by metra. It is 
sufficient now simply to state that contemporary IR tragedy is lacking a 
rigorous examination of the role of this very important tragedian concept.  
Lebow (2003), has found it advantageous to build a renewed form of 
Classical Realism upon the terrain of a “tragic vision” of politics. However, 
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such an approach excessively emphasises the centrality of hubris and omits a 
discussion of metra/measures even though such a concept is central to many 
understandings of tragedy.  
In this section we discuss the notion of metra in more detail before 
moving onto explaining how it is that such a concept is missing from 
contemporary tragedian accounts within IR.  
In our understanding, tragedy is tied together with a series of constituent 
concepts. At the centre of these concepts is the notion of “metra”. Metra, for 
Saxonhouse, represents a certain kind of limitation or boundary that marks out 
what human beings can or cannot do using the instruments of their own 
intellectual, and specifically rational, capabilities (Ahrensdorf, 2011: 7; 
Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272).  
A better definition is provided by Raymond Prier, who does not address 
tragedy directly but does provide an understanding of the linguistic and cultural 
environment in which the notion of metra existed prior to its incorporation into 
tragedy. That is, Prier helps us understand the cultural context of tragedy, a 
context where the notion of metra was well known. Prier argues that the notion 
arises as early as Homer, Heraclitus and Pindar, and that it describes initially a 
holistic term that relates to a sense of completion or culmination of something 
(Prier, 1976: 161). The sense is that there are full measures (metron) of 
something or a full measure (metra) of things that can be proportioned by the 
self through their own judgement of what those proportions are (Prier, 1976: 
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162). In Hesiod, the metra is manifested as measures “of the loud-roaring sea” 
(Prier, 1976: 164). These measures are not exogenous to the self, but are noetic 
and exist as a means of managing the phenomena which impact upon life (Prier, 
1976: 166-169). Therefore, metron/metra can be conceived of as either a 
bounded sum or a completed sum, a measure or proportioned thing, and its 
manifestation is a reflection of the mind’s judgement through which such 
measuring takes place.  
To bring this back to tragedy, there is an association of justice or a just 
measure that takes place between agents as they determine legitimate exchange, 
such as gifts or punishment (Slatkin, 2003: 43). The measures become just 
measures, or fair measures that are due to be exchanged or not depending upon 
what is appropriate (Slatkin, 2003: 44-45). This association of metra and their 
just observation has considerable impact insofar as there are very serious 
implications to overstepping them (Prier, 1976: 165). The implication is that we 
ought to know our measures and, if we do, then we can act wisely (Prier, 1976: 
165). Metaphorically, (although the Greeks understood this literally and 
cosmologically) the vengeful and dark spirits known as the “furies” intervene in 
order to uphold the just measures of things (metra) – consequently, metra are 
not things to be “overstepped” (Prier, 1976: 165; Slatkin, 2003: 26). The fate of 
tragic heroes are linked, furthermore, to the furies and the consequences of 
metra.  
 36 
For Saxonhouse, the relationship between tragedy and metra becomes 
more explicit when the tragic poet Sophocles warns his audience that the furies 
will enforce the metra of things (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). Reason is 
particularly prone to overstepping the metra of things if left unchecked and 
relied upon by political actors striving to radically transform things or arrange 
them out of their pre-existing patterns, i.e. tyrants in the Greek sense of the term 
(Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272).  
This “trailblazing” study of Sophocles’ political thought identifies how 
agents are not in control of their situations even if they believe they have a 
rational grip upon them (Ahrensdorf, 2011: 6, 7; Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). 
Metra cannot be escaped from or conquered because it represents concrete 
boundaries and limitations upon the aspirations of those who strive to put 
reason to use in transforming the world (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). If we assess 
these two general views of metra, then we can see how they are more similar 
than different. Although Saxonhouse stresses how limits are overstepped by the 
tyrant's excessive reliance upon reasoning, this view is congruent with the 
notion of metra as proportioned just measures. Wisdom in both cases arises 
from an understanding of the measures of things.  
These definitions give us a conception of measures which can be applied 
to the notion of the self. The self has measures as well. Indeed, the self is 
defined both in terms of having the potential to act justly, but also by being 
insufficient in relation to certain aspects of life. The metra of the self is perhaps 
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the most tragic dimension of life insofar as we learn that we have limitations, 
both material and intellectual (noetic). Further, not only can we fail to 
adequately know the metra of things, as in the case of Oedipus, we can also fail 
to find answers to questions that require them, such as in the case of Antigone.  
Hubris is the retrospective realisation that the tragic hero has overstepped 
the metra of things and thus is struck down by the furies. It is not something 
which can be avoided, and it arises when the metra of things is not grasped 
sufficiently. Respecting the metra of things is critical to best coping with the 
implications of the self’s insufficiencies.   
To refocus on metra exposes contemporary IR tragedian approaches as 
having an inadequate grasp of tragedy as a manifestation of the self’s 
insufficiencies. Perhaps the most important scholar to engage with IR and 
tragedy, as well as to fall into the trap of understanding hubris to be arrogance 
rather than a retrospective grasping of where measures were transcended, is 
Richard Ned Lebow. Indeed, Lebow’s “tragic vision” of politics has a number 
of limitations, such as problematically suggesting how to realise “progress” (i.e. 
Western liberal progress) through the wisdom that tragedy seems to teach. 
Tragedy does not “teach” so much as illustrate the implications of human 
insufficiencies. Tragedy provides no lessons, but it does help explain and enable 
the audience to grasp life and the limits of the self intellectually and materially.  
 Lebow stresses the role of hubris in tragedy (Lebow, 2012: 64). Lebow 
conceives of tragedy in such a way that the political actor is taken to be 
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somehow at fault for his own arrogance and in some way to blame for his own 
dénouement (Lebow, 2012: 65). Miscalculation/hamartia are exposed by the 
arrogance of agents buoyed up by their own accomplishments. However, owing 
to the epistemological complexities of tragedy, it is not the fault of a tragic hero 
that they suffer, since there was no other way to act given the information 
available to them in the tragic scenario. Oedipus’s hubris is regrettable, but it is 
not avoidable. That the metra of things were overstepped is not in doubt, but it 
was not the fault of Oedipus, who could not have known that such a situation 
had unfolded. Lebow’s language implies the language of fault, as if hubris is 
something that can be avoided so long as certain balances are maintained 
(Lebow, 2012: 70). However, as Euben argues, it is glory, not humility, which 
drives Greek customs. As such, it is not a sin to be proud, since it is pride which 
enlivens the world and brings about great accomplishments such as those of 
Oedipus (Euben, 2012: 89). Tragedy alerts the audience to the limits of the self 
and its intellect and the importance of grasping the just measures of things as 
well as not overstepping them where possible. It is not there to assign fault; this 
would miss the point of exposing limitations. Arrogance can be overcome but 
our limitations and insufficiencies cannot be.  
 Lebow recruits Thucydidies to make his hubris-focused argument. 
Thucydides is read as a tragedian and as proffering great wisdom which ought 
to be engaged with today; the hope of world peace may well be advanced by 
engagement with this ancient scholar (Lebow, 2001: 547-560; Lebow, 2003: 
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chapters 2, 3; Lebow, 2012: 69). Moreover, Lebow’s Thucydides provides an 
account of the rise and fall of Athens that stresses the arrogance of Athenians 
and the role of hubris in their tragedy (Lebow, 2003: 116-117; 41, 116, 124-
125). Hubris is identified with the Athenian repudiation of pan-Hellenic norms, 
which might confer some measure of legitimacy upon their imperialism, as well 
as the naked and arrogant projection of power (Lebow, 2003: 41, 116, 124-
125). Therefore, Lebow’s account stresses the wisdom of anti-hubris, 
understood as a need to cloak imperial ambitions within societal norms which 
establish the legitimacy of the polis in question. An imperial polis such as 
Athens ought not to miscalculate its position, but arrogance can lead to such 
miscalculation. 
 Tragedy, however, exposes the measures of things and the implications of 
the self’s limits. It does not, in our view, suggest that were tragic heroes to 
cohere their interests with the ethics of a particular society then this would be 
sufficient to avoid hubris. Oedipus and Antigone are people of conscience and it 
is this concern for shared ethics and norms which drives their emotional distress 
and suffering. They were most certainly trying to act within the framework of 
socially normative ethics of Hellenic society; circumstances, however, did not 
permit them to act in this manner. Tragedy does not teach that pride cometh 
before the fall.  
 A tragic vision that centres upon metra might well discuss the extent to 
which Athenians overstepped their metra and thus suffered a defeat at the hands 
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of Sparta. Such a vision would imply that Athens should have more adequately 
grasped its metra and understood its limitations.  
 Lebow’s vision, in contrast, emphasises how arrogance is the driving force 
behind what he describes as a “cycle” whereby hubris occasions a sequence of 
outcomes ending in nemesis or catastrophe (Lebow, 2012: 65). The ethical 
priority for Lebow is to create an “antidote” to hubris and thus transcend the 
tragic condition itself (Lebow, 2012: 66). This is, in our view, not consistent 
with a tragedian understanding of life or human existence. Tragedy is, in these 
hubris-centred approaches, reduced to an instrument through which liberal 
notions of international progress are advanced. Our account of metra, by 
contrast, equips the IR theorist with an understanding of tragedy that is 
consistent with human insufficiencies. Our question ought to be how best to 
grasp the metra of things, rather than how to avoid hamartia. 
 It would be wrong to argue that Lebow’s tragic vision is unaware of the 
metra of things, but such an awareness is advanced as a resource in order to help 
advance liberal progress in world politics. Moreover, Lebow does not advocate 
an understanding of the need to grasp and manage “the irremediable, 
ineluctable, inescapable” parts of life (Nietzsche in: Frei 2001: 187). By 
contrast, Lebow argues that his tragic vision can provide some kind of ‘antidote 
to hubris’ through a process of balancing that he associates with the concept of 
sophrosunē (Lebow 2012: 70): 
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“If thoughtful Greeks could observe our world, and rethink their understanding of the 
human conditions in light of modern conditions and possibilities, they might conclude 
that the golden mean – the medan agan, so central to their approach to life – describes a 
position somewhere between ancient acceptance and modern activism. If so, it would 
find expression in cautious hopes for progress, tempered by awareness of the dangers of 
forgetting the inherent limitations of human beings” (Lebow, 2012: 70). 
 
 Consequently, progress can employ an “awareness” of the metra of the self 
as a resource to undermine such limitations. Other checks upon the 
consequences of human limitations that Lebow provides include the notion of 
shared social norms. Athenian ascendency, for Lebow, is something contingent 
upon self-restraint and exercising power in accordance with clearly defined 
‘social conventions’ governing the behaviour and language of the Greeks 
(Erskine and Lebow, 2012b: 206). Thucydides, for Lebow:   
  
“finds that nomos – a concept that also encompasses values, norms, expectations and 
obligations embedded in relationships – shapes identities and channels and restrains the 
behaviour of individuals or societies” (Lebow, 2003: 117). 
  
 A secure and prosperous society depends upon social and ethical 
conventions that are built up and maintained through reasoning and intelligence 
(Lebow, 2003: 41). These checks upon the consequences of the metra of the self 
put the liberal activist in a position to advance progress in world politics. This, 
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however, misses the point of tragedy which explains that the metra of things 
cannot be transcended through elaborate checks upon the consequences of such 
insufficiencies. A metra-centred tragic vision would stress the importance of 
understanding the measures of things and of the self and aiming to exercise 
wisdom in light of the possibility that such measures may not be known to the 
agent.  
 There are elements of Lebow’s thought that we agree with in terms of his 
account of the implications of human limitations even if Lebow argues that such 
implications can be checked by things like shared social norms or self-
awareness. Lebow is correct to argue that the political agent which views itself 
as unchecked by limitations eventually comes to believe themselves to have the 
same eminence as divine beings (Lebow, 2012: 64). The consequences of not 
grasping the metra of the self for the political agent is thus that political 
successes, such as those in foreign policy, act to simulate excessive confidence 
in one's abilities. This leads to over-confidence and hubris (Lebow, 2012: 64):   
  
“Hubris is manifest as over-confidence in one’s own judgement and ability to control 
events. It encourages leaders and followers to mistake temporary ascendency for a 
permanent state of affairs” (Lebow 2012: 64). 
  
 In this interpretation of Thucydides, Athens makes strategic 
miscalculations, hamartia, which reveal how the qualities of “cleverness, self-
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confidence, forethought, decisiveness, initiative and risk taking” become the 
very fuel of over-confidence and an unwarranted lust for power (Lebow, 2007: 
406):  
“For Pericles, and the citizens of Athens, success stimulates the appetite for further 
success while blinding them to the attendant risks” (Lebow, 2007: 2034). 
  
 For Lebow, Thucydides is seen to provide an account of hubris 
concomitant with hamartia, i.e. miscalculation arising from the seductive effect, 
atē, of power (Lebow, 2007: 407). This is consistent with a metra-focused 
account of tragedy insofar as the agent is revealed to have a certain self-
destroying dynamic deriving from an ignorance of the metra of things. This is 
the case for Oedipus.  
 The TIR debate, however, goes beyond the work of Lebow. This is a broad 
outline of the debate between Rengger, Frost and Mayall. Rengger has 
described the debate between James Mayall and Mervyn Frost as one where 
Frost is presented as “too progressive, optimistic and teleological” and Mayall 
as overemphasizing the tragic in international affairs (Rengger, 2005: 321). 
Mayall defends himself against this by arguing that tragedy has its uses in the 
moderating of arrogance, hubris, and progressive thought; the obstacles to the 
progress that Frost desires are greater than he supposes (Rengger, 2005: 321). 
Rengger argues that although Frost may resist the notion of a tragic reality, he 
would nonetheless agree with Mayall and Lebow that “the real importance of 
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tragic vision is that it allows us to understand our situation better and learn from 
this so that we can make it better still” (Rengger, 2005: 323).  
 
 Rengger goes on to argue that Morgenthau may not have viewed tragedy in 
this way (Rengger, 2005: 323). In Rengger's view, Morgenthau did not think 
that tragedy could be used for the purposes suggested by Frost, Mayall and 
Lebow, since Morgenthau’s pessimism ran deeper than these thinkers. Lebow, 
for instance, contends that reflexive awareness of tragedy can create positive 
feedback and therefore escape its worst excesses (Rengger, 2005: 324). 
 These IR theorists kept alive the important role that tragedy can play in IR, 
even inspiring an IR and tragedy debate in recent decades. This debate, which 
has largely bookended, suggests a kind of progress-enabling and liberal tragic 
understanding within IR. Rengger argues that the recent IR debate about the 
notion of tragedy began with Mayall and Frost and mostly concerned the 
manner in which overly progress-enabling approaches to world politics may not 
be fully aware of the limitations that exist in regard to the realisation of 
international progress (Rengger, 2012: 53).  
 For Rengger, the views of Mayall and Frost on tragedy do not undermine 
their commitment to the view that there are substantial possibilities for the 
realisation of a normative and ethical order in the international 
system/international society to a greater (Frost) or lesser (Mayall) degree 
(Rengger, 2012: 53). Rengger holds that what unites scholars of tragedy and IR, 
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such as Mayall, Frost, and Richard Ned Lebow, is their emphasis on how a 
“tragic vision” serves as an enabler for social learning; the very experience of 
repeating cycles of tragedy occasions opportunities to enrich our learning and 
make us better placed to meet future challenges (Rengger, 2012: 57). As 
Rengger argues, Mayall, Frost and Lebow draw upon tragedy in the hope that 
the insights that tragedy proffers may enable a greater realisation of liberal 
progress in world politics than would be possible were we to remain in 
ignorance of these insights.   
 Frost argues that tragedy, and in particular the insights generated by the 
application of the tragic concept of the agon to the ethical questions of 
international relations, provides insights that help normative theorists to deepen 
their understanding of ethical problems in international practice (Frost, 2012: 
32). The agon is for Frost a defining feature of tragedy: its value is found in the 
way in which it exposes how the realisation of certain, broadly speaking, 
“normative” values frequently come at the expense of another privileged value 
within the identity of the normative actor (Frost, 2012: 28). Indeed, Antigone 
found herself “part of an agon among fractious and divided systems of 
signification” (Honig, 2013: 2). Frost argues that normative theorists can 
employ a deeper understanding of the tragic agon – that is, the inherent 
contradiction between positive ethical and moral values – in order to better 
identify value conflicts as well as deepening our understanding of these 
conflicts (Frost, 2012: 32):  
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“It alerts us to the relationships that hold between an actor, the wider society within 
which he or she is constituted as an actor of a certain kind, ethics and the consequences 
of his or her acts” (Frost, 2012: 32). 
  
 Thus, tragedy brings into focus which ‘social formations’ constitute value 
conflicts and thereby, implies Frost, puts modern human beings into a position 
to transform such formations and hence potentially dissolve the value conflict 
(Frost, 2012: 41-42). Such qualified optimism is echoed by Mayall insofar as 
his position accords with Lebow’s emphasis upon social learning (Reggner, 
2012: 57).   
 Indeed, Mayall argues that although tragedy may best explain certain parts 
of international relations, these relations take place within the institutional 
setting of an international society (Mayall, 2012: 51). Mayall argues that there is 
an opposition between the idea of progress on the one hand and tragedy (with its 
attendant value conflicts) on the other. However, his position remains that the 
hubris of progress can be diagnosed by tragedy and cured by the “antidote” of 
tragedy (Mayall, 2012: 45). Like Frost, Mayall is arguing that tragedy can be a 
path towards a form of progress defined by anti-hubris, but a better form of 
progress nonetheless (Mayall, 2012: 45). These liberal and progress-enabling 
tragic visions, however, are not metra-focused tragedian. Prosaically, they are 
liberal constructivists who aim to extract tragic insights from various sources 
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and employ them instrumentally as a conceptual tool kit designed for modern 
IR scholars who seek to realise their ethical priorities. 
 
Tragedy does not teach, let alone provide enlightened roadmaps to more 
progressive liberal ethical outcomes. The modern progress-enabling liberal 
constructivists, such as Lebow and Frost, miss the point of tragedy entirely from 
the perspective of a tragic vision that focuses upon the metra of things; some 
measures of which cannot be transcended. As Morgenthau wrote in his letter to 
Oakeshott, tragedy is a dimension of life (Rengger, 2012: 59). Ethical and 
political imperatives and priorities must be consistent with an awareness of the 
metra of things including the self, not to transcend such limitations but rather to 
reflect such measures within such normative views.  
 
Section Five: dialogue between a standpoint which is pragmatic, inclusivist, 
and dialogical and IR realist approaches which engage with tragedy 
 
In this literature review we have identified three gaps in the IR/IPT/realist 
literatures: (a) that there is in pragmatism great value in terms of an approach 
which is inclusivist and dialogical, and that the contribution of Cochran to IPT 
has been significant in introducing pragmatism into IPT. However, pragmatism, 
as it is understood in Cochran, suffers from an optimistic understanding of 
history. The application of a tragic vision of politics would address this 
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shortfall; (b) that the existing tragedian approaches in contemporary IR either 
focus upon hubris as the central concept of tragedy or in general advance a view 
of tragedy that conceives of the metra of things as something to be transcended 
through social learning. There is a need to revive the tragedy and IR debate by 
focusing it upon the notion of metra/measures which in many cases cannot be 
overcome; (c) there is, further, a need to address the absence of a more 
developed realist ethical standpoint within IPT.  
We in this thesis therefore aim to address these three lacunae 
simultaneously through a dialogue between a pragmatist approach, which 
stresses inclusivity and dialogue, and realist approaches which have engaged 
seriously with tragedy. These realist approaches must not view the limitations 
and insufficiencies of things or the self as things which could be overcome. The 
pragmatist approach must also have some notion of the limits of things.  
On the latter point, the thought of John Dewey would serve well insofar 
as it is heavily dialogical and inclusivist. Indeed, it has been already been noted 
by two eminent Deweyan scholars that there are “tragic” dimensions to his 
thought (see Hook, 1974; Rogers, 2009: 187). This would suggest a more 
fruitful dialogue than using James or Peirce.  
As for the realists, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr have been 
said to have tragedian approaches to world politics (Frost, 2012: 22-23). At the 
very least these approaches advance an understanding of human limitations and 
a strong view that such limitations cannot be transcended. These two meet our 
 49 
requirements because they are considered realists, in particular Classical 
Realists, and they engage with and produce tragic accounts of world politics.  
Our dialogue between these three scholars is therefore manifested as a 
need to address the three gaps in the literature that we have examined. An 
alternative understanding of the nature of world politics is needed, an approach 
which extends the scope and depth of realism as a normative theory of IR (an 
International Political Theory) through a dialogue with John Dewey’s 
pragmatism. In order to create a dialogue between these three scholars that also 
meets our need to better address the concept of the metra of things in relation to 
tragedy, we advance a research question that addresses this need throughout the 
thesis. Our research question is thus: to what extent can Deweyan pragmatism, 
in particular Dewey’s understanding of the “metra” of things, provide an 
alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the “tragic” nature of 
International Relations? 
This research question implies that our analysis of John Dewey will 
examine the extent to which his thought does indeed cohere with our 
understanding of the metra of things and the metra of the self. Following such 
an examination, the dialogue with the two scholars will put us in a situation 
where we are able to establish the extent to which Dewey’s approach does 
indeed provide an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world 
politics. As Dewey’s approach is pragmatic, inclusive and dialogical, it falls 
within the boundaries of IPT. If it can be demonstrated that it provides an 
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account of metra, through which an alternative understanding of the tragic 
nature of world politics can be constituted, then such an approach would not 
only bridge the gap between realism and pragmatism, it would also create a 





Chapter Two: Hermeneutic Methodology  
 
Section One: Advancing a Richer Understanding Through a Fusion of 
Horizon 
 
In this section, we articulate a number of hermeneutic concepts which 
will be employed instrumentally to aid interpretation of the standpoints (texts) 
we critically analyse. The interpretation that we constitute will become 
increasingly enriched throughout our analysis and thus represents the 
enrichment of our horizon. In this way we show our workings, so to speak, and 
put the reader in a position to understand how our enriched horizon is reached 
as well as to grasp the end product of this process of cultivation. Our thesis is 
one of enriching our horizons through the interpretation of the texts. Our 
methodology is inspired by the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-George 
Gadamer, although our own approach does not map directly onto his thought as 
we will explain in this chapter.   
In our view, hermeneutics is an excellent approach for understanding the 
relationship between texts (as part of language) and how the interpreter 
manifests the language practices inherent within life (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). 
Language is a central concept within hermeneutics insofar as it conceives of the 
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world linguistically (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). Gadamer offers us an alternative 
methodological view to orthodox empiricist approaches as well as one 
consistent with our method of an enriching horizon of understanding (Gadamer, 
2013: xx): 
 
“Even from its historical beginnings, the problem of hermeneutics goes 
beyond the limits of the concept of method as set by modern science, but 
obviously belongs to human experience of the world in general. The 
hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of method at all. It is 
not concerned with a method of understanding by means of which texts are 
subjected to scientific investigation like all other objects of experience. It is 
not concerned primarily with amassing verified knowledge, such as would 
satisfy the methodological ideal of science – yet it too is concerned with 
knowledge and truth” (Gadamer 2013: xx). 
 
In other words, the hermeneutic approach has an open epistemological 
view, and conceives of the hermeneutic phenomenon (i.e. understanding itself) 
as something which can include natural scientific knowledge but does not 
restrict itself to just this knowledge or truth.  
Gadamer’s approach to questions of ‘truth’ and the interpretive method 
owes much to his long engagement with a variety of philosophical traditions 
that can make the trajectory of his thought difficult to discern (Wachterhauser, 
1999: 1-2; Warnke, 1987: 1-4). Indeed, Gadamer would seem to advance the 
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general view that the depth of understanding of a particular subject-matter is a 
measure of the quality of the interpretation (Schmidt, 2006: 95-97). Moreover, 
Gadamer is skeptical of ahistorical views that ignore how interpretations are 
situated within historical contingencies (Schmidt, 2006: 98). Nevertheless, in 
spite of this commitment to the principle that there is no theory-independent 
knowledge, Gadamer does advance an understanding of truth that leans towards 
ontological realism (Wachterhauser, 1999: 59) 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics makes the ontological argument that 
there are essences which are integrated within the mind with thought and 
its manifestation of language (Wachterhauser, 1999: 57):  
 
“For Gadamer, these realities do not change in themselves. In this respect 
these noetic realities are like Platonic Ideas. But our grasp of them changes as 
history gives us access to some different, highly variegated side of them. 
These realities are what they are apart from our apprehension of them but 
their “look” varies, their appearances in time are widely varied. Nevertheless, 
a limited, finite grasp of them is possible through interpretation even though 
that interpretation can never claim to be timeless, eternal, definitive, or 
exhaustive” (Wachterhauser 1999: 57). 
 
Gadamer, who considered himself to be a Platonist, embraces the 
notion of “truth of being” occurring in “the ideality of language” 
(Gadamer, 2013: 118; Wachterhauser, 1999: xi). Indeed, essences occur 
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not in a domain external to language, but rather in language itself 
(Wachterhauser, 1999: 59): 
“Gadamer is an ‘essentialist’ of a nonconventional sort in that he insists that 
real essences are not to be found outside language but in language. 
Nevertheless, such essences are not mere language. Hermeneutic, for 
Gadamer, is not a nominalist enterprise. Despite the emphasis on the 
Sprachlichkeit der Sachen selbst, these things have an ideality that is not 
reducible to words. Consistent with his Platonic roots, Gadamer remains a 
metaphysical realist” (Wachterhauser, 1999: 59). 
 
However, we are not persuaded of the need to embrace an 
ontologically realist standpoint. The hermeneutic position that Gadamer 
develops is comprehensively linguistic in its understanding of the world. 
In this thesis, we aim to remain consistent with this dimension of 
Gadamer’s approach, even if this is a departure from his wider thought. 
This is why we describe our methodology as being inspired by 
Gadamerian philosophy rather than being fully representative of it. The 
“essences” that Gadamer speaks of are thus, in this thesis, understood to 
be contingent and limited “truth-claims” that indicate our ontological-
normative priorities.  
Gadamer captures how the interpreter “grasps” (reaches an 
understanding of) those things with which we come into contact; and for 
Gadamer this grasping represents a truth-event (Wachterhauser, 1999: 
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24). In our hermeneutic approach, by contrast, we conceive of grasping 
as an event of understanding. This event of understanding occurs 
through a process of interpretation that draws our own horizon into the 
horizon presented by the texts.  
Gadamer views language as a central concept within hermeneutics insofar 
as it conceives of the world as a linguistic construct. In this view, language is a 
mechanism for the disclosure of the world (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). In contrast, 
we consider language to disclose our interpretation of the world as consistent 
with our own horizons.  
However, there remain many aspects of Gadamer’s thought that 
we continue to draw upon in the development of our methodology. For 
example, we adopt the Gadamarian notion of the fusion of horizons in 
order to build our thesis of enriching our understanding of the texts we 
analyse.  
We argue, along with Gadamer and Palmer, that hermeneutics is a 
“transpersonal” approach which conceives of the notion of the “world” to be 
“seen as between persons. It is the shared understanding between persons, and 
the medium of this understanding” (Palmer, 1969: 205-206, 206). Furthermore, 
this experience is something which “occurs in and through” language (Palmer, 
1969: 207).  
The difference between our approach and orthodox naturalism is that we 
do not regard experience as somehow prior to language, but rather as something 
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that also happens within language itself (Palmer, 1969: 207). It is in language 
that the self is constituted and it is through the experience of language that the 
self “grasps” the world. Moreover, it is in the medium of thought that 
understanding is obtained (Gadamer, 2013: xxi). Much like Thomas Kuhn, for 
whom there is also no language-independent account of reality, Gadamer 
understands interpretations of what is real to be rooted in the situations of the 
interpreter (Warnke, 1987: 77).  
Central to our hermeneutic approach is the concept of horizons and the 
fusion of horizons. Gadamer’s reflections on horizons are central to our 
understanding of the concept in this thesis (Dostal, 2002: 3):  
 
“The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind, we 
speak of narrowness of horizons, of the possible expansion of horizon, of 
the opening up of new horizons, and so forth”. (Gadamer, 2013: 313). 
  
Gadamer continues: 
“A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-
values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, “to have a horizon” means 
not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it. A person 
who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this 
horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small” (Gadamer, 2013: 313). 
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We interpret these quotes to mean that a horizon represents a field of 
vision containing meanings that we employ in order to make sense of and grasp 
our world. It is within our horizon that our pre-judgements or prejudices are 
found, and these are understood in a positive sense to make understanding 
possible.  
Prejudices in hermeneutics are not controversial, rather they are 
necessary insofar as their absence would make it impossible to make sense of 
any standpoint or text (Crowe, 2019: 224; Warnke, 1987: 76). These 
assumptions or prejudices/pre-judgements are part of the present and they come 
into tension with the (past) texts in such a way that their alterity is productive. 
The interpreter’s (in this case the author's) personal horizon extends 
outwards towards the horizon of the heritage of text/standpoint as a dialogue 
between the two is established (Gadamer, 2013: 313). The interpreter thus 
comes to understand more than she did before. By necessity, this changes the 
horizon of the hermeneutician, who cannot escape how her horizon has been 
“broadened” through the dialogue (Palmer, 1969: 201). 
The horizon of the present is in a process of dynamic renewal as our 
prejudices are constantly tested (Gadamer, 2013: 317). Such testing often arises 
from the tension between our present horizon and the horizons of the past, 
including our own heritage (Gadamer, 2013: 317). As we illustrated above, the 
epistemological posture of hermeneutics is to be open towards embracing 
accounts of knowledge and truth that go beyond those delimited by naturalistic 
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philosophy. This openness is also evident in how the fusion of past and present 
horizons takes place.  
Indeed, as a result of the encounter with alternative horizons, the 
interpreter's horizon can transform its identity as its pre-judgements/prejudices 
are enriched and transformed through a better understanding of different and 
past horizons. This is a hermeneutical experience based on an “encounter 
between heritage in the form of a transmitted text and the horizon of the 
interpreter” (Palmer, 1969: 207). This “encounter with tradition” is manifested 
in the form of “questioning and seeking truth” (Gadamer, 2013: 313, 375). 
The fusion of horizon takes place within a hermeneutical conversation or 
dialogue, where the interpreter engages in “re-awakening” the meanings of a 
historical horizon (found within the historical text):  
 
“In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that 
he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into 
play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says” 
(Gadamer, 2013: 406). 
 
This is how we will apply hermeneutic philosophy in this thesis. We aim 
to “re-awaken” the meanings of the texts that we will study, and then further to 
that, we will advance our horizon and thereby make our own interpretation of 
what the text means. That is, we will enrich our horizon by fusing it with the 
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other horizons studied in this thesis. This approach mobilises our prior 
prejudices in order to create a cycle of interpretation which brings about a better 
understanding of a historical text (Schmidt, 2006: 101; Wachterhauser, 1999: 
9). A deeper level of understanding becomes possible, albeit one which “can 
never claim to be timeless, eternal, definitive, or exhaustive (Wachterhauser, 
1999: 57).  
Gadamer encourages us to “hear” what a text/standpoint has to say on a 
particular subject, to give it a fair hearing, and to be open to the possibility that 
one’s own understanding might evolve through this process of hearing and 
participating through language. As Palmer states: 
 
“Because through hearing, through language, one gains access to the logos, to the 
world to which we belong. It is precisely this deeper dimension, this ontological 
dimension accessible through language, that gives the hermeneutical experience its 
significance for the present life of the interpreter” (Palmer, 1969: 209). 
 
It is for this reason that, in our view, standpoints and texts are in effect 
“answers” to historic questions; and to disclose these questions is to grasp the 
value of the text/standpoint to the interpreter’s own understanding of the 
subject-matter (Palmer, 1969: 199-200). They are attempts to grasp the world to 
which we belong and the answers that they provide can indeed continue to offer 
us insights that continue to challenge our prejudices. Indeed, such a feedback 
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loop inherent within the fusion of horizons could go on indefinitely (Palmer, 
1969: 198-200; Wachterhauser, 1999: 51-53).  
This dialogue must be situated within the medium of language and can 
never escape this situation and look down upon it from an external vantage 
point (Gadamer, 2013: 312). The alterity within this dialogue is thus the 
dynamic interaction between the consciousness of the interpreter and the 
heritage (and answers to historical questions) embedded within the text 
(Gadamer, 2013: 312). When we engage dialogically with Morgenthau, or 
Dewey or Niebuhr, we look to the answers that these scholars provided to the 
questions that they considered significant. These answers necessarily have an 
impact on shaping the vorurteile of the interpreter through a process of 
broadening (Palmer, 1969: 201).  
The dialogue between the interpreter and the texts/standpoints in this 
thesis does not aim to end conversations pertaining to the subject-matters we 
research. On the contrary, “the process of fusion” of (present) horizon with 
(past) horizon is never ending and forever emerging as “something of living 
value” (Gadamer, 2013: 317).  
A new understanding of the text must in principle be unable to claim that 
this particular understanding is the actual truth of the text. The openness of 
dialogue also opens up the possibility of an open ended discussion with a new 
interpreter forever finding new latent meanings within the same text, thus 
opening up the possibility of a forever evolving debate and the disclosing of 
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new meanings in the text that are no longer bound to the original meaning of the 
texts made by their authors. All texts are living texts that can evolve into new 
meanings through the processes of hermeneutic interpretation and the fusion of 
horizons. Indeed, such a process of grasping serves to enrich and cultivate the 
interpreter whose prejudices are strained and compelled to experience “a kind of 
continual formation and re-formation” (Crowe, 2019: 228). 
For the sake of methodological clarity, in this chapter we outline below 
the various “tragedian” concepts that shape our vorurteile, or what one might 
call the author’s tragedian bias. Our vorurteile is shaped by our understanding 
of the metra/metron of things, i.e. “boundaries” in the archaic sense, and our 
understanding of how metra/metron shapes tragic notions of hubris and the 
agon. Methodologically, we bring our vorurteile to bear upon the 
texts/standpoints of Dewey, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. In doing so, we produce 
an interpretation of the answers they provide to the questions they maintain are 
significant. However, as this is an open approach, we aim to hear these texts as 
they are transmitted through the universal linguisticality of worlds in such a 
way that we are open to permitting this heritage and its horizons to advance our 
understanding dialogically (Palmer, 1969: 207-209). That is, the world (logos) 
in some part opens itself up to (discloses itself) to the interpreter and thus 
moulds and shapes the interpreter’s identity, understandings and vorurteile 
(Palmer, 1969: 209).  
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Methodologically, then, we perform a dual task. On one level we aim to 
interpret – or in our own sense of the term, to “grasp” – the heritage/legacy texts 
employing our own conceptual (tragedian) understanding. On the other level, 
we will maintain an openness to the heritage standpoints/texts such that we as 
hermeneutician “hear” these texts and learn from them the implications for our 
own understandings and prejudices. In the following section, we illustrate the 
concepts that are constitutive of our prejudices in this specific methodological 
sense. These concepts will be used instrumentally throughout the thesis as a 
means of interpreting the meaning of the heritage/legacy texts/standpoints.  
 
Section Two: The Horizon of the Interpreter (Tragic Horizon) 
 
As part of the methodology, this section explains our own grasp of 
tragedy as it is understood to the interpreter. It is on this basis that we can speak 
of having a tragedian horizon through which we will show “our workings”. To 
make this clear, what we are doing in this section is to establish how it is that 
we understand tragedy. The implications of this are that our horizon has been 
deliberately embedded with an understanding of tragedy and metra which we 
will discuss in this section. It is this bias, or prejudice/pre-judgement, that 
enables the hermeneutician with the means through which an interpretation is 
possible in the first instance. In our case, we “grasp” tragedy in a particular 
way and employ such an understanding instrumentally as part of the 
 63 
interpretive practice of bringing my horizon to bear upon the texts of the three 
principal scholars in this thesis.  
We grasp tragedy as illustrating the measures of human life through a 
process of bringing the audience into the tragic performance, and thus, teaching 
this audience the implications of not adequately understanding or respecting the 
metra of things. Our understanding of tragedy is expressible in a manner 
consistent with an ontology that maintains the role of language in constituting 
social worlds. Indeed, at the heart of tragedy is the notion of a riddle that cannot 
be answered due to the intellectual insufficiency of the tragic agent. In the case 
of Oedipus, the tragic agent is revealed to have a measure of human 
intelligence, the consequence of which is a worthy but delimited 
accomplishment: “Oedipus did save Thebes” and his abilities are indeed worthy 
of glory (Euben, 2012: 89). However, crucially, this is not the end of the story. 
The resolution of one set of riddles reorients the tragic agent towards asking 
new questions, so discovering the existence of seemingly new but harder 
riddles. Indeed, in the case of Oedipus the resolution of the Sphinx’s riddle 
leads him to discover how he acted historically, revealing himself to be the true 
monster of the tragedy (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1988: 45, 214-216). The 
resolving of riddles thus ultimately brings him some epistemological clarity and 
a clear line of sight to the inherent metra/measures of things exposed throughout 
his accomplishments (Euben, 1990: 57). 
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Tragedy, indeed, exposes the self to “problems that defy resolution” 
(Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1988: 242). Moreover, it exposes the 
insufficiencies of the self in terms of finding solutions to value-conflicts which 
are internal to one’s own ethical space (Aristotle, 1982: 59). But for Oedipus 
tragedy has a forceful impact as he is left with a question that he is unable to 
answer: how to live properly in full knowledge of his past actions. In our view, 
tragedy exposes the conditions of existence in which human beings live in 
exactly this way. We need to know the truth of our reality as well as how to live 
correctly, but we cannot find answers owing to our own flaws as limited beings. 
The world we constitute through our social and linguistic practices is takes the 
form that it does in part as a reflection of the limitations and insufficiencies of 
human beings. The manifestation of the world is formed in a way that reflects 
our delimited intellect, our measures/metra, and therefore falls short of 
becoming a world that is truly satisfactory. We consequently find ourselves 
caught between the longings of our mind to reach satisfaction and the delimited 
capacity to build a world that could accomplish such a feat. This is our own 
eminently personal tragedy (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). 
 
Tragedy is bound up with and relies upon the conception of measures 
which we developed in the literature review. However, we do distinguish in this 
thesis between an account of metra which can but should not be breached by the 
self’s choices, and an account of metra where the self is powerless to breach 
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such limits even if it was so inclined to do owing to its inherent insufficiencies. 
Our grasping of tragedy builds outwards from the role that we think that metra 
plays: the downstream consequences of human measures is that tragedy can 
illustrate the inability of the self to reconcile conceptions of what is good, and 
consequently is caught within the agony of an tragic agon from which it cannot 
escape. And tragedy also illustrates how the self often overshoots its legitimate 
measures and is brought low as a result. This is the notion of tragic hubris. The 
concepts of metra, and then agon and hubris, combine to form our grasping of 
tragedy, and thus forms our pre-judgments going into the practice of 
interpreting the texts of the three scholars.  
 
One has to feel tragedy in order to understand its impact; the essence (as 
we use the term) of tragedy is knowable in the suffering of Oedipus who in his 
blindness is left groping for his daughters all the while alert to the agony that his 
accomplishments, built upon the exercise of reason to solve riddles, are 
manifestations of the overshooting of legimate metra and are therefore also acts 
of hubris (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270-1271). The false confidence of Oedipus, 
bolstered by his successes in using reason to defeat the Sphinx and save Thebes, 
evaporates in an instant and we are left with a crushed king who is left ruined 
and in a state of failure.  
The audience undergoes the experience of living out tragedy by proxy 
and, in doing so, acquires an emotional character and a normative identity that 
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is changed by the experience; the practice of reasoning can usher in the light but 
also darkness. Metra is embedded in all human accomplishments, including the 
outcome of ethical practices.  
The tragic agōn arises from the metra inherent in identity. Indeed, in 
tragedy the agent is represented as undermining her own identity (at least in 
part) as a result of the fact that the implementation of one value must come at 
the expense of another. That is, the metra of human capacity/intellect, 
discourses and practices, acts to limit the choices of the agent who must 
sacrifice some values for the sake of others. Even declining to choose is itself an 
action that invites normative consequences. The agent is motivated by 
legitimate and justifiable values but encounters a sort of riddle, in the broadest 
sense of the term, the confrontation with which reveals the metra embedded 
within her identity and thus reveals its problematic nature.  
Like Oedipus, Antigone’s father, who was blind to the choices embedded 
within his own accomplishments, Antigone’s own limits are manifested as a 
blindness to the possibilities of creativity and the vitality of life which leads her 
down a path of self-destruction (Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Antigone’s 
unflinching piousness to the God of death, Hades, and unwillingness to concern 
herself with matters which might create or renew life, leads her down a path of 
achieving glory only through her own moment of death (Saxonhouse, 1986: 
409). Even Antigone’s very name implies the arch of her character: anti-gone 
meaning against birth and suggesting a denial of the renewing dimensions of 
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life (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Moreover, Creon’s unflinching denial of the 
practices of funeral and kinship leads him to practice justice in such a way as to 
cause real consequences for him and for Antigone, whose self-destruction is 
something that Creon supremely regrets (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). The 
shock for the audience is that Antigone and Creon are trapped by their metra 
and unable to think their way out of this riddle. Thus, like a runaway train, they 
are destined to crash into ruination. 
Whereas it is the vitality of creativity and life which raises up Oedipus 
only to bring him down, for Antigone it is her opposition to the vitality of 
creativity, something implied by her name anti-gone meaning against birth, 
which leads her into opposition against Creon’s law passed against the bonds of 
kinship (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Antigone is even willing to hang herself, 
rather than extend her life inside her tomb, in order to quicken her reunion with 
her dead father and brothers (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408). Antigone’s metra is 
manifested, thus, as a blindness to the value of life which leads to a denial of its 
own possibility: that is, the very denial of life that her actions represent are 
themselves practices that obtain in failure.  
When “undergoing” the theatre of tragedy, the audience undergoes an 
emotional learning curve which results in their perspective being changed and 
their identity enriched. In IR, tragedy teaches insights by provoking emotional 
and ethical learning which allows the audience to experience vicariously the 
consequences of eminence by exposing hubris and its relationship to perceived 
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eminence (Erskine and Lebow, 2012a: 186-187). Hubris is our third tragic 
concept and we view it once more as a consequence of human metra and the 
impact of the furies, and not as a manifestation of selfish pride as portrayed by 
Ned Lebow.  
Hubris is not something that is, in tragedy, associated with pride per se. 
Indeed, the audience of a tragedy witnesses and experiences how the 
employment of our rational intellect is something worthy and generates a great 
measure of authority (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1264). The employment of reason 
engenders accomplishments, just as Oedipus is able to abstract a wider context 
from clues – e.g. he reasons that a child or an old priest, a baby or a fool, are all 
of ‘man’ manifested in different ways (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). Oedipus 
transcends the particularity of his world and thus establishes a measure of 
confidence in the practice of employing reasoning. In so doing, he becomes 
convinced that such practices give him a greater measure of freedom than would 
seem warranted by custom or tradition or even the divines (Saxonhouse, 1988: 
1267).  
Sophocles juxtaposes the “seer” with Oedipus and leaves the audience in 
no doubt as to the tension between Oedipus’s confidence in the power of his 
reasoning and the religious order to which the audience subscribes (the Ancient 
Greek religion) (Euben, 1990: 108). The “seer” is not presented as the 
representative of archaic and dogmatic backwardness but rather as a legitimate 
and worthy authority (Euben, 1990: 108). Thus, it would seem that it is pride or 
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overconfidence in the power of reasoning which leads to his nemesis. Yet this is 
not the case. Instead, the practices and discourses that lead Oedipus to establish 
his accomplishments can also in turn lead him to learn the distressing answers 
to the riddles that confront him.  
The power of his own reasoning gives him the ability to test his 
boundaries, first against the Sphinx, which he defeats through reason, and then 
against the plague, which he also defeats (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271). Oedipus 
thus is carried forwards from one riddle to the next, pushing beyond the metra 
established by the divines – a boundary which should not be crossed – by the 
power of his own reasoning and his confidence in the use of these powers. 
However, such accomplishments are soon revealed to be problematic as the 
power of his own reasoning reveals himself to be the corruption that has 
infected Thebes (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271).  
Tragedy exposes our eminence to be constrained by metra, thus is simply 
unable to deliver humanity from being humbled by forces which defy our 
attempts as a species to explain (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270, 1271-1272). Tragedy 
brutally reminds us that whatever confidence and joy we may feel, we are still 
faced with a crushing retrospective realisation that what we had thought was 
right, just, and good was simply hubris (Euben, 2012: 88). Tragedy prepares us 
emotionally for the blackest of days, the grimmest of prospects, and we are 
alerted to the possibility that we have met our metra and that as a result we are 
defined by our hubris.  
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In the case of Oedipus The Tyrant, an epistemic dimension embedded in 
the grimmest moments exposes the relative emptiness of notions such as justice, 
good, and right (Euben, 1990: 101). The suffering of Oedipus, as he undoes 
himself by answering the riddles of his own life, enhances the wisdom of the 
audience by revealing to them how what goes right is the cause of what goes 
terribly wrong (Euben, 1990: 55-59; Euben, 2012: 86-87).  The tragic lesson is 
not the banal claim that taboo and patricide are bad things to do, but rather that 
there is an inherent risk in an attitude which assumes that “one has a monopoly 
of intelligence and foresight” or that “prior success guarantees future ones” or 
indeed feeling confident that “one can see the origins and consequences of one’s 
actions” (Euben, 2012: 87-88). 
In Sophocles Oedipus is presented as stubborn and unable to turn away 
from learning new information about his own situation – for example, in the 
way in which he dismisses his wife/mother who attempts to shield him from the 
truth of himself; or how he is unable to simply leave a riddle unsolved (Euben, 
1990: 105, 121). Oedipus learns the truth of his ancestry from a shepherd who 
to his horror reveals to him that in his ignorance, he had murdered his father and 
married his mother, thus revealing him to have lost sight of the boundaries, 
metra, of human knowledge and power (Euben, 1990: 105, 122; Lebow, 2012: 
65). This scene exposes the audience to a choice for themselves, a choice to 
look to their own emotional well-being, to avoid suffering or the grimmest 
moments of life. In losing sight of metra, Oedipus – an intelligent, eminent man 
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– is revealed to have been “ignorant of the fundamental facts of his existence, 
his name, place and birth” and is totally unaware of what “he is doing to himself 
and others” (Euben, 1990: 102). Here the audience is alerted and called 
instinctively to examine in their own lives where they have pushed the 
boundaries of metra and to wonder, at least in terms of their imagination, what 
they have done which perhaps has gone too far.  
The impact is heuristic for the audience and the Social Scientist. Oedipus 
comes to see how his failures were manifested in the belief that he was totally 
aware of the truth of his situation and existence only to discover that such a 
view was itself hubris. Hence, the audience learns the prospect of transcending 
their own metra: “If a man as talented and perceptive as Oedipus can be so 
wrong about so much, how can we be sure that we know who we are and what 
we are doing” (Euben, 1990: 105).  
Tragedy exposes the authority of a plurality of practices which build an 
identity into the self or collective (Euben, 1990: 108; Erskine and Lebow, 
2012a: 187). For Euben there are differing accounts of authority from different 
dimensions of life, such as the epistemic, the religious, the normative, and so on 
(Euben, 1990: 108). Tragedy is true to “the enigmatic quality” of life and our 
existence (Euben, 1990: 108). It makes no apology for this unflinching look into 
life and seeks to leave unexplained that which is only grasped emotionally or 
intuitively and defies rational abstractions into hypotheses which can be tested 
quantitatively. 
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Embracing modesty is not a sufficient emotional response: one cannot 
moralise one's own way out of tragedy. We learn to perceive, but what we see is 
not something that can be put into words, although it is true nonetheless (Euben, 
2012: 89). As Goldhill argues, a nebulous and paradoxical vision, tragedy 
associates sight with ignorance (in Euben, 1990: 101).  
Per Ahrensdorf, scholars such as Euben and Saxonhouse read Oedipus as 
providing a critique of theoretical and political rationalism (Ahrensdorf, 2009: 
6-7). Indeed, Euben argues Oedipus represents an understanding that the 
rationalist hope in “epistemological and moral enlightenment” is misguided 
(Euben, 1990: 26-27). For Euben, the self cannot authenticate for itself its own 
beliefs: “Sophocles portrays human beings as riddles to themselves and to 
others, as grasping for certainties that elude and then turn back on the most 
talented among them” (Euben, 1990: 27). Political thought does not have to be 
defined by rationalism but rather can be shaped by visions, and in the case of 
tragedy visions that give due weight to the concept of metra (Euben, 1990: 101, 
105). Political visions rely upon reflexively comprehending the self as well as 
understanding the impact that our identities have upon our normative choices 
(Euben, 1990: 41).  
Tragedy exposes the lesson that the truth is always up for grabs and can 
be always made anew (Euben, 1990: 101). Tragedy's shock therapy encourages 
the audience to be aware of paradoxes, and to manage those paradoxes if they 
are manifested in politics (Euben, 1990: 55-59; Euben, 2012: 86-87). However, 
 73 
tragedy does not permit the idea that a middle ground somewhere between 
enlightenment rationalism and a treatise on human limitations is possible in the 
manner Lebow suggests (Lebow, 2007: 411; Lebow, 2012: 70). Tragedy 
exposes our paradoxes, hence the view that: 
   
“reason and reasonableness are as much a part of the problem as they 
are part of the solution” (Euben, 2012: 87). 
 
What is up is down and what is up is still good even if it leads to down; 
tragedy enriches the audience’s emotional comprehension by teaching a lesson 
that does not in itself expose lines of rational abstraction. Rather it does the 
opposite: it aims to communicate the enigmatic quality of life, not to reduce it 
into rational abstractions.  
Tragedy gives us a conceptual toolkit that fuses rational conceptions with 
emotional human responses. Tragedy in our view centres on metra but leaves 
the concept vague and as much an emotional threshold as a rational or 
intellectual one. Hubris is exposed in retrospect and cannot be identified in the 
moment. Nor can it be eliminated given human insufficiency; rather it must be 
lamented and accepted emotionally. Agon is a concept which exposes the 
tensions and emotional agonising which exist between good, just and worthy 
values in such a way as to accept that authority can come from a variety of 
practices. These can be as broad and vague as religious practices all the way 
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down to resolving logical riddles (quantitative reasoning). Katharsis is the 
acceptance of those things we can change emotionally either as a grief for what 
we have lost or as sorrow that we cannot realise our dreams. This concept is not 
a metaphor for the modern notion of catharsis, but rather is an ancient concept 
that has a direct relationship with tragedy.  
Classical theorists have found in Sophocles the instances where agents 
are exposed to their failings by retrospectively discovering their hubris during a 
recent past when they had identified themselves as virtuous or eminent. 
Certainly this is the case for the hubris of “rationalism” (Ahrensdorf, 2009: 6-7). 
Tragedy exposes the practices which have obtained within the drama and, in 
doing so, leaves the audience with the normative insight that this practice has 
led the characters to their ruin. Certainly this is the case with “rationalist” 
practices, which are frequently exposed by tragedy to lack the power to reshape 
outcomes themselves (Euben, 1990: 26-27).  
Tragedies frequently expose the actor as blind to his true nature and 
defined by an insufficiency which leads him to be forever “grasping for 
certainties” even if these are by necessity unattainable (Euben, 1990: 27). 
Tragedies are thus holistic in the way they conceive of the self as constituted by 
various and sometimes quite different, or even incommensurable, 
concretisations coming from differing cultural and historical practices. Just as 
human sight extends only so far, so also human comprehension and knowledge 
of what is just or wise never achieves the status of immutable (Euben, 1990: 57, 
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105). The loss of certainty is not simply something occasioning sorrow in 
tragedy, it is the loss of a particular confidence in one’s own wisdom and sense 
of justice. The tragic shock is the retrospective and sudden learning that the 
dramatic complexities of life have been managed by beliefs that suddenly 
appear false and lamentable (Euben, 1990: 57). Thus, it is in this loss of false 
certainty that the actor discovers the emotions of regret, sorrow and distress. It 
is this which gives the drama its emotional weight. This resonates with the 
identity of the audience, which is shaped by a special kind of normativity that is 
emotional in nature and not rational or logical. Aristotle describes this as 
Katharsis; it is a special set of emotions pregnant with a tragic normativity that 
must be experienced/undergone/suffered in order to be fully understood. One 
must feel tragedy to understand its impact. Tragedy is knowable in the suffering 
of Oedipus who in his blindness is left groping for his daughters all the while 
alert to the agony that he has committed hubris by using reason to resolve 
riddles (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270-1271). The false confidence of Oedipus, 
bolstered by his successes in using reason to defeat the Sphinx and save Thebes, 
evaporates in an instant and we are left with a crushed king who is left ruined 
and in a state of failure. 
The audience undergoes the experience of living out tragedy by proxy 
and, in doing so, acquires an emotional character and a normative identity that 
is changed by the experience; the practice of reasoning can usher in the light but 
also darkness. Everything comes at a cost, even the practice of making 
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normative choices. Indeed, tragedy identifies the agon as lying at the heart of 
the moral identity of an individual agent, say Creon, or a collective, say Creon 
and Antigone and the wider population of Thebes. The audience is thus in a 
privileged position to spot this agon even before the agents themselves see it. 
This is another potent emotional shock. The agent is motivated by worthy 
views, concretisations of legitimate social and historical practices, and can come 
into conflict with another agent that also embraces equally worthy views.  
The audience, and by extension the Social Scientist, is in a position to 
perceive the tragic agon. This concept refers to the inherent tension which exists 
within a moral space, such as within the self or an audience/collective: 
 
“In tragedy the conflict in the agon is not between a protagonist who 
is taken to be good and an antagonist who is understood to be the 
ethically unacceptable ‘other.’ These are not fights between good and 
evil, between the foreigner and us, or between friends and enemies. 
What gives tragedy its edge is the way in which the ethical positions 
in conflict are positions understood and endorsed by both the parties 
involved and by the audience. Tragedy, one might say, involves a 
conflict within our own ethical space” (Frost, 2012: 28). 
 
This is found in the positions of Creon and Antigone where both are 
worthy and good in their convictions, and indeed Antigone is quite right in her 
avocation of kinship. Like Oedipus, Antigone’s father, whose blindness to 
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human intellectual limitations is what eventually sets the seeds for his own 
downfall, it is Antigone’s blindness to the possibilities of creativity and the 
vitality of life which leads her down a path of self-destruction (Saxonhouse, 
1986: 409). Antigone’s unflinching piousness to the God of death, Hades, and 
unwillingness to concern herself with matters which might create or renew life, 
leads her down a path of achieving glory only through her own moment of death 
(Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Even Antigone’s very name implies the arch of her 
character: anti-gone meaning against birth suggests a denial of the renewing 
dimensions of life (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Moreover, Creon’s 
unflinching denial of the practices of funeral and kinship leads him to practice 
justice in a way that creates real consequences for him and for Antigone, whose 
self-destruction is something that Creon supremely regrets (Saxonhouse, 1986: 
408-409). The retrospective shock for the audience is that Antigone and Creon 
are trapped by their beliefs and like a runaway train are destined to crash into 
ruination; although this is perhaps best understood after repeat viewings.  
It is the vitality of creativity and life which raises up Oedipus only to 
bring him down; for Antigone, it is her opposition to the vitality of creativity, 
something implied by her name anti-gone meaning against birth, which leads 
her into opposition against Creon’s law passed against the bonds of kinship 
(Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Antigone is even willing to hang herself, rather 
than to extend her life inside her tomb, in order to quicken her reunion with her 
dead father and brothers (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408). Antigone’s blindness to the 
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value of life leads to a denial of its own possibility: that is, the very denial of 
life that her actions represent are themselves practices that obtain in failure. 
When “undergoing” the theatre of tragedy, the audience undergoes an 
emotional learning curve which results in their perspective being changed and 
their identity enriched. In IR, tragedy teaches insights by provoking emotional 
and ethical learning which allows the audience to experience vicariously the 
consequences of eminence by exposing hubris and its relationship to perceived 
eminence (Erskine and Lebow, 2012a: 186-187). As Euben argues, the audience 
experiences vicariously the drama being played out before them. The good 
tragedian poet will elicit emotions in the audience through alteration of the 
narrative being played out. What the audience learns in part is that to employ 
our rational intellect is indeed something worthy and something that can be a 
source of authority (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1264). For example, Oedipus is able to 
abstract from clues how they may belong to some wider commensurate thing, 
e.g. a child or an old priest, a baby or a fool, they are all of ‘man’ albeit 
manifested in different ways (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). Oedipus is able to 
transcend the boundaries of the particular and has confidence in his rational 
capacities. Thus, as a new ruler without care for custom and tradition, he 
measures his freedom not by boundaries set by gods or men but by his power to 
reason (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). The power of his own reasoning gives him 
the ability to test his boundaries, first against the Sphinx which he defeats 
through reason, and then against the plague which he also defeats, albeit at the 
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cost revealing himself to be the very pollution he strives to drive from Thebes 
(Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271). Oedipus is thus carried forwards across boundaries 
which should not be crossed. Through his reasoning, he transcends metra and 
puts himself in a position of vulnerability regarding the possibility that the Gods 
will punish him and his creativity. 
Euben argues tragedy is educative, something of a social institution, 
which prompts those who learn from it to think through their own 
circumstances and difficulties (Euben, 1990: 56). One of the lessons learned is 
in relation to ‘the epistemological complexities of the world’ whereby wisdom 
can be derived from different accounts of truth (Euben, 1990: 57). Nevertheless, 
tragedy impregnates such complexities with an emotional quality that is not 
easily explained. Metra is revealed through the success of those who solve 
riddles (Euben, 1990: 56-57). Tragedy exposes our eminence to be constrained 
by metra, thus is simply unable to deliver humanity from being humbled by 
forces which defy our attempts as a species to explain (Saxonhouse, 1988: 
1270, 1271-1272). Therefore, it is tragedy as theatre which draws our attention 
to those aspects of life which words alone struggle to explain but which 





Chapter Three: John Dewey and the Metra of Things 
 
Section One: Introduction to Chapter  
 
In this chapter we will argue that John Dewey’s Classical Pragmatism is 
defined by our broader conception of metra and, thus, advances a tragedian 
political thought which can be applied to world politics. The advantage of 
Dewey’s political thought is that it advances a form of inquiry which, if applied 
to world politics, draws in insights within a dialogical epistemic practice that 
refines our knowledge of how to cope with our broader understanding of the 
concept of metra. 
In subsequent chapters, we will show how it is that Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr likewise understand “the metra of things” as we conceive of the term. 
Building on this, we advance the argument that all three legacy scholars share 
with Dewey much of the same caution towards the scope of human intellectual 
power as well as the profound anti-dogmatism necessary to continue to adapt to 
a forever changing situation in world politics.  
In their own ways, what unites all three scholars is not just their alertness 
to “the metra of things”, it is also that they share similar political and ethical 
imperatives: to better manage metra through cultivating institutional structures 
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that embody those norms which act to generate some degree of adaptation to the 
situations in which human beings find themselves, above all the metra/tragedy 
of human life and by extension the tragedy of world politics. The vision of 
intellectual inquiry, and adaptive actions, advanced by Dewey is not 
characterised by idealistic notions, but rather by the art of the possible. Dewey 
seeks to manage metra through the exercise of intellectual forms of inquiry that 
it is reasonable to expect world political actors to be able to perform in practice. 
Indeed, Dewey’s form of inquiry does not aim to rely upon the altruism or good 
nature of human beings, but rather upon pooling the insights from the widest 
possible number of participants within a dialogue designed specifically to meet 
the needs of all mankind. This pooling of intellectual insights and capabilities is 
in Dewey a collective enterprise. This is perhaps the defining feature of 
Dewey’s political thought: the manner in which he fuses epistemological 
dialogue with inclusiveness and collectivism in order to advance policy.  
Concerning political matters, realising our norms in practice is fraught 
with difficulties. Dewey was keenly aware of what goes wrong with attempts in 
political life to advance the collective interests of mankind (Putnam, 2004: 10-
11). Indeed, Dewey understood that while intelligence and reflection do indeed 
help us to advance collective interests, they only go so far (Dewey, 2002: 278). 
For Dewey it is entirely possible that a particularly vexing political or social 
problem cannot currently be solved due to our intellectual and practical 
insufficiencies (Dewey, 2002: 278). To bring our methodology to bear, we 
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interpret this to mean that Dewey was alert to the metra inherent in intelligence, 
and indeed in political and intellectual discourses and actions. Yet he finds his 
own need to exercise inquiry to be the best way to advance the case for 
employing the insights of as many qualified voices as possible with a view to 
discerning the best way to cope with the otherwise unknowing implications of 
metra that extend outwards from the partially visible structures of limitations 
and measures that exist beyond our capacity to control. 
 
Section One: The Metra of the Self and the Tragic Conditions of Existence 
and Dewey.   
 
In The Oxford Hand Book of The Self, Richard Menary argues that much 
of pragmatism denies that there is any meaningful distinction between “a 
conscious, knowing, or experiencing, subject and a world experienced” 
(Menary, 2011: 618). There is “no deep metaphysical discontinuity between the 
mind and the world” (Menary, 2011: 623). This is problematic insofar as it 
introduces an abstract distinction that would seem to put human minds and 
nature into different ontological realms as well as doing very little to advance 
any particular solutions to the concrete problems a demos might face in 
adapting to its environment. In the absence of such an unproductive and 
unnecessary distinction, Dewey develops an extremely useful conception of 
“body-mind” which captures the consequences of when “a living body is 
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implicated in situations of discourse, communication and participation” 
(Dewey, 1958: 285). Human beings “are biological adaptations of organism and 
environment” where the subject-matter that makes up knowledge occurs in the 
same world in which the mind has evolved into being (Dewey, 1958: 277). The 
separation of “life from nature, mind from organic life” only serves to generate 
abstract problems (Dewey, 1958: 278). Furthermore, abstraction frequently 
leads to what Santayana describes as “hypostatising the conclusions to which 
reflections may lead” as well as to engage in debates dogmatically by arguing 
that these things are “prior realities” (Santayana, 1951: 247).  
To interpret then – that is, to bring our horizon to bear – we infer this 
element of Dewey’s thought to indicate that for Dewey there is a direct 
relationship between the self and its environment. We interpret the question, 
which Dewey is answering, as to whether or not it is possible to conceive of the 
self in a manner that situates it within, and co-constitutive, of body-mind and 
environment, but to do so without hypostatising abstractions to such an extent 
that they become dogmatic. Such dogmatism, in our interpretation, thus 
indicates how it is that Dewey’s thought captures the importance of the 
intellectual capacity of the self, its metra/measures, and the need for not 
overstepping these measures and thereby creating a dogmatism characterised by 
hubris (as we understand the notion).  
Such an understanding of the capacity of the self to be limited by its own 
measures translates directly into Dewey’s conception of knowledge. Knowing 
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things thus becomes to know within the capacity of the self to know things. 
Therefore, there is only a limited measure of warrant attached to any 
knowledge-claim – and, as Dewey claims, such knowledge contains within 
itself always a “sceptical element” (Dewey, 1998d: 203).  
If our knowledge-claims are mutable and plastic then there is no 
dogmatic barrier regarding the evaluation of the worth of any particular 
knowledge-claim employing a process of interrogation and inspection (Dewey, 
1998d: 203). Dogmatic accounts of what is warranted knowledge, which 
invariably represents the sum of adaptive knowledge designed to meet the needs 
of previous situations, is foregrounded in the vision of Deweyan analysis which 
examines whether or not a particular-knowledge claim continues to be 
appropriate for the present situation (Dewey, 1998d: 203).  
For Dewey, knowledge is, epistemologically, “artefacts of our evidentiary 
sources” (Margolis, 2002: 112). As such, what we come to know is a mutable, 
plastic and contingent product of the self’s intellectual capacity. Our knowledge 
thus reflects, at its best, the full measure of human intellect. But such a measure 
must in principle fall short of the absolute, and any knowledge that is produced 
therein cannot be more than simply what it is: warranted assertions into what 
reality might look like. 
To bring our horizon to bear, there is a modesty in this epistemological 
stance insofar as it accepts that knowledge is measured not by its capacity to 
explain the ontologically external world in the form of an absolute account of 
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what is true. It rather explains the external world in terms of the use that a 
particular knowledge-claim has in aiding the self in its adaptation to its 
environment and in advancing one's best interests.  
There is a considerable degree of consistency here in terms of how 
Dewey sticks to a modest sense of the value of the knowledge that the self can 
produce given its metra. Indeed, the creation of new knowledge is manifested as 
a form of intervention into the prior insights that the self has about its existence: 
and thus as knowledge evolves dialectically, so too will our insights into all 
things continue to transform and remodel themselves (Dewey, 1958: 286-287; 
Margolis, 2002: 115-116). Therefore, dogmatism and absolutism are 
continuously repudiated; so, too, in our interpretation, is the hubris associated 
with both of these positions.  
The world “experienced” by the self is co-constitutive of the self and 
indeed, our knowledge of that world brings into being a “reality” that is defined 
by human dialectics (Dewey, 1958: 287; Hook, 1974: 9). Nothing stands still 
and there is a constant evolution of the situation in which the self discovers 
itself placed and is required to make sense of by employing the full measure of 
its intellectual capability. Grasping the nature of the world and its various 
features is critical to understanding how to act (Hook, 1974: 9).  
For Dewey, to grasp the external world – that is to say, to construct 
knowledge which enables the body-mind to cope with the situation into which it 
finds itself – requires the employment of meanings which become the building 
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blocks of an unending dialectical approach. This is distinct from Hegel’s telos 
driven version. For Dewey, the ends-in-view are of primary importance, not the 
ends of history as it were. This is a modest view in congruence with his 
awareness of the proportions and metra of things.  
Meanings do not “belong” to an ontologically external “nature” but are 
constituted by the self, in its collective form, and find as its inspiration the 
natural circumstances and events within which a community is immersed 
(Dewey, 1958: 287-289). A “sociological” or “community-oriented account of 
truth” is advanced by Dewey that repudiates “the correspondence theory of truth 
and representationalist theories of mind and language, where mental states 
model or represent states of affairs in the natural world” (Baghramian, 2004: 
145). In this sense the self has an interpretive role in bringing meaning, through 
language, to the situation in which it finds itself. The direct interaction between 
situation and self does not mean that what comes to be grasped is in any way 
“correct” by virtue of such interaction (Dewey, 1958: 287-289). Knowledge has 
a direct and instrumental bearing upon the manner of coping with the situation: 
the ethical objective of mitigating any human suffering, for which the concrete 
experiential impact serves as a prompt to produce practical knowledge, is the 
central objective of his pragmatism (Dewey, 1958: 110-111). The yardstick by 
which knowledge is measured is therefore the utility it serves as a means of 
coping with situations, not its capacity to create within the self a true 
representation of an external world.   
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To bring our horizon to bear, this line of reasoning suggests that a 
question Dewey is answering, is how can the self use its capacity to constitute 
knowledge in order to cope or manage a constantly evolving situation? 
The self is defined by metra insofar as it simply cannot grasp the actuality 
of things in terms of creating representations of our external world that are 
irrefutably true. The self must rely upon knowledge which is useful in some 
fashion in order to cope with evolving situations. This is a modest 
understanding of the authority of human truth-claims, and implies that Dewey 
understood the metra of all human beings, in particular intellectual limitations.  
Our interpretation is strengthened by the manner in which Dewey 
understands the actuality of existence in its absolute sense to be beyond our 
intellectual capabilities to understand, let alone “control” in the Deweyan sense 
of the term. Human beings have the means to achieve knowledge which is 
manifested as something “settled” in terms of debates upon a subject. However, 
such a settlement remains simply an “assertion” that has been given the status of 
“warranted” only as a result of the outcome of debates concerning the subject at 
hand (Dewey, 1998d: 203).  
Just as it is that the “metra of things” – the measures and boundaries of 
things – are within the grasp of the audience to a tragedy to comprehend, so it is 
that the demos as it is understood within Deweyan thought is in a position to 
learn the lessons of human experiences. In Deweyan thought the metra is 
embedded both within “nature,” as a construction of human intelligence, and in 
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the human being who remains defined by his intellectual metra. This differs 
from the hubris-centred IR tragedy, as discussed in the literature review, which 
conceives of human beings as having the power to breach metra, such as the 
norms of international society. Dewey’s conception is that while there may be 
some metra (measures) that human beings can breach, as IR tragedy would 
expect, there are other metra (boundaries) for which human beings, because of 
their own metra (intellectual limitations), do not have the power to breach. 
Dewey therefore advances a form of inquiry which is more than capable of 
asserting hypotheses as to where the boundaries and measures of things can be 
found. This offers hope of finding ways to advocate a more valuable adaptive 
response to the evolving situation of world politics.  
What inquiry is possible, then, into human nature itself? The Deweyan 
position highlights the role of the interaction between the individual and group 
and the ‘surrounding medium,’ and in particular the role of the ‘social’ in 
constituting the ‘desires’ manifested within each person (Dewey, 1998b: 305). 
Dewey rejects the notion that the ‘social’ is something ‘external’ to what is 
‘native’ in the human (Dewey, 1998b: 306). As Westbrook argues, the Deweyan 
position takes human nature to be constituted through ‘habits’ that are 
themselves functions not of a particular individual but rather of the mediating 
social level (Westbrook, 1991: 287-288). The human mind is a downstream 
variable dependent upon the societal customs and norms. As such, human 
nature is entirely mouldable, and intuitions – or what Dewey calls impulses – 
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are organised through the interactions of an individual and the social medium 
(Westbrook, 1991: 288-289): ‘The meaning of native activities is not native; it 
is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium’ (Dewey, 
in: Westbrook 1991: 288). Dewey argues this leads to tensions between 
differing internal social norms brought about by the motor of social change 
(Westbrook, 1991: 290).  
 
The Deweyan position takes there to be no ‘intelligent exercise of 
preferences’ without the judgement of moral agents being ‘tested’ by the 
circumstances of the contingent environ of which our (moral and natural) 
knowledge is fallible and constitutive (Dewey, 1998e: 309-310; Dewey, 1958; 
51 -52). Indeed, Dewey stresses that wisdom is created in the context of this 
metaphysical/existential discourse of ‘incompleteness and precariousness’,  
complicit in choices and human endeavours, such that what becomes wisdom 
and morality is not fixed to nature but is bound up with the process of its 
constitution (Dewey, 1958: 52). Dewey argues that human beings crave the 
transformation of what is understood to be ‘good’ from the status of ‘unstable’ 
to ‘stable’ such that human groups can have beliefs they rely upon (Dewey, 
1958: 53). What is ‘surrendered’ is the distinction between ‘knowing and doing’ 
(Dewey, 1982b: 291). What is gained is an appreciation for the role of culture in 
occasioning judgement and valuing (Dewey, 1982b: 304-305). Whatever ‘good’ 
comes to be transformed into a ‘stable’ belief is a manifestation of culturally 
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informed/constitutive practices which determine the status of the belief and not 
the ‘being’ or ‘reality’ of the thing believed ‘to be’ in itself. The essence or 
morality of a subject matter is a metaphor for that which is most prized by a 
human group for its value: conferring of the status “warranted” is an act of 
valuing.  
Persuasively, Dewey criticises traditional thinkers for emptying their 
accounts of nature and morality of the incompleteness, precariousness, and 
instability of existence (Dewey, 1958: 53). That is, the metra of things is most 
certainly required in order to best grasp the conditions of human life and 
existence. 
Implying that it is in suffering existence that human beings/groups are 
innervated, Dewey argues that stable, unstable, high and specious accounts of 
existence do not imply distinct correct or false explanations of nature and ethics 
but rather are a product of practices which are impacted by the ‘precarious and 
incomplete’ character of existence that ‘involves us in the necessity of choice 
and active struggle’ (Dewey, 1958: 53). Moreover, for Dewey, in the absence of 
an immutable lodestar that can guide us towards an account of existence that 
resolves all debates, it is necessary to view the world as something that is 
constituted through adding into the manifestation of the world interventions or 
reconfigurations of older interventions. Through this, owing to the changing 
nature of the sum of all knowledge, the world can be totally reconfigured 
(Dewey, 1998b 314; Dewey, 1998c 111). This radical plasticity extends 
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outwards across all things that Dewey considers natural as well as meta-
theoretically into his own theoretical discourse.  
This relates to tragedy insofar as Dewey distinguishes between two levels 
of metra: (a) the metra level concerning those measures that are mutable 
through interventions or reconfigurations; and (b) the metra level of those 
measures which we cannot mutate as they extend beyond human power. It is 
into this deeper level of existence that Dewey delves, albeit he stops before 
transforming his speculative account of existence into anything more than 
warranted assertion. Even in his account of existence Dewey retains his grasp 
upon the metra of all human intellectual capability. Indeed, in Rorty’s 
estimation, Dewey maintains the view that it is entirely possible to have an 
account of what is or is not warranted, in the sense of having knowledge, 
without this account needing to be attached a formal epistemology (Rorty, 
2009: 318). Moreover, it is from the authority of the collective that the 
evaluation of the warrant of any claim to knowledge is derived (Rorty, 2009: 
174).  
However, Rorty argues that Dewey’s account of the existential aspects of 
human life are somewhat fixed and in “slightly bad faith” given Dewey’s 
otherwise strong commitment to the plasticity of all things (Rorty, 2010: 73). 
Indeed, Rorty argues that Dewey “occasionally came down with the disease he 
was trying to cure” in advocating seemingly fixed insights into human existence 
and at the same time trying to eliminate traditional epistemology (Rorty, 2010: 
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83). However, this argument is debunked by Joseph Margolis, who points to 
how Dewey’s insights into the conditions of human existence are not contrary 
to his prior commitments but, rather, reflect Dewey’s insistence that criticism 
itself does not have an upward limit or end point! (Margolis, 2002: 115).  
 
To bring our methodology to bear, we can see here how Dewey extends 
his understanding of the metra of human intellect into the insight that whatever 
discourse human beings create, there cannot be a point from which any 
particular man-made “paradigm” ever ends a particular debate and thus 
becomes a lodestar from which to order some sort of metaphysical order.  
Relevant here is how Morgenthau - drawing upon Nietzsche - and 
Niebuhr - drawing upon Kierkegaard - understood modern man as unable to 
sustain the metaphysics of traditional Christian Europe. Given that Dewey spent 
most of his life opposing dogmatism and various forms of rationalism, he would 
not have had reason to live in fear of Morgenthau’s or Niebuhr’s critique 
(Dewey, 2011: 111). Furthermore, Dewey understood normative matters to be 
somewhat rough and ready, perfection remaining a ‘vague conception’ and 
presumably devoid of much value for Dewey (Dewey, 2002: 282). Indeed, as 
Dewey states:  
 
“Till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they will not 
know where to look to find it” (Dewey, 2002: 282). 
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Dewey rejects a search for formulas which strive towards perfectible 
progress as embodied in absolute ideals. He favours a view of normativity as a 
forever changing and dynamic process of moving from one justified belief to 
the next without ever determining that a particular view is final (Dewey, 2002: 
282). Dewey views normative practices to be embodied as a dynamic process of 
social justification in the absence of general natural laws. Again, Morgenthau's 
mischaracterisation is illuminated. Morgenthau also misrepresents the 
overarching vision of Dewey’s thought regarding the possibilities inherent in 
world politics by implying that they are either unsolved or yet to be solved 
‘rationally and with finality, once the right formula is discovered’ (Morgenthau, 
1946: 28).  
On the contrary, the Deweyan position does not advocate the notion that 
all that is required is the right formula to solve normative questions. Indeed, 
Dewey argues that it is often the case that moral agents struggle to find an 
answer to the question of what is just: 
 
“he hesitates among ends, all of which are good in some measure, among 
duties which obligate him for some reason” (Dewey, 1998a: 315). 
 
What we have here is Dewey articulating an ethical agon which in Frost’s 
estimation is the ‘heart’ of a tragic understanding of morality (Frost, 2012: 27). 
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Indeed, Dewey recognizes that the social agent is torn between differing moral 
goods in a manner perfectly consistent with a 'tragic sense of life'. Frost 
describes this dilemma as ‘a conflict within our own ethical space’ (Frost, 2012: 
28). Whereas in Morgenthau’s estimation the Deweyan engineer is little more 
than a mouthpiece for a decadent rationalism which articulates a failed over-
reliance upon 'science' as a liberator from moral distress, Dewey’s position in 
fact represents a dynamic understanding where ‘each human being has to make 
the best adjustment he can among forces which are genuinely disparate’ such 
that all that can be achieved is ‘a juster estimate of the force of each competing 
factor’ (Dewey, 1998a: 320). 
To bring our horizon to bear once more, Dewey is more than aware of the 
metra of the self and its intellectual limitations, and thus in this case is 
compelled to adopt the view that there is only a least worst outcome available. 
To understand such value antagonism implies a keen awareness of the tragic 
nature of making ethical judgements about one’s own values. 
And yet the critical difference is – and what this thesis is drawing towards 
– is that in Dewey the inclusive inquiring dialogue extends outwards into the 
global demos and the vast possibilities of collective thought and knowledge 
production.  
Far from Morgenthau’s caricature of the ‘social engineer’ whereby 
‘correct’ solutions to social problems are produced as a result of 
experimentalism (Morgenthau, 1946: 219), Dewey is humble enough to 
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acknowledge the way experimentalism creates hypothetical possibilities which 
only become warranted beliefs if they acquire a certain status within a 
community. As we have shown, such epistemological restraint allows Dewey to 
evade intellectual hubris, i.e. to overshoot the metra of things.  
Far from Morgenthau’s “scientific man”, Dewey is opposed to 
rationalism (Dewey, 2011: 111). Indeed, Dewey resisted “vague conceptions of 
unattainable perfection” in ethics (Dewey, 2002: 282). Dewey maintains that the 
pursuit of “a general formula” through which ‘progress’ can be attained is 
something that must be eschewed so that attention is not diverted away from the 
concrete problems experienced by social groups (Dewey, 2002: 282). In 
conceiving of ethical values as something arising out of social practices, Dewey 
implies opposition to any approach claiming to have ethical values that are 
situated in an external sphere of non-human truth (Dewey, 2002: 282). Our 
beliefs are not discovered: they are produced. Objective laws are social 
constructions which are mutable and change over time and space (Dewey, 2002: 
282). In this Dewey acknowledges our very real and concrete human metra.  
Like Morgenthau, Dewey accepts that “progress” is a matter of 
interpretation and in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, he accepts that the truth 
of human existence will never be arrived at because humans lack the ability to 
capture knowledge about the truth of actuality (Dewey, 2002: 282). It is in 
illustrating this that Dewey views normative practices to be embodied as a 
dynamic process of awarding authority to certain warranted assertions. 
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Dewey’s pragmatism is inherently defined by its reflexivity. Not only is 
Dewey able to apply his meta-theory to nature and mankind, exposing their 
character, but also to turn his critical thought inwardly, exposing the plastic 
nature of his own mutable insights into existence. To support this, Margolis 
cites a passage within Dewey’s famous book entitled Logic which points to how 
the occasion of new knowledge is itself an intervention into already existing 
understandings of what might be said to be known (Margolis, 2002: 116). To 
develop a new insight into existence is to modify our comprehension as a 
species and thus generate a new representation and hence a new cosmos 
(Margolis, 2002: 116). Therefore, what comes to be said to be known, and 
pertaining to all events, are ontological instances of alteration and creation: our 
insights into existence can themselves be redesigned as a result of this practice.  
For Dewey, to settle upon one set of metaphysical insights concerning 
existence as immutable and endless truths would be to make the same error as 
classical philosophers in which their “tradition” takes “the proper goal and ideal 
of true knowledge” to be “realities which even if they are located in empirical 
things cannot be known by experimental methods” (Dewey, 1998c: 103). 
Theories of knowledge for which the construction is predicated upon the 
assumption that the universe is static or unchanging, are problematic (Dewey, 
1982a: 275). Philosophy had become “a species of apologetic justification” 
regarding an “ultimate reality” and as such had tended to support an 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the objects which 
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populate a reality to be “measured by adhesion to fixed and immutable objects, 
which therefore are independent of what men do in practical activity” (Dewey, 
1998c: 103-104; Dewey, 1982a: 276-277). 
To interpret then, Dewey understands the measures of existence, albeit 
within the limited, mutable and plastic account of things that can never reach 
the point of a metaphysical lodestar from which to construct a metaphysical 
order to things. To posit the attainability of such an order would be to make the 
same mistake as Oedipus in putting his faith in his human intellectual capacity 
to exercise reason for the good of all. Instead, Dewey echoes the insights of 
Sophocles that the measures of things, even the scholarship of the social 
scientist and theorist, must be respected. Overshooting these measures will 
produce hubris and thus trigger the furies who ruthlessly enforce the metra. In 
this, Dewey embraces the narrower conception of metra common to IR 
tragedian approaches.  
As we read Dewey, the constituting of a new world or reality is explained 
by Dewey as the transformation of the “universe of discourse,” namely a 
horizon of understandings by a collective (Dewey, 2008: 74). As one world 
intermingles with another, so they interact and interpenetrate: the consequences 
of these interactions have a bearing upon all social realities and thus generate 




“It is a commonplace that a universe of discourse cannot be a term or 
element within itself. One universe of discourse may, however, be a term of 
discourse within another universe. The same principle applies in the case of 
universes of experience” (Dewey, 2008: 74). 
 
In this eloquent passage, Dewey expresses beautifully the manner in 
which one world has bearing upon another; both belong to a wider existence as 
they are united into a shared existence. It matters little, then, if a particular 
social meaning or value is or is not incommensurable between different social 
worlds, only that we understand that as they intermingle they generate 
consequences within each other’s worlds. What they are united by is the 
conditions of existence which are plastic all the way down. The interaction 
between these universes can be grouped together and explained in terms of the 
consequences of how one impacts the others, something that can be done 
through the use of the pragmatist maxim.  
Dewey’s understanding of human beings and their existence identifies 
their position within the linearity of time as it unfolds and stretches outwards 
into the undiscovered country of the future. Dewey identifies the self’s 
insufficiency in this regard as the necessary reliance on past circumstances to 
guide our deliberations concerning any attempt to determine the course of future 
events (Dewey, 2002: 278-281). In Dewey’s idiom, the term “control” 
represents a hypothesis regarding the downstream consequences implied in 
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present actions. Our insufficiencies derive from the fact that our vantage point is 
by necessity located in the present. As a direct result, it is impossible for any 
human individual to “know” or “control” the true consequences of their choices 
(Dewey, 2002: 278-281). This sceptical concept, it could be argued, has a 
normative dimension because it implies that under the conditions of our human 
existence we ought to exercise some measure of caution as we cannot truly 
know what the consequences of our actions are going to be in social and 
political matters. Dewey evokes the epistemological argument that there are 
limits to “what we can know” thus maintaining a consistency with what he calls 
the “sceptical element” within his thought. We can have “warranted” 
knowledge upon which we must depend, yet this knowledge is a “justified 
belief” and little more (Dewey and Tuft, 1909: 261-262; Dewey, 2002: 278-
281). These educated guesses about the future are, of course, subject to 
revisions: a strength of Dewey’s thought is its plasticity, because this allows the 
potential for a total revision of the sum of human knowledge as a result of any 
intervention resulting from developments within debates concerning the 
“warrant” of new truth-claims. This flexibility elevates all participants in 
dialogue into potentially world transforming actors. 
As a result, when we look to the best guesses regarding how to act well or 
to make a better choice regarding a particular desired outcome, the powerful 
and the meek are all in the same boat. In the absence of certain control 
concerning the future, all human beings are necessarily powerless to control 
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their destiny and thus by implication are totally at the mercy of future events 
over which they have, in fact, no control (Dewey, 2002: 278-281). All 
decisions/choices are in fact made blindly, and once a choice is made there is a 
terrible possibility that hoped for consequences might simply evaporate and the 
success of these choices become simply a matter of good fortune (Dewey, 2002: 
281). While the Enlightenment Rationalist (à la Morgenthau or Niebuhr) can 
trust in the verisimilitude and trustworthiness of his righteous choices, the 
Deweyan doubts that any truth-claim can be given the status of immutable and 
forever true.  
For Dewey, there is an indeterminate, precarious and plastic universe 
which we cannot truly comprehend and in which, as a consequence of the 
conditions of our human existence, we are compelled to render all truth-claims 
as little more than justified beliefs. The human mind simply lacks the 
“foresight” to comprehend how its choices will shape the future: 
 
“The future situation involved in deliberation is of necessity marked by 
contingency. What it will be in fact remains dependent upon conditions that 
escape our foresight and power of regulation” (Dewey, 2002: 208). 
 
Therefore, the conditions of human existence prompt in Dewey a 
sceptical response to questions concerning the reliability of knowledge and 
indeed the value of our best guesses. How to reach a decision then becomes a 
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very dramatic choice and something that must be enriched, so Dewey argues, 
through the collective pursuit of inquiry through dialogue in order to allow us to 
make better choices. As West argues, Dewey does not devalue knowledge; he 
grounds it in human experience (West, 1989: 86).  
Implied in this distinction is the sense in which unintended consequences 
can and do occur, which adds weight to the view implicit in Dewey’s thought 
that it is naïve to suppose we can determine a normative outcome by applying 
the correct remedy. Human limitations are further implied when Dewey argues 
that to help increase the chances of a normatively positive outcome, the 
normative actor must understand his limits:  
 
“It is only through taking into account subsequent acts consequences of 
prior acts not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the fuller 
significance of his own power and thus of himself. Every builder builds 
other than he knows, whether better or worse. In no case, can he foresee all 
consequences of his acts” (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261). 
 
Echoing themes found in Classical Tragedy, where man is revealed to be 
a riddle unto himself, it is only by learning the consequences of choices that we 
learn. However, whereas for Aristotle Tragedy occasions Katharisis brought on 
by the encounter with the limits of human beings, for Dewey it prompts the 
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view that we can learn and develop a more sophisticated hypothesis/best guess 
about how to act. A more sophisticated form of inquiry can aid us in this regard.  
For Dewey, all ‘truth’ is a possession and property of the present 
moment; its truth is subject to the contingencies of that moment and its social 
situation (Dewey, 2002: 275). 
Certainly, this does not mean that a degree of foresight is impossible, 
only that the social existence of an ethical value takes place in the present 
situation, and any attempt to conceive of ethics in the undiscovered country of 
the future can only exist within our imaginations in the present and therefore 
proves, Dewey implies, unreliable (Dewey, 2002: 274-276). A moral view must 
be found in the existing concrete contingencies of the social situation, and is 
sustained by the social habits built into that situation as individuals and groups 
strive to think intelligently (Dewey, 2002: 271-276).  
Moreover, as the situation changes, and the consequences of actions are 
better understood, intentions are influenced by this growing awareness:  
 
“This translation of consequences once wholly unforeseeable into 
consequences which have to be taken in account is at its maximum in the 
change of impulsive into intelligent action” (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261). 
 
In the context of human limitations, Dewey implies that intelligent action 
requires a measure of humility in recognising that in order to effect moral 
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change the ethical actor must be attentive to the lessons already learned from 
social experience:  
 
“The great need of the moral agent is thus a character which will make him open, as 
accessible as possible, to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior” 
(Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 262). 
 
However, this argument seems to imply that a path can be charted out of 
dilemmas by means of fastidious attention to historical patterns and tendencies. 
Yet Dewey maintains that judging principles is a matter of reflection as well as 
determining the effect of the utility of these principles in differing social 
situations (Dewey, 2002: 239). The path forwards remains as uncertain as our 
contingent truths.  
Judgement can be a matter of reforming principles and their meanings in 
social situations, which are constantly evolving (Dewey, 2002: 240). To 
suppose that existing wisdom will retain its on-going adaptive success, as well 
as to radically abandon the rich legacy of wisdom inherited by society, is in 
effect to recognise the contingency of social life as well as exposing the 
excessive pride held in principles that are unwarranted for new circumstances 
(Dewey, 2002: 239-240). Intelligence is not a silver bullet, and it may prove 
useless in the attainment of a new equilibrium; nevertheless, it is valuable as a 
means through which a successful path towards a wise way of living can be 
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achieved. However, Dewey’s path towards a true wisdom is just a path, and we 
can never in principle arrive at this outcome. Again, we must make good 
guesses and remember our powerlessness in an existence where our destiny 
cannot be determined through our own hands. 
Dewey’s concern is to get to the heart of what constitutes a “wise” choice 
given human insufficiencies and the conditions of human existence. How can 
one be wise when there is no infallible certainty that our choices will produce 
the consequences we desire? Dewey’s conception of reasoning, argues West, is 
largely directed at reflecting upon wisdom, which for Dewey is defended as 
“conviction” (West, 1989: 86).   
Thought serves a purpose: it adds wisdom and value and helps us to cope 
with the circumstances of the age (West, 1989: 92-93). Wisdom is derived from 
goal-directed reflections that refuse to bow easily to easy answers conjured up 
by those fixed to orthodoxy or blind to humility of any kind with regards to the 
power of human truth (Hook, 1974: 7). The thrust of Dewey’s thought is to 
enable the collective to respond wisely to the circumstances they find 
themselves in, whatever they may be. This is accomplished by including the 
widest number of participants in a dialogue, and if necessary challenging those 
who hold onto dogma at the cost of coping better (Dewey, 2011: 113):  
 
“Triumphs are dangerous when dwelt upon or lived off from; successes use 
themselves up. Any achieved equilibrium of adjustment with the 
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environment is precarious because we cannot evenly keep pace with 
changes in the environment. These are so opposed that we must choose. We 
must take the risk of casting in our lot with one movement or the other. 
Nothing can eliminate all risk, all adventure; the one thing doomed to failure 
is to try to keep even with the whole environment at once - that is to say, to 
maintain the happy moment when all things go our way” (Dewey 2011: 
113). 
 
In other words, the ever developing plastic universe compels us to 
constantly develop and renew our “wisdom” or conviction about what is the 
right way to act regardless of the normative cost of the values “rejected” along 
the way. What Dewey has in mind is a constant battle between the inherited 
knowledge of the past horizons of wisdom and the special kind of suffering that 
collectives experience as a result of the conditions of their existence (Dewey, 
2011: 112-113). This is how Dewey understood experience: as something 
incorrigible and impossible to change even when the light of Enlightenment 
Rationalism is cast upon it. “Truth” for Dewey represents the reaction of the 
collective to their common existence, that is, the interpenetration of nature and 
human minds as a fused continuous phenomenon (Dewey, 2011: 112-113). The 
fusion represents the total sum of our experiences, and the “real” is as much a 
manifestation of our comprehension as vice versa. 
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The elimination of righteousness is implied in Dewey’s assertion that the 
future is largely out of our control (Dewey, 2002: 271-276). The historical 
horizon of inherited wisdom is valuable, but can also cause righteousness 
(Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261). The indeterminate nature of the future creates 
the need for control and implicitly the acceptance that whatever it is, it remains 
a representation rather than a factual or immutable account of how the future 
will develop in social affairs (Dewey, 2002: 206). The implicit wisdom in 
Dewey, then, is to acknowledge the helplessness of mankind as its defining 
feature; we can overcome indeterminacy only at the cost of believing our own 
fictions, namely that we know the true nature of things.  
In Dewey's view, all knowledge and all truth is fallible and owes its 
authority to practices of social and linguistic status-giving driven by our social 
and historical cultural valuations as to what counts as true or false (Dewey, 
1998d: 203): 
 
“The position which I take, namely, that all knowledge, or warranted 
assertion, depends upon inquiry and that inquiry is, truistically, connected 
with what is questionable (and questioned) involves a sceptical element, or 
what Peirce called 'fallibilism,' But it also provides for probability, and for 
determination of degrees of probability in rejecting all intrinsically dogmatic 
statements, where 'dogmatic' applies to any statement asserted to possess 
inherent self-evident truth. That the only alternative to ascribing to some 
proposition self-sufficient, self-possessed, and self-evident truth is a theory 
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which finds the test and mark of truth in consequence of some sort is, I 
hope, an acceptable view” (Dewey 1998d: 203). 
 
 
Dewey resists labelling his truth-claims as timeless, fixed, and immutable 
when he writes: 'what is taken to be so fixed and final that man may repose 
upon it, differs with race, clime, epoch and temperament' (Dewey, 1998f: 347). 
Moreover, our very human nature, argues Dewey, does not reside in immutable 
and infallible truths (Dewey, 1998f: 347). Rather, it is a highly plastic thing 
which evolves or regresses as it moves towards and away from its incentives 
and circumstances (Dewey, 2002: 89 98, 106, 124). Thus, humanity is of nature 
(Dewey, 2002: 295-296).  
Wisdom requires us to maintain an open mind, to resist dogmatism, and 
to engage in open dialogue. This goes hand in hand with the humility needed to 
understand that our own inherited knowledge and horizon is not a true account, 
but rather one of many – all of which have varying, and culturally determined, 
levels of value or warrant. Indeed, by combining a “fallibilist” theory of 
knowledge with a plastic conception of all things, Dewey introduces both 
sceptical and relativistic dimensions into his approach. His anti-dogmatism is an 
attack on any approach which fails to keep pace with developments over time, 
where developments represent the transforming and constantly changing fusion 
of mind with nature. So, it is possible for Dewey to argue simultaneously that 
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human beings are “finite” and “subject to conditions imposed by space and 
time” and at the same time that the consequences of our collective experience of 
undergoing existence is the sum of “reality” (Dewey, 2002: 287; Dewey, 2011: 
112-113). This fusion is never still or fixed, as if on a pedestal. The meaning of 
mankind is reconstructed continuously as our understanding of both ourselves 
and nature develops. The modes by which mankind lives and the truth-claims 
we construct, either fit or do not fit the needs of the situations we find ourselves 
in at particular times (Dewey, 1998e: 225-229). By implication, bringing these 
truth-claims into equilibrium is the wisest set of actions mankind can take.  
What might be considered wise modes of living in one time – that is to 
say, the existence of societal habits which occasion a measure of equilibrium 
between species and environment – may not prove appropriate in a different 
situation (Dewey, 1998e: 229; Dewey, 2002: chapter 1). As human beings 
transform their social habits and beliefs in response to changing circumstances, 
they can remake the world so as to render humanity a good 'fit' at least for a 
time.  
This is in keeping with Dewey's view pertaining to whether or not 
problems have to be solved or abandoned:  
 
“It would be difficult to find a single problem during the whole record of 
reflective thought which has been pursued consistently until some definite 
result was reached” (Dewey, 1998e: 225). 
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Indeed, the solution to a problem is reached not by logical justification 
but because there has been 'a change in men's points of view' (Dewey, 1998e: 
225). In effect, there is no final opinion upon the matter of what is, or is not, 
human; our humanness emerges out of social practices employed by humanity 
as it strives to make sense of the existence it suffers/undergoes.  
As we have shown, Dewey argues that our account of what is beyond our 
social reality is itself a product of our contingent social, historical and cultural 
circumstances, and says nothing about what is truly correct in all things in the 
ultimate sense. Nevertheless, there is a manner in which humanity can 
constitute a socially factual objective reality which can be put to normative 
purpose as a way of bringing the lives of individuals and societies into 
alignment with reality or environment (Dewey, 2002: 54-55). 
This aim of creating equilibrium between environment and community 
involves reality constitution as well as ongoing adaptive practices in light of 
that constitution. However, such coping is not a guarantee of success (Dewey, 
2002: 55). As we have shown, all coping, all truth, and all wisdom for Dewey 
are understood to have only moderate authority and cannot be expected to 
deliver in the future anything more than what good luck delivers.  
Just as Dewey implies a celebration of how we can as a species develop 
ways of coping with our limitations, we have shown that in a wider context such 
coping is limited and ultimately only a blind guess about the future. Dewey 
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implies, in other words, that we persevere with our dogmas because we must, 
even as we acknowledge that such hubris exists because we cannot escape our 
limits and simply see beyond our social and historical contingency into an 
external reality where truth is what it is and has very little to do with the 
constitutive practices societies employ in order to constitute their social 
realities. In other words, we have to go with what we have got, even if we know 
that such dogma is bound by its time and culture. We must, however, be 
prepared to drop these assumptions in an instant in order that we may come to 
learn new lessons as the consequences of previous actions become apparent (as 
conceived by the pragmatist maxim). But in what direction?  
For Gale, the summum bonum in Dewey’s thought is the concept of 
'growth'. By this Gale means the accomplishment of moral progress arrived at 
through dialogical engagement with a community which strives for a common 
outcome serving the interests and desires of the group (Gale, 2010: 72). This 
does not eliminate the indeterminacy which Dewey returns to in his arguments 
regarding the conditions of human existence, or the insufficiency of the self and 
the mind to realise all of our most cherished desires or to crush our least hopeful 
dreams (Dewey, 2002: 281). Nevertheless, triumphs, accomplishments and 
successes in a broad range of fields are possible, even if they are manifestations 
of fallible accounts of truth.  
For Dewey, there is no sense in which 'growth' is the instrument whereby 
such accomplishments must evolve, only that it directs us in principle towards 
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what may bring about such successes (Dewey, 2002: 283). Indeed, Dewey 
advocates that the role of experimental inquiry may help us to determine the 
path by which humanity may move towards greater fruits; however, this is only 
the case if circumstances permit (Dewey, 2002: 283).  
Gale incorrectly claims that Dewey orients towards a view where desires 
and interests are harmonised, and hence that Dewey is representative of an 
approach which 'reduces the normative to the factual' (Gale, 2010: 72, 73). Yet 
Dewey is clear that all truth claims are fallible (Dewey, 1998d: 203). As we 
have shown, the insufficiency of the self is built into his understanding. By 
necessity this places the agent in a position where the realisation of one belief or 
value comes at the cost of another. We argue that Dewey thus precludes the 
view that the harmonising of society is possible.  
Indeed, growth remains very much a manifestation of a forever 
reconstructing equilibrium which we define as the “wisdom” of a particular 
place and time. The wisdom of a particular place and time are constantly in a 
state of retransformation and reconstruction. Although there is a fundamental 
powerlessness inherent in the human condition, growth gives us directionality 
by creating the retrospective accomplishment of equilibrium; the possibility, 
that is, that dogma can be created in the first place. 
For Melvin L. Rogers, Dewey conceives of the self as reflective and able 
to engage in a process of deliberation through which the self is transformed and 
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made anew by the exercise of choice (Rogers, 2009: 186-189). Moreover, for 
Rogers:  
 
“It is the importance of the values within any normal person’s self-
conception and larger vision of what gives their lives meaning that makes 
choosing tragic” (Rogers, 2009: 187). 
  
In Rogers' view, “tragic” refers to the rejected beliefs and values 
discussed above; but Rogers also points out that the self conceives as internal to 
its identity a number of commitments or cherished beliefs that help bring social 
meaning to its own self-image (Rogers, 2009: 187). The tensions existing within 
the self make it difficult to reconcile its identity, and in a globalised world 
where norms and values are increasingly diverse, such vast commitments 
generate equally vast tensions (Frost, 2012). This fusion of self and society is a 
critical dimension of Dewey’s thought (Brinkmann, 2013: 88). As Brinkmann 
argues, Dewey distinguishes between the physical/biological sources of the self 
when it practices reflection, deed and emotion, from those which find their 
origin at the social level (Brinkmann, 2013: 88) Indeed, Dewey sees the social 
level as intervening within the self in such a way as to create shared experiences 
and understandings and the communication of commensurate social meanings 
(Dewey, 2008: 52-53).  
 113 
Dewey is also able to recognise that incommensurable social meanings 
and the ‘universes’ they constitute have a bearing upon each other. It is in their 
interaction and interpenetration that all social realities create consequences for 
each other. Logically, then, the self is constituted as a concrete social being 
within one social reality where social meanings are incommensurable. They are, 
thus, co-constituted within differing social realities where social meanings are 
indeed commensurable. The self is therefore a site of tensions, straddled at once 
across and within social realities and constituted by commensurable social 
meanings as well as some incommensurable ones. It is a social being that 
harbours ethical values which arise and co-exist as they go into the very makeup 
and form of the self.  
Sydney Hook, a sometime critic and sometime friend to Dewey, 
acknowledged the implicit tension within Dewey’s thought. On the one hand 
there is the hope and possibility that the promise of intelligence creates the 
possibility of realising our normative aspirations. On the other hand, there is the 
recognition that circumstances frequently arise in which certain norms or values 
must be prioritised over and above others which may be equally passionately 
held (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). Hook notes that Dewey understands there is a 
cost to realising a value and that the limits on the possibility of a moral world 
come not from the defeat of what is bad, or wrong, or evil, but rather come at 
the cost of the “rejected” value (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). This element of 
Dewey’s thought is congruent with Frost’s description of a “tragic” choice 
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whereby social actors are confronted with a choice between cherished beliefs 
regarding proper conduct (Frost, 2012). Hook likewise uses the term “tragic” to 
describe this element of Dewey’s thought (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). Although 
we do not maintain in this thesis that Deweyanism is a “tragedian” approach, we 
do think that this element of Dewey’s thought implies the presence of a tragic 
“agon” within the deliberative space of the human mind.  
Dewey has a vision of what could be described as the relentless 
“progress” of mankind towards a more liberal and technologically advanced 
society. Nevertheless, a vision is not “blind faith” – and as Putnam argues, 
Dewey advances a highly qualified view of “progress” by identifying the need 
for ever improving understandings in order to have the hope of realising it in 
practice (Putnam, 2004: 11). Identifying what goes wrong, as it were, is critical 
for finding a way to make things go right (Putnam, 2004: 11). Understanding 
what goes wrong can bolster an optimistic approach with richness and 
seriousness (Putnam, 2004: 11). Although this might seem like a crude or 
simplistic philosophical argument, Dewey's philosophical purpose was not to 
engage in ivory tower discussions but rather to “reconstruct” philosophy as a 
transformative force whereby collectives could use dialogue and practicality to 
create a better world. The vagueness of notions like “better” and “progress” is 
perhaps deliberate for Dewey as it might well represent his attempt to 
acknowledge the contingency and relativity implied by these terms. 
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Dewey is widely thought to take the view that value conflicts can be 
transcended. This view has been given weight by thoughtful scholars such as 
Westbrook, who has made a version of this argument (Rogers, 2009: 183). 
However, as Rogers argues, Dewey is uncertain about whether or not such 
conflicts can even be properly understood, still less transcended. Thus, we may 
discover that there is an ‘irreducibility’ inherent in these types of conflicts 
(Rogers, 2009: 185).  
This conception of value conflicts is found in Dewey’s famous work 
Ethics, in which he emphasises the need to choose between cherished values 
(Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 209). This even extends to choices between desired 
ends (Dewey, 2002: 278). When instances of incommensurability arise, the 
power of the intelligence to generate solutions is exposed as insufficient (Hook, 
1974: 10, 13, 22; Rogers, 2009: 183-189).  
Dewey expands upon this notion of value conflicts when he argues that 
there are various “modes” of normative reasoning which pit goods against 
goods, virtues against virtues, goods against virtues et cetera (Dewey, 1998a: 
315-320). Thus, for Dewey, inherent in the process of normative reasoning is an 
acknowledgement of human insufficiency regarding our inability to overcome 
these tensions (Dewey, 1998a: 315-320): 
 
"The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no 
evil presents itself as evil. Until rejected, it is a competing good. After 
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rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation” 
(Dewey 2002: 278). 
 
In this quote, Dewey identifies how “the bad” is a manifestation of 
choices made to “reject” certain values. Thus, in the context of his view that 
human insufficiencies are responsible for the need to make such a “tragic” 
choice, Dewey is in effect arguing that the agent, necessarily and inevitably, 
causes “the bad” of a situation to occur by attempting to make the best out of a 
difficult situation. To clarify, Dewey, like Morgenthau, perceives negative 
normative consequences arising from the manifestation of our human 
insufficiencies. 
The self as a concretised social fact is unable to escape the tragic agōn at 
the heart of its identity. This is not to say that the self is a tragic being, forever 
agonising and unable to find emotional relief without drowning itself in the 
sorrow of failure. The self for Dewey is rather a construction that reflects the 
collective identity as much as the individual. But how to choose? How to 
deliberate and act wisely? 
Dewey implies that the self cannot be fully in charge of its own identity 
because action itself helps shape the collective identity, which in turn engenders 
the identity of the self (Dewey, 1998i: 341-442). The self is fused in part with 
its own deeds and thus changes as the consequences of choices develop 
(Dewey, 1998i: 343). The self learns alongside the collective through the 
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development of consequences. The self can thus review its estimation of the 
value and worth of a particular choice or normative judgment (Dewey and 
Tufts, 1909: 209; Dewey, 1998h: 329). In estimating the value of a 
choice/judgement by reference to its empirical and concrete consequences, the 
self in combination with the collective is able to judge not just other agents but 
also their deeds (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 259-261). As learning progresses, and 
hence “growth” is accomplished, so the self learns what it is capable of 
achieving if it is lucky enough to have the fortunate circumstance found in the 
future (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261).  
The mesh that holds together this process of growth is dialogue, in 
particular the process of engagement whereby such dialogue engages the widest 
number of participants possible. This brings the energies and minds of the 
collective into a focused effort to realise a new equilibrium and thus to restore 
or demolish the confidence we have in our convictions/wisdom (Dewey, 2012: 
160; Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 180-181; Dewey, 1951: 589; Dewey, 2002: 217). 
We therefore think that in spite of his implicit awareness of the vast 
insufficiencies of the self, there is a great degree of hopefulness and optimism in 
Dewey’s thought. Much like Morgenthau and Niebuhr, Dewey understands that 
the development of theoretical thought offers huge scope for personal and 
collective growth. Dewey’s self may have a tragic dimension, but there is also a 
hopeful dimension that puts faith in the capacity of human intelligence, through 
the shared potential of collective energies and dialogue, to generate wise 
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convictions. We may celebrate what rigorous social scientific empirical inquiry 
can achieve. To engage in a process of deliberation and experimental discovery 
is to uncover not only the extent of our insufficiencies but also the potential to 
limit the impact of these insufficiencies upon our enterprises:  
 
“Conflict is acute; one impulse carries us one way into one situation, and 
another impulse takes us another way to a radically different objective 
result. Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of 
quality by reducing it to one of amount. It is an attempt to uncover the 
conflict in its full scope and bearings. What we want to find out is what 
differences each impulse and habit imports, to reveal qualitative 
incompatibilities by detecting the different courses to which they commit us, 
the different dispositions they form and foster, the different situations into 
which they plunge us” (Dewey, 2002: 216). 
 
Hence, when Dewey affirms the importance of growth, he is doing so 
with a clear understanding of the nature of the self as an insufficient being 
capable of comprehending the internal tensions within itself: a good way to help 
prioritise which values to favour. In Dewey's view, deliberation requires that we 
estimate the worthiness of particular judgments by investigating whether 
choices were or were not made in full awareness of the acute conflict between 
values (Rogers, 2009: 185). 
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Dewey, thus, embraces the notion that within the limits of our 
insufficiencies we are still capable of making value judgments. As such, 
deliberation and estimation are bound up in the judging of choices to be good or 
bad (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 3). Indeed, the purpose of normative reflection is 
to ‘give some guidance for the unsolved problems of life which continually 
present themselves for decision’ (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 4). In concrete 
situations, the suggestion that a choice or value judgement ought to be taken is 
not a retrospective action – that is, the return to dogma or the assumption that 
what worked in the past will work again – but rather a prospective act, a deed 
concerning the future which is done without certainty as to whether or not it is 
the right thing to do (Dewey, 1998k: 280).  
The self is forward looking and concerned to employ its intelligence for 
the purposes of building a better future. Although this may involve the sacrifice 
of certain cherished beliefs, ultimately developments drive learning and growth 
(Dewey, 1998k: 282-283).  
In The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, Dewey argues that scholars 
err in maintaining that the self is independent of events and happenings. On the 
contrary, we are highly influenced and partly constituted by the social world to 
which we belong, a manifestation of 'different ways of being in and of the 
movement of things' (Dewey, 1993a: 4). Ontologically, Dewey conceives of the 
self/mind as being procured by 'the course of events' as well as 'partaking in the 
course of events' in such a way that the 'presence' of 'future possibilities' serves 
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to encourage the self/mind to anticipate future events. Epistemically, it is in this 
process of anticipating and reflecting upon consequences that the knower comes 
to know and refine the best guess of wisdom in the manner outlined above 
(Dewey, 1993a: 4-5).  
The knower comes to know herself, as well as the world to which she 
belongs, not in terms of her 'antecedent fixity' but rather by treating events in a 
particular way, altering them so that they have meaning to her insofar that 
becomes better able to understand future situations or what might happen in the 
future (Dewey, 1993a: 1-4). Dewey very strongly implies that knowledge is 
value-based and can be evaluated through societal deliberation. Indeed, Dewey 
employs the notion of deliberation in relation to moral actions insofar as the 
social actor is shaped by his habits; these are a significant influence on how 
deliberation occurs (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 202-203). Habits arise in 
behaviour that occurred 'in the past' and which influence the present by means 
of conditioning the social actor (Dewey, 1958: 279). If Dewey argues (a) that 
social actors deliberate in a manner that is a matter of habits, and (b) that such 
habits reflect the influences which impact their deliberations, then it is logical to 
argue that the deliberation enabling value judgments to be made is a 
manifestation of the habitual norms of a particular group. 
 
Section Two: Political and Ethical Imperatives  
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Richard Bernstein’s examination of Dewey’s ethical thought advances 
the view that democracy is not some other form of associated life but a direct 
extension of the life of communities (Bernstein, 2010: 72). Moreover, 
democracy does not bifurcate governors and governed but fuses both within a 
shared government that incorporates the sum of all the citizenry (Bernstein, 
2010: 73). Dewey contends that there is scope for any citizen to cultivate the 
competence required to govern without the assistance of any aristocratic elite 
(Bernstein, 2010: 74-75). Indeed, Dewey does not advance a view of any 
particular member of the demos being called upon to govern at any moment. 
Rather, it is the case that any member of the demos may become a joint partner 
in the practice of governance amongst other citizens. As Rogers argues:  
 
“For Dewey, however, citizens do not merely authorize the use of power and so 
legitimize political action, but are genuinely authoritative. Among their contributions, 
citizens contextualize and give purpose to expertise; otherwise such expertise would 
be meaningless. This view is premised on yet another claim, namely, that in matters 
of politics there can be no political expertise independent from the wisdom of the 
public. A democratic understanding of collective problem-solving thus envisions 
deliberation as emerging from the relationship among experts, political 
representatives, and the larger public. This ensures, he believes, that justification of 




For Dewey, thus, any particular individual within a broadly inclusive 
dialogical practice of knowledge creation, including those who perform policy 
and political practices, do indeed engage with expertise. This expertise emerges 
amongst those who engage dialogically across the demos in the broadest sense 
of the term.  
To bring our hermeneutic method to bear, we interpret this as indicating 
that Dewey is alert to the metra of the individual and thus the need to pool the 
insights and standpoints of the widest possible demos in order to constitute the 
most warranted assertion possible. Allegorically, this is just as the audience to a 
tragedy is in better a position to understand the position of the tragic heroes than 
the heroes themselves. The audience has the advantage of knowing a wider 
amount of information than is available to the bounded characters on stage, 
often as a result of the chorus directly feeding the audience information of 
which the heroes are unaware. The audience is thus in a position to understand 
the ignorance of the hero to the metra of things. Although Dewey’s demos 
cannot be free from metra, it nonetheless evades the hubris of assuming that the 
individual is capable of greater knowledge, through reason or any other means, 
than the pooled insights reached through collective dialogue and inquiry.  
 
For Dewey, democracy must rest upon its capacity to replicate itself 
across the generations: for that, the educative process is critical in the 
establishment of such norms. Indeed, the process of education is the mechanism 
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through which the individual is drawn into the culture of the society to which he 
belongs (Pring, 2017: 346-347). Moreover, Dewey puts a requirement upon the 
collective to constitute “norms that shape and control behaviour” so as to meet 
“the expressed needs” of all members (Waks, 2017: 11). In our view, the core of 
Dewey’s ethical and political imperative is that the demos is best served through 
the creation of the knowledge necessary to reproduce collective norms that 
underscore democratic life. Insofar as it is amid these collective practices that 
an individual comes to take on a measure of political agency, this individual 
will use the educative process to reproduce those features of democratic living 
most essential to the well-being of the demos. 
Therefore, the imperatives within Dewey’s thought are linked to his 
democratic ethics and the need to secure a democratic way of life that supports 
the well-being of the demos. The nature of democratic life is such that there is 
an openness to dialogue, a readiness to seek out opinions and alternative values, 
an openness to engage in critical dialogues and to have access to relevant 
information (Pring, 2017: 347). Such things are necessary to accomplish to the 
fullest extent possible the Deweyan style of inquiry that aims to pool the 
insights of the widest possible demos.  
 
Furthermore, the pooling of insights also highlights the inherent value of 
every contributor to dialogue, thus indicating the role of equality in determining 
the quality and ethics of any particular inquiry. As Dewey states, “It means that 
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every existence deserving the name of existence has something unique and 
irreplaceable about it” (Dewey, 1998L: 46). This notion of equality is linked to 
the contribution that any individual can bring to the knowledge-creating 
dialogue, but it also maps onto the ideal of democracy that Dewey advocates. 
Dewey’s pooling of insights strives to achieve a number of things. First, 
to address the specific, concrete and socially applicable, as opposed to ivory 
tower, problems which command Dewey’s attention (Putnam, 2004: 28, 99-
100). Second, to disprove the notion that reason (as the product of a scholarly 
activity) can be divorced from practices (undertaken in order to obtain them) 
(Dewey, 2008: 64). Third, to isolate rational discourse from ‘anything outside 
itself’ is to shut down any debate about how the cultural circumstances may 
have impacted the manner in which knowledge is produced (Dewey, 2008: 64-
65).  
To bring our methodology to bear, we can see that for Dewey intellectual 
metra is manifested in the manner in which intellectuals turn towards 
rationalistic conceptions and juxtapose them to cultural norms even though such 
a distinction overlooks how knowledge fuses both as an outcome and as a form 
of practices. The focus upon practical matters represents an acceptance that the 
metra of things demands that certain imperatives be taken. There is little value 
in engaging our intellectual resources into building perfect theories that can 
resolve any manner of intellectual problem. It is more pressing to address the 
practical problems that arise and face the demos and engage our intellectual 
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energies in this manner; the outcome then serves as a way of addressing the 
needs of the demos. 
Dewey’s ethical imperatives employ the notion of “ends-in-view” which 
“denote plans of action or purpose” that draw upon knowledge that is arrived at 
through inquiry and is manifested as warranted assertions, and is better 
understood as a “mode of operation that will resolve the doubtful situation” 
(Dewey, 2008: 169). Dewey’s ethical imperatives exercise “genuine moral 
judgement” which examines the situation in its empirically concrete and social 
forms and supplies practice-oriented knowledge which may supply the right 
means of operations through which a resolution to ethical dilemmas might be 
ascertained (Dewey, 2008: 169-170). Hence we can speak of Dewey’s ethical 
imperatives being situational in the sense that just as the end-in-view may well 
change given the views of the demos, so it is that empirically informed ethical 
judgments can likewise change if the circumstances require such adaptations 
and changes.  
To interpret, then, Dewey evades the risk of hubris by acknowledging the 
mutability and limited authority of knowledge and judgements and even of 
ethical and political imperatives. Nevertheless, in terms of our wider conception 
of metra, Dewey maintains a firm commitment to keep limit such imperatives to 
the status of warranted assertion and never to permit such assertions to be 
transformed into rationalistic absolute claims.  
 126 
It is from this stance of respecting the measures of things that Dewey is 
able to argue that there are no pre-determined responses to particular ethical or 
political predicaments (Dewey, 2008: 169-170). The exercise of what Dewey 
calls intelligence, very much requires the individual and the collective to 
understand the metra of their intellect, their knowledge and their situation and to 
be prepared at a moment’s notice to abandon all pre-existing imperatives and 
choices if they appear to not meet the need of that situation. The metra of things 
are always in dynamic change and transformation, so it must be that our ethical 
and political imperatives must also be in a state of transformation.  
The uniqueness of each social, political and ethical predicament requires 
a unique response as well as the view that whatever problems are encountered 
must find their resolution not as an expression of applying rational maxims but 
rather on a case by case basis employing a wider cultural analysis as well as 
being prepared to adopt new values or to reform these values if it required to do 
so. Dewey therefore invites dialogue into the examination of the values and 
knowledge through which the metra of things is managed in both the wide and 
narrow senses of the term. Moreover, this may require that the democratic 
culture which underscores such a dynamic and dialogical approach to adaptation 
also requires that the culture of each individual ethos or imperative be also 
investigated. A warranted assertion is produced whenever inquiry produces the 
requisite knowledge necessary for a resolution of a particular problem, in the 
broadest sense of the term (Dewey, 1951: 559). Nevertheless, owing to the 
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metra of human intellect, such a “resolution” need not be thought of as adding 
weight to a particular set of “truths” that ought to have the authority to act as a 
social and cultural loadstar. Indeed, the mutability of any warranted assertion is 
certainly necessary in order to evade the hubris of assuming too much of the 
human intellect: that is to know how to develop maxims capable of addressing a 
host of political and ethical problems through the exercising of reasoning alone.  
To interpret, then, Dewey is alert to the metra of human intellect and 
understands that such limitations mean that there cannot be discovered the 
essential nature of things or indeed the absolute truths through which the 
resolution of all problems might be attained. Such alertness leads Dewey 
towards embracing the notion of warranted assertions and thus evades the 
nemesis which could arise if we were to assume that our knowledge represented 
the true imperatives necessary to make the measures of things irrelevant to 
human beings insofar as they could manage and thus transcend their impact. 
The furies would be rendered irrelevant and there would be nothing to stop a 
particular warranted assertion from taking on the significance of absolute and 
immutable truth.  
Dewey argues that democratic ethos where the end-in-view is to build 
adaptive knowledge and values, as well as to resist dogmas which restrict our 
lives as we encounter new opportunities (Dewey, 2002: 100). For Dewey, “the 
ethos and spirit of a group is the decisive factor in determining the system and 
meanings in use” (Dewey, 1998g: 82). Thus, because the ethos of democracy is 
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something special in that it represents more than simply another form of 
government through which to organise a sovereign state, it evokes political and 
ethical imperatives which engender a certain type of world. This world is one 
that is shaped by the notion of “equilibrium.”  
Indeed, for Dewey, an ethos is a dynamic thing which facilitates or 
renders effective any temporary equilibrium established between the demos and 
its situation. The whole notion of equilibrium in Dewey fuses the notion of 
warranted assertions arrived at by pooling the insights of the widest possible 
demos alongside the political and ethical imperatives required in order to shift 
the demos in the direction of an accommodation with their environing 
circumstances.  
To interpret, then, Dewey is alert to the measures of things as they are 
manifested within the natural circumstances that bear down upon the demos as 
it strives to make sense of its environment. Such metra is, however, not 
mastered or transcended, but rather the demos find as its imperatives the need to 
establish some measure of equilibrium between the societal and the natural, 
both of which are embedded with metra and are constituted as “real” as a 
consequence of the production of knowledge into all aspects of our world.  
 
And perhaps at the heart of Dewey’s imperatives is to act upon the 
potential of democracy as an ideal to which the fullest fruition of dialogue and 
equilibrium become possibilities:  
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“Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life. It is the ideal of community life itself” (Dewey, 1998h: 295). 
 
Furthermore: 
“Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by 
all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such 
as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good 
shared by all, there is insofar a community. The clear consciousness of a communal 
life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy” (Dewey, 1998h: 295). 
 
Therefore, the democratic world achieves in its ideal form the fullest 
fruition of social and communal life that a collective can reach. However, the 
measure of democracy’s place within that world is its capacity to engender 
some kind of equilibrium.  
In order to assess the extent of Dewey’s ethical relativism it is helpful to 
establish an account of what this might look like in a social setting: 
Baghramian’s provides such an understanding in arguing that:  
 
“Once we accept that there are many such communities, and that their 
practices tend to vary substantially and even be at conflict with each other, 
then the sociological account of truth ends up giving us diversity and 
incompatible conceptions of truth, rationality and objectivity. Historically, 
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there have been many occasions when different communities of enquirers 
have agreed on different - and incompatible - beliefs. To explicate truth in 
terms of intersubjective agreement is to concede to one of the key points of 
relativism: that truth is dependent on local and changing norms and 
conceptions” (Baghramian, 2004: 148). 
 
In light of this we can see that Dewey does indeed have a measure of 
ethical and political relativism within his thought as it is the case that Dewey’s 
theory of knowledge is designed in such a way as to advance the notion that 
contingency is central to the determination of the meaning of knowledge-
claims. Moreover, as we saw above, Dewey conceives of the world as a product 
of knowledge practices. Nevertheless, Dewey’s notion of equilibrium provides a 
loadstar against which some measure of the extent to which the demos is 
adapted to the metra of things does provide an orientation to Dewey’s ethical 
and political standpoints. Even if we cannot know what is good in the absolute 
sense, we don’t really need to know more than a warranted assertion in order to 
achieve a measure of adaption as well as the development of democracy as a 
means of coping with the metra of things.  
 
Indeed, Dewey’s view of knowledge, which is that it defined by its 
fallibility, draws upon the notion that insights arising out of and through the 
demos are sufficient for the purposes of establishing an equilibrium. Although 
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there is for Dewey no value-free or contingency-free ethics, there are more than 
enough warranted insights through which to dialogically integrate into 
warranted knowledge in order to accomplish our ends-in-view. Such an ethical 
and by extension political imperative is, in our interpretation heavily impacted 
by the broader definition of metra that we outlined in the literature review. The 
intellectual metra of the self and indeed of individual self-reliance, such as 
which follows from the use exclusively of reasoning, is acknowledged and left 
unchallenged. But that the scope for warranted knowledge, even fallible 
knowledge still remains. In the next section, we take our interpretation of 
Dewey and apply it to world politics.  
 
Section Three: Application to World Politics  
 
Generally speaking, Deweyan political thought can be applied to world 
politics without much difficulty and indeed, as Cochran argues, that Dewey can 
be considered an “international thinker” (Cochran, 2010: 309).  
Just how Dewey conceived of the domestic polity as a composite of 
differing interdependent stakeholders, so it is that Dewey conceives of the world 
community as largely defined by a diversity of interests and actors which, in the 
era of globalisation are industrially interdependent: indeed his writing as early 
as 1902, as well as during World War One, point to the centrality of webs of 
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industrial interconnectedness which shape the ideal form that international 
relationships should take (Cochran, 2010b: 309). 
Generally speaking, Dewey conception of world politics is that there are 
problems, at the level of the domestic polity, and by extension the level of the 
world polity: “the problems of men” penetrate as deep as the domestic level and 
as high as the level of the world community; the best management of these 
interconnected levels of analysis and policy takes, in the Deweyan political 
agenda a collectivist form and moreover the ethical yardstick by which a state 
may be evaluated is by the extent to which it constructs collectivist institutions 
designed to further the interests of what we call the global demos (Cochran, 
2010b: 311, 313). Dewey correctly gauged that modern nation-states lack the 
means to adequately manage the problems that their societies collectively share 
and thus there is an ethical need to look beyond the boundaries of the nation-
state towards any actor which might play a role in advancing solutions to the 
problems of mankind (Cochran, 2010b: 314-315).  
To bring our methodology to bear, Dewey grasps the measures of things 
in world politics and comes to the realisation that in order to mitigate the impact 
of the metra of nations, their aggressiveness and their propensity to put the 
interests of their own states ahead of the interests of addressing the problems of 
mankind on a collectivist level.  
At a policy level Dewey’s support for the USA’s involvement in global 
conflicts arose in the context of the role that he thought that the USA could play 
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in developing the kind of global political collectivist institutions necessary for a 
transformation of circumstances that favoured the individual citizen of the USA 
(Howlett, 1977: 4-5). However, this policy is in tension with his reluctance to 
endorse the exercise of the institutions of, and policy of, war-making (Cochran, 
2010b: 321-323; Howlett, 1977: 4-5). On balance Dewey acknowledges the 
metra of not acting and advances a positive case for USA interventionism which 
it is hoped would bring about an ethical reorganising of world politics. The 
metra of pacifism informs his agon and thus puts him in a position to answer the 
question: how can the USA act in such a way as promote the ethical reordering 
of world politics such that supranational institutions may take on the burden of 
governance with regards to our common problems.  
Collectivism manifests itself as in opposition, in Deweyan thought, to 
anything which gets in the efficient management of the problems of mankind. 
That is, the problems of mankind required a collective response from mankind, 
and the directionality of his political thought extends beyond the measures of 
the nation-state or the boundary of international sovereignty into the global 
demos and in doing so juxtaposes the advantages of supranational collectivism 
over and above ongoing inter-state competitiveness. Dewey advances an ethical 
view which aims at the advancement of the flourishing of all human beings, not 
just the citizenry of any particular nation: something which is also true of 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr.  
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In our reading, Dewey would have agreed with Putnam’s view that 
questioning and critique should not be limited in scope or target (Putnam in: 
Rogers, 2009: 52). There is very little that should be spared the inspection of 
thinking or criticism; our ability to examine our own convictions and cherished 
beliefs is of extreme significance if the social actor is to avoid the worst 
excesses of its blindness to the truth of its circumstances. The blindness of the 
social actor is highlighted in moments when it finds itself no longer walking 
along the edge of a cliff but has unknowingly walked a long way off the edge 
and is currently in free fall.  
Even our attempts to determine matters of justice are limited by our 
blindness and anything that we perceive to be objective in such matters is an 
inference arrived at through an examination of consequences (Dewey, 2012: 
51). Dewey conceives of all things as existing in a concrete form; however, 
their “essence” has no real representational form beyond the meanings we bring 
to them. The human conditions of existence are a vacuum of emptiness where 
“events” are random and “an infinite number of meanings” collide and form 
into configurations that serve to confuse as much as clarify (Dewey, 1958: 318-
319). It is the responsibility of the collective to make sense of these random 
things and to participate in the dialogues and practices through which 
normatively useful meanings can be organised and tamed so that they can be 
used in order to effect social change (Dewey, 1958: 318-319). When Dewey 
writes that the “possibilities of conjunctions are endless, and since the 
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consequences of any of them may at some time be significant, its potential 
meanings are endless” (Dewey, 1958: 319), he highlights how possibilities are 
open and endless: the sky is the limit in terms of creating new worlds. And it is 
the experience - and choices - of the collective that makes the difference 
between these worlds as they render meanings upon the existence that they find 
themselves experiencing.  
Dewey takes even metaphysics to be produced by this process of meaning 
formation within the intersubjective space (Margolis, 2002: 16). The suffering 
of existence that the collective undergoes is part of the process of meaning 
formation. Because it is a human activity, so it is a fallible outcome: the world 
that emerges is one defined by social and historical contingency.  
Inquiry begins naturally: the overarching sense is that to practice valuing 
as a process of giving and exchanging reasons, refining and reinterpreting 
significations, in a manner in which an account of what is wise proves to be, in 
retrospect, a valuable way by which human communities can in a practical 
manner adapt dynamically to the evolving situation.  
Dewey shares with Brandom a concern that “we remain answerable to the 
world of social and natural phenomena and so engage in an objective affair 
without also making the more dubious claim about corresponding to the real” 
(Rogers, 2009: 52). Although Brandom is making a point about how to be 
objective without becoming ontologically realist, he is also highlighting how the 
collective interacts with and is responsible in the context of the world it 
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experiences. Dewey understood the collective to be thus so, trapped in a 
condition in which there is no guidance as to how we should act in order to act 
wisely - certainly an atheist proposition - but we have natural responsibilities 
that reflect directly our participation in our world. This has epistemological 
force: the collective is responsible to the truths to which they have already 
committed themselves (Brandom, 2011: 30). That is, in the absence of guidance 
directly from the universe, we must embrace our historically inherited wisdom 
and act either to transform that knowledge if it no longer works for us or to 
respect its authority because it serves a normative function. And what is the 
medium through which such transformation or respect is communicated across 
the collective? It is the social activity and practice of inquiry - as manifested 
within dialogue - that constitutes the discursive basis of the collective agent 
(Brandom, 2011: 30).  
As Brandom and Dewey argue - epistemologically - in the asserting of 
hypothesis/justified beliefs, the inquiring social actor makes commitments to 
truth-claims which bind downstream inferences that the social actor is entitled 
to make given prior commitments. On a purely common sense level, to assert 
that the Earth is both the centre of the solar system and that it orbits the Sun is 
to render the view discursively incoherent and of no epistemic, ontological, or 
ethical/normative value. What is implied in this argument, for Dewey and for 
us, is that what is done in the process of reflection is to produce inferential 
consequences with regards to the assertion of truth, which occasion in 
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combination with the ongoing dynamic process of the inquiring practice, an 
inferential structure - which is called an objective structure by Brandom - 
compels the responsible inquirer to limit further truth-claims such that they are 
structured in a manner which imbues these truth-claims with a quality which 
cannot be achieved by the self, acting on its own epistemic authority (Rogers, 
2009: 92). 
Such a triumph - the capacity to cope at all - is all the more impressive 
because it occurs in an existence which provides inherent normative guidance; 
there are no natural laws upon which the collective can lean back upon. We 
have only to make sense of this existence through the production of worlds that 
have their own logic as a result of the human origin of the significations used to 
make sense of these worlds. And the inquiring practice that this takes place is 
inherently dialogical.  
In this way, we can appreciate the normativity implied in understanding 
because it is performed through dialogue within a collective in order to take 
responsibility for our own affairs. Whatever fallibility may exist in our 
blindness, the accomplishments of the collective nonetheless is the 
accomplishment of its internal dialogue realised in an existence without 
naturally occurring guides.  
As has already been noted in this chapter, Dewey's norms do not imply a 
straight forward instrumentality of collective response to chaining situations - 
the autonomic response of automatons responding deterministically to stimuli - 
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rather it is the intervention of collective thought and choices into its situations 
that renders these responses democratic. It also fuses the outcomes of dialogical 
inquiry with the enriched understandings of the collective: what insights are 
produced represents the common-sense and practical thinking of the 
demos/collective as well as incentivising certain social habits over others. That 
is, the incorporation of the demos into the process of creating wisdom is of 
paramount importance to Dewey’s attempt to achieve growth. 
Indeed, in The Public And Its Problems, Dewey argues that individuals 
come to be connected within a “human association” and in the process of 
associating internalised norms which are in fact the product of intersubjectively 
arrived at social habits (Dewey, 2012: 52-53). These social habits - practices of 
dialogical meaning generating - bring about the social construction of the self 
and even its awareness of itself (Dewey, 2012: 52-53). Thus, at the basis of 
many elements of what counts as social affairs, the self, the collective, the 
notion of usefulness, normativity et cetera, all these arise out of the habitual 
processes of intersubjective dialogue and knowledge/meaning making. 
For Dewey collective life acquires a normative character that mere 
associated living lacks: the collective creates emotional and intellectual support 
that enables a more enriched consciousness to be sustained (Dewey, 2012: 123). 
Both bridge the gap between natural and social phenomena and both are 
renderings of “collective action” (Dewey, 2012: 123-124). Dewey implies a bias 
towards collective life insofar as it is the normative character of this grouping 
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that lends itself to the hope that through collective agency and thought - i.e. 
inquiring dialogue - a conscious understanding of the unfolding of 
consequences is possible (Dewey, 2012: 123-124). This is important as for 
Dewey it is in understanding the unfolding of consequences that we can posit or 
surmise hypotheses regarding just and wise actions.  
We see in this the beginnings of inclusivity and democracy for Dewey. 
The collective has a certain mode of internal communicating and a dialogical 
means of inquiry. There is no attempt by Dewey to hold out a portion of the 
collective for special consideration. All parts of the demos have a part to play.  
The collective agent can act most wisely when it embraces the diverse 
sources of opinion and debates from across its classes and divides. This 
inclusivity towards the demos is consistent with Dewey’s epistemological 
vision of dialogical inquiry as something that should be unhindered and open. It 
is more than simply an ethos, it is a rendering of the demos into potentiality, an 
attempt to focus political and social energies into a force through which we may 
come to have the best guesses about what is wise, just or true. All of the demos 
participates in this most inclusive of democratic dialogues (Dewey, 1993a: 4-5). 
Indeed, Dewey values the inclusivity of the demos, because to employ a 
dialogue in this way, maximises the possibility of there emerging an 
equilibrium between the world and the collective which is an ideal version of 
success for Dewey (Dewey, 1993a: 4-5). Such an inclusive dialogical inquiring 
practice achieves a certain quality.  
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Indeed, quality must come from the elimination of dogma and limitations: 
there must be no limits upon dialogical interaction within the collective and 
nothing and no one should be excluded from ethical conversations: the liberty of 
all in the collective to have the right to participate is the best quality outcome to 
be accomplished. The implication is that elitist inquiry can occasion a measure 
of wisdom, however, successful adaptation to the world must come from 
incorporating all the demos into a greater conversation which is in pursuit of a 
more valuable wisdom. 
For Dewey, in viewing democracy to be a matter of good inquiry, and in 
the productive practices whereby wisdom is refined through dialogical 
engagement, Dewey identifies demos-inclusivity with epistemic and normative 
accomplishment. That is, the best guess of wisdom, is best generated by the 
widest conversation possible.  
For Dewey, this association is spelled out in Science and Free Culture, 
where Dewey argues that in societies where opinion is closed and closely 
controlled by a governing elite - such as in Soviet Russia - then “a general 
atmosphere of control of opinion cannot exist without reacting in pretty 
fundamental ways upon every form of intellectual activity - art too as well as 
science” (Dewey, 1993b: 49). Dewey implies thus, that to shut down or control 
and limit the intellectual freedoms of the demos has by necessity a deleterious 
effect upon the quality of the wisdom obtained through dialogical inquiry. In a 
discussion concerning the value of the scientific ethos - in this case regarding 
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the exposing as spurious various forms of propaganda - Dewey develops the 
opinion that it is possible to educate the demos as a whole as to what is or is not 
trustworthy forms of information and it is this which is said to avoid the 
possibility of pseudo-public opinion being created through deception (Dewey, 
1993b: 57). The scientific spirit is held up as that which is able to assure the 
very possibility of a public opinion which is enriched enough - in terms of 
substantiated, systematic, and competent knowledge - to withstand the impact 
of deceptive propaganda (Dewey, 1993b: 57). Implied here is an element of 
faith and hope that the democratic way is not some arbitrary normative position 
which is the equivalent of some other socio-political system, but rather a 
qualitative mechanism to get the best out of a collective and for that collective 
to live up to its own potential in the fullest. Inclusivity is central to that promise.  
Such a unity is in prospect about meeting the expectations of the demos. 
The capacity of the demos to take responsibility for its own well-being is 
something that must extend outwards to the whole of society and to every part 
of the demos. Indeed, as Brinkmann argues a 'community' is in Dewey’s 
understanding is not an arbitrary collection of people but rather it is a 
manifestation of a group of people whose interests, and wellbeing, is accounted 
for and a good community has normativity when it coheres around shared 
interests and understandings; that is, where there is a fair measure of solidarity 
(Brinkmann, 2013: 136). 
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Indeed, when Dewey argues that intolerance and hostility directed at a 
specific quarter of society must deny that minority or group 'all human qualities' 
(Dewey, 1993c: 227), it is implied that tolerance and inclusivity which confers 
more upon a community than simply a certain ethical status from which it draws 
its legitimacy; the community is wiser because it is more inclusive of all of the 
demos.   
It is an effective, indeed wise community, which embraces the widest 
possible engagement in the pursuit of good adaptation to the situation of the 
day. Although the scope of solidarity may supply a greater wisdom, the absence 
of solidarity, however, weakens the fruits of science, runs contrary to the 
practical notion that a wider debate is a richer and more detailed debate, and 
increases the probability of maladaptation and the loss of wisdom.   
However, while this relative and inclusively produced wisdom generates 
growth and thus hope of equilibrium between society and environment, this 
process takes place within the moment of the present and takes place within the 
constraints of human limitations. Dewey at once affirms the value of the 
democratic ethos by associating it with adaptive epistemic means to generate 
growth and the possibility of a better equilibrium, and at the same time affirms 
that the achievement of wise choices defined by growing knowledge remains 
fallible, relative to the community and by extension unable to push beyond the 
limitations of human beings and establish ultimate values. What represents 
optimism of a positive adaption and equilibrium is exposed to be once again 
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measured down by its limits and our inability to know the consequences of our 
actions in the present upon the future course of events. The optimism implied 
by the inclusive dialogical process is revealed to be, for Dewey, continent 
fallible and subject to the dangers of ill fortune. 
In other words, society only comes into being for Dewey, once its 
members begin to act in an inferentially objective way; that is to say, to become 
aware that a greater thirst will accompany drinking the well dry, therefore, it is 
wiser to let the well replenish itself and to only take what little is needed; 
assertions about future consequences are held accountable to past truth-claims.  
Moreover, Dewey conceives of community life as the same thing as 
democracy as something of which the ideal realisation is impossible and thus, 
we argue along with Brinkmann, that for Dewey, community life/democracy is 
of great normative value (Dewey, 2012: 122; Brinkmann, 2013: 136). To do 
what is better, what is wiser, is to care about all the component parts of a society 
in order that the society achieves a greater aggregate than would be achieved 
without such solidarity: 
 
“In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name 
for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in 




Therefore, Dewey’s position takes the sum of wisdom to be amplified 
through solidarity within the demos as they employ inferential objectivity in 
order to better adapt to the situation which is manifested within, and across, 
social realities.  
As Hook argues, intelligence ‘tries to make it possible’ for individuals 
and societies to cope with our limitations and the inevitable tensions which arise 
within ourselves because of the incommensurability of certain ‘good and rights 
and duties’ (Hook, 1974: 19). As we have shown, these socially constituted 
tragic tensions are found in the interweaving of the self and the social levels, 
thereby embedding within each ‘self’ a tragic agon that undermines the hope 
that our judgments will ever be perfectly good. As Dewey acknowledged, 
judgements made in order to make moral and ethical progress must come at the 
cost of a ‘rejected good’ and as Hook and Dewey argue, at the heart of all 
judgments is found a ‘tragic sense of life’ (Hook, 1974: 13).  
As Dewey argues, the constraining limitations which impact the free hand 
with which a society acts to promote its interests, incentivise the society to 
create wisdom and promote positive consequences in the future (Dewey, 1998e: 
311). However, such constraining limitations do not remove for society the 
opportunities to work within these limits in order to create as much progress as 
possible  (Dewey, 1998e: 314).  
As Putnam argues, this is the optimism within Dewey, it is a strategic 
optimism designed to constitute our worlds around in terms of the restrictions 
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and constraints which bear down upon societies (Putnam, 2004: 11). But then to 
strive to find any possible way to push back these limitations, and as Dewey 
writes: 
  
“The good can never be demonstrated to the senses, nor be proven by 
calculations of personal profit. It involves a radical venture of the will in the 
interest of what is unseen and prudentially incalculable. But such optimism 
of will, such determination of the man that, so far as his choice is concerned, 
only the good shall be recognized as real, is very different from a 
sentimental refusal to look at the realities of the situation just as they are. In 
fact a certain intellectual pessimism, in the sense of a steadfast willingness 
to uncover sore points, to acknowledge and search for abuses, to note how 
presumed good often serves as a cloak for actual bad, it a necessary part of 
the moral optimism which actively devotes itself to making the right prevail. 
Any other view reduces the aspirations and hope, which are the essence of 
moral courage, to cheerful animal buoyancy; and, in its failure to see the 
evil done to others in its thoughtless pursuit of what is called good, is next 
door to brutality, to a brutality bathed in the atmosphere of sentimentality 
and flourishing the catchwords of idealism” (Dewey in: Putnam, 2004: 11). 
 
Conclusion to chapter three:  
 
In this chapter we have built our interpretation of Dewey’s thought as 
consistent with the metra of things. Managing the measures of things takes 
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place through a process of epistemological, dialogical and inclusivist inquiry. 
At the level of world politics the ethical and political priorities of adaptation to a 
forever evolving situation are understood to be best managed by pooling the 
insights of those who can participate in inquiries that address the shared 
problems of the widest possible self in its collective form.  
 
The manifestation of metra comes from the modest view of knowledge 
and truth that Dewey holds and knowledge itself can be abandoned if it is no 
longer useful in some fashion regarding the managing of the problems inherent 
in a situation. This leads Dewey to advocate a rejection of dogmatism. The 
alternative that Dewey provides is one that evades the need to ground truth into 
anything in particular but instead offers the existential insights that there are 
limits and measures in all things and that such things have consequences for us 
all at all levels of society. The response to such consequences is a contingent 
and forever evolving practice of building knowledge through dialogue with the 
widest possible group of contributors.  
 
There is no guarantee that the optimum policy will be generated through 
dialogue, and Dewey acknowledges that all we can do is hope that our answers 
are in some fashion an appropriate response to our collective needs. Dewey’s 
grasp of the metra of things, however, indicates the presence of the wisdom of 
insecurity that comes from a realisation that limitations are real and that things 
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constantly change. This in our view is a tragic account in so far as it does not 
provide an escape from hubris, but rather acknowledges that we simply cannot 
know if today’s knowledge will build tomorrow’s solutions. We can only hope 
that through inclusivity and shared practices of knowledge building we may just 
be able to achieve some measure of policy and reform needed to meet our 
collective needs at the level of world politics. Although nothing is guaranteed 
and thus we are required to forever “return to the drawing boards” if our 









In our interpretation of Niebuhrian thought, we view his conception of 
the self to be defined not just by its capacity to overshoot metra, and thus 
generate “tragic ironies” but also as something defined by metra in the broader 
sense of the term that we discussed in the literature review and in the 
introduction to this thesis. In the broader sense of the term, metra conceives of 
things to have measures which extend beyond those things that human beings 
can manipulate (for right or wrong). As such, the self is without the requisite 
means to take control over the process of history and thus determine its own 
destiny. 
For Niebuhr, there are specific circumstances that contextualise the self 
which are conceived of by a discursive view that integrates both his Christian 
faith (which he calls either a Biblical faith or a neo-orthodox faith) and his 
understanding of the modern conditions of existence:  
 
“It is to be noted that the great Christian existentialists, Pascal, Luther, 
Kierkegaard, thought in a world in which modern science had not radically 
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altered or was just beginning to alter the conception of nature. Modern 
Barthians blithely disregard the evidences of modern science as if they did 
not exist” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 233). 
  
Thus, Niebuhr’s understanding of the self, as something that acquires 
identities that arise within the context of the cultural-historical contingencies of 
a particular time, leads him to grasp the importance of bringing into harmony 
modern worlds and what he regards as Biblical truths (Rice, 1993: 1219-130, 
160). Commentators, however, such as Dewey, point to how Niebuhr is much 
like Kierkegaard insofar as they both have somewhat lost faith in “traditional 
statements” concerning Christian faith and yet are striving to contrive 
“something which supplies to them the gist of Christianity - what they find 
significant in it and what they approve of in modern thought” (Dewey in: Rice, 
1993: 160).  
Niebuhr belongs to modern times and thus must find some way to 
accommodate the modern world which he inhabits with the Biblical truths 
which his faith requires him to hold. Evidence of his modern way of thinking is 
illustrated by his biographer June Bingham, who points to how Niebuhr 
condemns the fanaticism of religious extremists by stating that “bad religion can 
be worse than no religion” (Niebuhr in: Tjalve, 2008: 63). 
To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear, then, we can see that 
Niebuhr understood the metra of dogma in the sense of holding onto the 
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traditional statements regarding the Biblical faith in a time when the 
contingencies of history and culture have evolved through history to produce a 
modern world where those traditional statements no longer seem to have the 
warrant that they once had. Niebuhr is conscious of this metra, and thus moves 
to advance an understanding which recaptures the modern self and introducing 
into it an identity which can inhabit modern worlds and also maintain the faith 
in circumstances where it could be washed away by naturalist accounts of 
history. 
Niebuhr thus moves to separate a naturalist account of history, and 
thereby, we infer, expose the metra of that position, and the human history in 
which metra is comprehended and the pattern of its impact can be discerned 
over time. Indeed, for Niebuhr “modern apologetics” must make a “radical” 
distinction between the natural world as manifested in the passage of history 
and human history “in which the true God is encountered” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 
233-234). That is not however to argue that a rational theory of God’s impact 
can be made through some sort of historical inquiry.  
Niebuhr understood the role that faith can play in escaping the closed 
cage of reason that would otherwise attempt to lock inside itself all things 
(Niebuhr, 1986d: 236). Niebuhr finds this rationalised account of all things to 
be restrictive and prohibitive with regards to one of the most significant features 
of the Biblical conception of the self, that is, its ability to render the seemingly 
capricious nature of suffering experienced by the self (either individual or 
 151 
collective) as instances of divine judgement (Niebuhr, 1986d: 236). Viewed in 
this way, divine judgment is contextualised by the hope of salvation that goes 
beyond a rationalised conception of all things: 
 
“This faith in the sovereign of a divine creator, judge, and redeemer is not 
subject to rational proof, because it stands beyond and above the rational 
coherences of the world and can therefore not be proved by an analysis of 
these coherences. But a scientific and philosophical analysis of these 
coherences is not incapable of revealing where they post beyond themselves 
to a freedom which is not in them, to contradictions between each other 
which suggest a profounder mystery and meaning beyond them” (Niebuhr, 
1986d: 236). 
 
For Niebuhr, such mysteries are manifested in and through human history 
and it is his understanding of this history that it is meaningful and that it “passes 
through the sense of the tragic to a hope and an assurance which is “beyond 
tragedy” (Niebuhr ,1937: x): 
 
“This is a wisdom beyond human knowledge, but not contrary to human experience. 
Once known, the truth of the gospel explains our experiences which remain 
inexplicable on any other level. Through it we are able to understand life in all of its 
beauty and its terror, without being beguiled by its beauty or driven to despair by its 
terror” (Niebuhr, 1986a: 85). 
 
 152 
The self, thus, finds itself within a world where there is a means of escape 
from the tragic circumstances of life so long as it aims to avoid certain pitfalls 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. Niebuhr advances a view of the 
self as a finite being that can through the power of The Lord find satisfaction in 
its transformation into “a new life” consisting of “love, joy and peace” 
(Niebuhr, 1986d: 236).  
Interpreting, then, Niebuhr grasps the metra of things, including the 
broader definition and defines this as being trapped within a tragic world where 
the self is subject to endless tragedies. However, owing to his faith, Niebuhr 
establishes that there is a means to achieve “a new life” and thus push beyond 
tragedy but only if the metra of things are observed.  
This is also a view that is consistent with Niebuhrian thought. Indeed, 
Niebuhr’s account of the radical freedom of human beings, i.e. as having the 
capacity to decide for themselves their choices and behaviours, renders the self 
into an ethical agent. Nevertheless, such an agent is also limited by its 
intellectual metra, in the broad sense, and its inability to manage the future 
outcomes that can be said to control the passage of history.  
Applied to world politics, Niebuhr identifies the metra of collectives in 
both senses of the term metra. On the one hand the collective manifested as the 
nation-state is conceived of as overshooting metra and thus falling prey to its 
own self-image as eminent, and thus engendering a pretentiousness or false 
pride in its own accomplishments and power. Owing to the dynamic of hubris 
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and nemesis in Niebuhrian thought, such pride comes before a fall: the cycle of 
pathos, and irony manifests itself throughout the history of world politics and 
human history in general exposing the lack of wisdom or insight on the part of 
those who do not adequately grasp the metra of things.  
We read Niebuhr in this chapter in light of the previous chapter on 
Dewey in order to advance the dialogue between our three heritage scholars. 
Just as we did in the case of Dewey, we understand Niebuhrian thought to be an 
answer to questions embedded within his standpoint. We will in this chapter 
create an interpretation of what those questions might be. Again, to reiterate, 
our purpose here is not to construct answers to the question of the truth of 
Niebuhr’s thought, but rather to interpret his work, his texts, in a way that 
provides new meaning as a result of the fusion of horizon between the horizon 
of our understanding of the text and our own horizon employing the tragedian 
concepts we developed in the methodology chapter. This process will be 
repeated in the next chapter on Morgenthau’s approach to world politics.  
 
 
Section One: The Self and Judgment in Niebuhrian Thought 
 
Just as we began the chapter upon Dewey with an interpretation of the 
self, and its relationship to the practice of judgement making, so we also have a 
section in this chapter in this chapter. These themes replicate themselves across 
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our interpretations of the three scholars in order to facilitate the dialogue within 
which they are placed in this thesis.  
Niebuhr advances a conception of the sort of knowledge that the self, as a 
finite and intellectually limited being, can produce. Such knowledge is not just 
limited, it also arises in historically contingent circumstances: Niebuhr 
understood social meanings to arise only within “the flux of history” and the 
importance of rejecting accounts of history which claim to have transcended 
such a flux (Niebuhr, 1986: 234). Moreover, for Niebuhr the content of any 
interpretation of history must reflect the “governing” beliefs which are prevalent 
at the time and in the culture of those who construct those beliefs (Niebuhr, 
1952: 152). There is thus, in Niebuhr, as in Dewey, a strong sense of the 
plasticity of our warranted beliefs and an understanding of how such beliefs 
reflect our historical and cultural contingencies.  
Niebuhr conceives of the self as in a position to understand nature and its 
dynamics up to a point, and to have scope to exercise its freedom in such a way 
as to shape the process of history (Niebuhr, 1944a: 3). The self is a creator of 
the historical process as well as something which stands within the “flux” of 
that process (Niebuhr, 1986d: 234; Rice, 1993: 140). The self is also somewhat 
free of nature insofar as it has the capacity to register insights into what is 
eternal under its own power (Rice, 1993: 158). Niebuhr even understands the 
self to be somewhat mysterious and requires this sense in order to retain a 
religious outlook (Rice, 1993: 157-158).  
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To bring our hermeneutic approach to bear, we interpret this dimension 
of Niebuhr’s thought to mean that the self is, in Niebuhr, defined by its metra, 
in the broader sense of the term. The self is a finite being, and thus even the 
intellectual and the theorist, can only secure some degree of knowledge 
concerning all things before the limits of human nature make their presence felt 
to the thinker or any human being. Niebuhr understands our knowledge of the 
self to be limited to the status of a warranted assertion, but he goes much further 
than Dewey, and suggest that there are even more mysteries to the self that even 
the religious will struggle to understand. Niebuhr is content with such 
limitations and focuses upon that aspect of human life which can be moulded to 
fit his ethical approach: the agency of the self as a being with freedom and the 
capability to make ethical and political judgments.  
Such judgments must take place, however, in the context of the 
conditions of human life. Whereas Dewey envisages human life to be involved 
in a plastic universe that reflects our limited capacity to grasp the nature of our 
world as well as to manage such a world, Niebuhr argues that there are 
consequences for attitudes and actions that run contrary to how it is that 
Christians ought to behave.  
Niebuhr understood good and bad behaviour to be visible in the passage 
of history itself, and indeed, Niebuhr understood that it is, amongst other things, 
within the passage of history that God encounters human beings (Niebuhr, 
1986d: 234). For Niebuhr:  
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“God is encountered in judgements whenever human ideals, values, and historical 
achievements are discovered to be in contradiction to the divine rather than in simple 
harmony with the ultimate coherence of things” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 234). 
 
To interpret, then, these contradictions often become instances of where 
the self oversteps the just metra of things, in the narrow sense, which has been 
designed by The Lord as measures we ought not cross and then we are punished 
for its sinfulness through nemesis and thereby fall into patterns of history that 
Niebuhr claims to be empirically visible throughout history as it unfolds. 
However, there is also metra in the broader sense insofar as the self is totally at 
the mercy of divinity, its metra has distinctive limitations that puts it in an 
extremely vulnerable position to either The Lord or the Greek Gods.  
Unlike in tragedy, however, Niebuhr understands The Lord to be a 
merciful God and judge and thus is fully prepared to forgive any particular 
human being who strives towards contrition and to put an end to their sins 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 332; Niebuhr, 2008: 155). 
For Niebuhr, insights into how to behave in a way that is consistent with 
the moral laws found in the Gospels, can be found in the deployment of a 
Christian lens through which to interpret the sum of human history (Niebuhr, 
1937: x-xi). History, to the extent that it can be understood, must be understood 
through a Christian lens (Niebuhr, 1952: 151-153). In our view, Niebuhr 
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conceives of history as displaying a certain pattern which, in the context of his 
Biblical insights, leads him to think that history has a directionality and order to 
it that will ultimately find its resolution at a specific point (Niebuhr, 1937: x-xi).  
Niebuhr thus sets out two layers: (a) the layer of history as it plays out 
through human agency and consequence and (b) how this somewhat “tragic” 
process is ultimately dissolved by God: in Beyond Tragedy Niebuhr argues that: 
 
‘It is the thesis of these essays that the Christian view of history passes 
through the sense of the tragic to a hope and an assurance which is ‘beyond 
tragedy’. The cross, which stands at the centre of the Christian world view, 
reveals both the seriousness of human sin and the purpose and power to 
overcome it. It reveals man violating the will of God in his highest moral 
and spiritual achievements (in Roman law and in Jewish religion) and God 
absorbing this evil into Himself in the very moment of its most vivid 
expression. Christianity’s view of history is tragic insofar as it recognises 
evil as an inevitable concomitant of even the highest spiritual enterprise. It 
is beyond tragedy insofar as it does not regard evil as inherent in existence 
itself but as finally under the dominion of a good God’ (Niebuhr, 1937: x). 
 
To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear then: the self in 
Niebuhrian thought can achieve satisfaction in the form of religious piousness 
and its metra need not be seen as resulting in an outcome to its existence that is 
limited by that metra in the broader sense of the term. The significance of the 
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Niebuhrian view is that it provides a means of managing the metra of things and 
even, to believers at least, a way of transcending metra and pushing beyond the 
tragedy of human life.  
Indeed, for Niebuhr, were the Gospels untrue, it is implied, then 
existence, life and all of history would be defined by ‘pure tragedy’ (Niebuhr, 
1986a: 84-85). This quote illustrates how Niebuhr distances himself from the 
kind of tragic vision of the self that we embrace in terms of our own horizon. 
Furthermore, Niebuhr distances himself from ‘pure tragedy’ when he writes: 
 
“The pessimism of Greek tragedy is somewhat different from that of the 
philosophers and most nearly approaches the Christian interpretation of life. 
But, unlike Christian thought, it has no answer for the problem it presents. 
In Aeschylus and Sophocles the capricious jealousy of Zeus against mortal 
men of Homeric legend had been transmuted into the justified jealousy of 
the ultimate principle of law and order against the lawlessness of human 
passion. But unlike the philosophers, the dramatists see human passions as 
something more than mere impulses of the body. The principle of order and 
measure, represented by Zeus, is constantly defied by vitalities in human life 
which are creative as well as destructive. The tragedy of human history 
consists precisely in the fact that human life cannot be creative without 
being destructive” (Niebuhr, 1941: 11). 
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Pure tragedy, for Niebuhr, incorrectly portrays human creativity and 
vitality as defiance of divine order, that life cannot be “creative without being 
destructive” (Niebuhr, 1941: 11). Individuals who defy the advice to moderate 
their creativity come into defiant conflict with or between divine beings, and for 
Niebuhr this conflict finds no solution or resolution within pure tragic discourse 
(Niebuhr, 1941: 11-12).  
To bring our horizon to bear, then, Niebuhr remains doubtful of the 
notion that the metra of things, in the broader sense of the term, can be managed 
by the self either as an individual or as a collective. This, we think puts Niebuhr 
at odds with Dewey, insofar as Dewey incorporates a spirit of experimentalism 
into his pragmatism and thus is able to see in practice if a particular metra can 
be well managed. For Niebuhr, the limitations of human beings give the self an 
opportunity to behave in line with the metra of things in the narrow sense of the 
term and thus to alert us to the discipline that we ought to expect for behaving 
in a sinful way. The most important sin, is the sin of pretentiousness: 
 
“For the destructiveness in human life is primarily the consequence of 
exceeding, not the bounds of nature, but much more ultimate limits. The 
God of the Bible is, like Zeus, “jealous”. But His jealousy is aroused not by 
the achievements of culture and civilisation. Man’s dominion over nature is 
declared to be a rightful one. Divine jealousy is aroused by man’s refusal to 
observe the limits of his freedom. There are such limits, because man is a 
creature as well as creator. The limits cannot be sharply defined. Therefore, 
 160 
distinctions between good and evil cannot be made with absolute precision. 
But it is clear that the great evils of history are caused by human pretensions 
which are not inherent in the gift of freedom. They are a corruption of that 
gift. These pretensions are the source of the ironic contrasts of strength 
leading to weakness, of wisdom issuing in foolishness” (Niebuhr, 1952: 
158). 
 
The Biblical view of the self, as defined by its free will, can act in a 
manner consistent with The Lord’s will, and this brings about the hope and 
possibility that salvation can be achieved (Niebuhr, 1952: 158; Niebuhr, 1986a: 
85). However, for Niebuhr pretensions and a false sense of the self’s eminence 
is ubiquitous throughout human history and thus frequently results in tragic and 
ironic reversals of fortune. Intervention not from the furies, as the Greeks would 
expect, but by The Lord for whom “the children of darkness” have come to rule 
across the historical process.  
 
The inevitability that the self will employ its free will and the gift of 
freedom to misbehave and attempt to build its own eminence is central to 
Niebuhr’s conception of the self. Indeed, this vision of life is informed by his 
understanding of how sin, or what could be called misbehaviour, is ‘pitiful,’ 
hence a pathos, and happens whenever the self, in its individual or collective 
forms, adopts an exclusive reliance upon what is revealed through its own mind, 
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as well as when a hubristic pride becomes manifested because of a false 
confidence in one’s own “eminence” (Niebuhr, 1937: 167-168).  
Although Niebuhr acknowledges that it is anxiety which frequently drives 
the self to sin, often arising from reflections concerning the indeterminacy of 
their own existence, Niebuhr sees this as no excuse for sinning (Niebuhr, 1941: 
266). Although to an extent an understandable response by the anxious self to 
take self-responsibilty for their own wellbeing and safety in an indeterminate 
and potentially threatening reality, for Niebuhr this is a sinful deed that reflects 
a doubt in the will of The Lord to deliver what is just to all peoples (Niebuhr, 
1941: 266-267; Niebuhr, 1941: 212, 267-269; Niebuhr, 1963: 15-16). 
To bring our own horizon to bear, Niebuhr’s conception of the self as 
sinful for acting in a responsible manner would seem to set the bar for the self 
very high, and to imply that “the children of light” have to face no tragic agon 
and the metra of things do not in effect apply so long as the self employs 
practices which are consistent with the Bible and the Gospels.  
 
Attempts, that is, to assume responsibility for one’s own safety, as well as 
sense of certainty, is the sinful reaction which comes from the absence of 
humility to divine grace. We thus bring about further sin, i.e. pride in our 
accomplishments and in overcoming such uncertainties (Niebuhr, 1941: 266).  
We interpret the following quote to mean that for Niebuhr, the “defect” in 
the self is illustrated in how, such as in the case of the Garden of Eden, it may 
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misbehave and rebel against what The Lord has determined to be its best 
interests. The self eventually comes to “weep for itself” and thus in doing so 
creates the right conditions for its eventual repentance and eschewal of 
excessive pride or hubris (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). Although not a total or “pure” 
tragedy, as there remains a measure of hope that some belong to the saved 
citizenry of heaven, as in the Augustinian framework, it nonetheless explains 
(implicitly) much of history as a pattern of managing, and sometimes escaping, 
the consequences of overshooting the metra of things:  
 
“The cross does not reveal life at cross purposes with itself. On the contrary, 
it declares that what seems to be an inherent defect in life itself is really a 
contingent defect in the soul of each man, the defect of the sin which he 
commits in his freedom. If he can realise that fact, if he can weep for 
himself; if he can repent, he can also be saved. He can be saved by hope and 
faith. His hope and faith will separate the character of life in its essential 
reality from life as it is revealed in sinful history” (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). 
 
For Niebuhr, free agents may misbehave and abuse their freedom, and create 
pretension.  
To bring our horizon to bear upon this, we view this line of arguing to be 
one where it is somewhat restrictive to conceive of nemesis as arising only as a 
result of a particular set of circumstances. The metra of the self, in our view, 
and in Dewey’s, is such that whenever and for whatever reason, nemesis occurs, 
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it would be foolish to claim that this is a result of a handful of factors, when in 
reality each nemesis may be unique to that particular circumstance. We are not 
in an intellectual position to narrow down the causes of nemesis into a pattern 
which seemingly brings meaning to the sum of the human historical process. 
This would seem to overstep the metra, in the narrow sense, of the self/thinker 
for whom there is no timeless way to determine the causes of nemesis as tightly 
and as specifically as Niebuhr does in his standpoint.  
This is not to say that the Niebuhrian account does not provide a 
contribution to our understanding of world politics, only that its account of the 
consequences of metra is somewhat narrow and restricted as a result of his 
religious commitments.  
However, while Niebuhr describes the experiences of modern man as 
belonging to “the category of pathos,” and nemesis arising from divine 
judgement upon human pretensions, there remains the hope that the self will 
exercise its freedom in a way consistent with the of the “children of light” 
(Niebuhr, 1944a: 19; Niebuhr, 2015a: 777): 
 
“Man is the kind of animal who cannot merely live. If he lives at all he is bound to 
seek the realization of his true nature; and to his true nature belongs his fulfilment in 
the lives of others. The will to live is thus transmuted into the will to self-realisation; 
and self-realisation involves self-giving in relations to others. When this desire for 
self-realisation is fully explored it becomes apparent that it is subject to the paradox 
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that the highest form of self-realisation is the consequence of self-giving, but that it 
cannot be the intended consequences without being prematurely limited. Thus the will 
to live is finally transmuted into its opposite in the sense that only in self-giving can 
the self be fulfilled, for: “He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life 
for my sake shall find it”.” (Niebuhr, 1944a: 19). 
 
To bring our horizon to bear then, this passage gets to the heart of 
Niebuhr’s answer to the question, how do the children of light live in a way that 
is consistent with the Gospels. Niebuhr hopes indeed that humanity will find it 
within their hearts to embrace the notion that there is a paradox of self-
realisation that in order to advance self-realisation the self must “loseth his life” 
through a standpoint of self-giving. However, his political and ethical 
imperatives answer the question of what if the self does not find it within its 
heart to embrace such an ethic of giving.  
Niebuhr is not naïve, and indeed, is highly attuned to what he refers to as 
“a contingent defect in the soul of each man, the defect of the which he commits 
in his freedom” (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). Although Niebuhr conceives of life as 
“capable of destroying the evil which has been produced in it” his outlook 
continues to draw attention to how it is that the self frequently gives into its 
anxieties and attempts to build a measure of security for itself and thus opens up 
the road to sin (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158).  
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These ironies are found in their strongest whenever there is a defiance of 
divine laws by the idolatrous “pretensions” of individuals and collectives, who 
make themselves the final “source and ends” of life: something which leads 
Niebuhr to argue that there is an implicit vanity amongst the pretentious that is 
manifested as a belief that they themselves are more magnificent than the divine 
(Niebuhr, 1986b: 24). For Niebuhr, to mistake oneself to be “God-like” is 
something manifested in history in cases where politics contrives to embolden a 
nation-state to such an extent that it begins to over-stress and exaggerate its 
accomplishment or “eminence” (Niebuhr, 1937: 212). The tragic ironies of 
history play out, thus, within the history of International Relations whenever the 
eminence of nation-states and “civilisations” is exposed as false by a divine 
judge: the very source of the presumed “eminence” becomes the very internal 
vulnerability that occasions divine judgment (Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986b: 24-
25):  
 
“Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one 
side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature 
and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature 
aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic 
aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. 
They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and 
civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not 
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by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues” (Niebuhr, 1937: 
212). 
 
Tragic ironies occur for Niebuhr in a manner that exposes the negative 
impact of employing reason as a tool to quell the self’s inner anxieties arising 
from its own indeterminate situations. A reliance upon knowledge which is 
revealed exclusively by reason, is singled out by Niebuhr as particularly at risk 
of vulnerability insofar as it often creates, in particular on the part of collectives, 
a sense of pride which can all to easily turn into the sin of “pretension” 
(Niebuhr, 1993: 154-155; Niebuhr, 1960: xxix). This occurs in the context of 
how the nation-state develops an exaggerated sense of its own entitlement and 
thus adopts a righteous attitude with regards to what it regards as an 
infringement upon its national interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 154-155; Niebuhr, 
1960: xxix). Thus, for Niebuhr, there is an association between how the self 
puts into practice the transformation of rational theory into policy, and the sense 
of entitlement and frustration that rational policy, such as a policy designed to 
advance the national interests of the collective, encounters opposition.  
 
In the case of the USA, Niebuhr was concerned that the self-idolatry, i.e. 
excessive pride or superbia, in itself would prove a more fundamental threat to 
national wellbeing than Soviet Communism (Tjalve, 2008: 76). If it was the 
case that the USA was a special case of excessive pretension and an excessive 
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sense of its own eminence, then there would surely be, in Niebuhr’s formula, a 
tragic ironic consequence to this extreme disregard of the notion that it is only 
through making The Lord the ends of our lives that tragic ironies may be 
mitigated. Indeed, and drawing upon the standpoint of Augustine, Niebuhr 
writes:  
 
“Augustine’s conception of evil which threatens the human community on every level 
is a corollary of his doctrine of selfhood. “Self-love” is the source of evil rather than 
some residual natural impulse which mind has not yet completely mastered. This 
excessive love of self, sometimes also defined as pride or superbia, is explained as the 
consequence of the self’s abandonment of God as its true end and of making itself “a 
kind of end”.” (Niebuhr, 1986e: 125). 
 
Moreover, the power of The Lord is not to be doubted for Niebuhr for 
whom the Old Testament connects the exercise of divine power with the sense 
of vulnerability that human beings have in the face of such power:  
 
“God is the ultimate source of that indestructible order in the world against 
which man’s pride and self-will beat in vain. Here Christian faith, drawing 
its conceptions of divine justice from the teaching of the Old Testament 
prophets, reveals similarities with the interpretations of the Greek tragedies, 
in which the power of Zeus is conceived of as the final order and power 
which ultimately defeats all lesser majesties and forces which are arrayed 
 168 
against it. All lesser sources of power, which seek proudly to usurp the 
position of Zeus, are finally brought low” (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24). 
 
Such lesser forces include the nation, which in a moment of self-idolatry incurs 
a terrible nemesis: 
 
“In the Bible, particularly in Hebraic prophetism, there is no question about 
this point. The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial 
defiance of the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible 
character of His wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of 
history” (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24). 
 
 
In this Niebuhr is setting out his view that there can be no doubt that self-
love or pretension, or hubris, will lead to the terrible intervention of The Lord 
and thus makes it incumbent upon the self to make judgements which mitigate 
this ironical and pathetic situation. Niebuhr’s thought thus identifies the wisdom 
of rooting out this pride where possible by “a repentant attitude towards false 
completions of life” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 235).  
 
Section Two: Ethical and Moral Imperatives  
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The intellectual scene of the mid-century in the USA was characterised 
by an optimistic, liberal and positive pragmatic outlook which in no small part 
was defined by John Dewey. Hans Morgenthau, indeed, as a representative of 
having had a “European” education discovered his new adopted country of the 
USA to have a climate of excessive optimism and an overreliance in his view 
upon ahistorical or pragmatist approaches (Frei, 2001: 184). Morgenthau found 
that the USA was a society that deeply favoured the notion of the scientific as 
well as a general acceptance of the notion of “progress” (Frei, 2001: 181, 186). 
For Morgenthau, US society believed that science would bring under the power 
of reason the chaos of modern life and thus by a form of alchemy bring about a 
better society (Frei, 2001: 186).  
Morgenthau was not alone in this reaction to the intellectual climate of 
the time. Indeed, Niebuhr reacted in much the same manner to many idealists 
for whom the badge of “historical optimism” was added and described this 
upwards progression of science leading towards the accomplishment of good 
ends (Frei, 2001: 186). The term is apt insofar as it does indeed reflect how for 
idealist scholars in mid-century America there was a considerable hope that the 
progress of reason could be used to benefit mankind as a whole (Niebuhr, 1993: 
153-154, 156). For Niebuhr, reasoning does not represent a medicine to treat 
social problems because it alone cannot persuade other social and political 
actors to behave differently from what they would otherwise do (Niebuhr, 1993: 
155-156). The light of reason alone is not sufficiently powerful interest groups, 
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such as wealthy capitalists, to act against their material interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 
155-156). Indeed, Niebuhr found the whole notion that the social sciences could 
through the exclusive practice of intellectual activities generate the same kind of 
transformation of the world that the natural sciences had accomplished in the 
Victorian era; indeed, the notion that all that is required for the social science is 
to catch up with the success of the natural sciences, the so called “cultural lag” 
argument, is something that Niebuhr finds problematic (Niebuhr, 1993: 156-
157).  
For Niebuhr, historical optimists err in their optimistic beliefs that 
intellectual enterprises are sufficiently capable of acting as instruments through 
which the delivery of normative progress in politics and international relations 
can take place (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). The ‘moralist’ and the ‘educator’ are both 
interchangeable parts of historical optimism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxii). They 
represent idealistic rationalism which overlooks or poorly understands 
(Niebuhr, 1959: 116). A critique of moralism is found when Niebuhr writes in 
1959 that:  
 
“The educational enterprise for this nation, in short, must include a thorough re-
examination of the problems of political morality, which will help the new generation 
to understand that any consideration of power and interest in analysing the peace 
within a nation and among the nations need not be a cynical defiance of the moral 
order but can well be what responsible statesmanship has always been: an effort to 
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coerce competitive and contradictory human aspirations and interests into some kind 
of tolerable order and justice. Such a task is a highly moral one” (Niebuhr, 1959: 
116). 
 
Niebuhr’s approach to moralism and the need to redesign the conception 
of a whole generation such that they will acquire the necessary practices needed 
in order to continue the furtherance of “order and justice” is central to his 
understanding of how historical optimism will be transcended and an alternative 
more resilient approach to ethics and politics might be born. Such an approach 
must not repeat the mistakes, or pathos of rational man.  
Indeed, the pathos of rational man is a manifestation of the tragic ironies 
that we find within the general patterns of history (Niebuhr, 2008: 154). 
Niebuhr conceives of rational man as hubristic in attempting to aggregate 
human achievements as part of a cumulative pattern of development such that 
the progression of history, as it were, carries the progress of society and ethics 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion and sees in such 
hubris an implicit “desire” that “would keep man’s ends” that is to say his 
destiny firmly “under his control and in his power” (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). 
Rational Man aims to “prematurely to complete” the historical process 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 332). If mankind proceeds down a path of self-reliance then a 
“false centre” to life is constructed and thus a failure to trust in divine 
deliverance (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158): 
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“The Biblical view of human nature and destiny moves within the framework of irony 
with remarkable consistency. Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden of Eden 
because the first pair allowed “the serpent” to insinuate that, if only they would defy 
the limits which God had set even for his most unique creature, man, they would be 
like God. All subsequent human actions are infected with a pretentious denial of 
human limits” (Niebuhr 2008: 158-159). 
 
Humans exercise in their freedom the capacity to overstate their stature 
and thus cultivate pride in their eminence; this is how Niebuhr conceives of 
“original sin” (Tjalve, 2008: 63).  
 
To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret this view to indicate that for 
Niebuhr, the metra of things, the measures that The Lord sets down, have been 
overstepped since the time of the mythical Garden of Eden. Indeed, in 
Niebuhr’s Biblical vision, this myth serves to illustrate the origin of original sin 
and such a notion brings with a clear ethical (and indeed political) imperative: 
do not be like Eve and be defy the metra that The Lord has established. That is, 
to observe the boundaries and measures in all things and to act responsibly with 
the freedom that has been given to all human beings or else face nemesis and 
the tragic ironies of history.  
Niebuhr’s polemic battle with historical optimism stems from this 
opposition to Niebuhr’s opposition stems from his own conviction that human 
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life and history is profoundly shaped by dimensions which are beliefs central to 
his own faith, and what he calls his ‘historic religion’ (Niebuhr, 1986c: 13). 
There is no scholar for whom Reinhold Niebuhr held to be the best example of 
historical optimism than that of John Dewey and in particular his concept of 
‘intelligence’ (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Niebuhr argues that the exercise of 
‘intelligence’ in Dewey’s Pragmatism is problematic in over-emphasising the 
extent to which disinterested reason can be used as a tool to achieve social 
change (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). As we have seen in the preceding chapter 
Dewey’s conception of intelligence is a dialogical approach which draws in the 
insights from the widest possible number of contributors and is not a 
rationalistic approach based upon non-contingent a priori.  
Niebuhr rightly advances the notion that reasoning can never exist as a 
neutral or independent force within social interactions, however, he is quite 
wrong in suggesting that it is Dewey that advocates an unbiased and 
autonomous conception of reasoning or to have erroneously overstated its 
possibilities and potential (Niebuhr, 2013: xxix-xxxvi). However, as we have 
seen, Dewey is alert to the metra of things and it underscores most of his 
thought.  
Nevertheless, this attack upon Dewey exposes the directionality of 
Niebuhr’s ethical and political imperatives insofar as it exposes his forceful 
anti-idealist stance.  For Niebuhr, the application of disinterested reasoning is a 
useless palliative given the depth of human corruption (Niebuhr, 2013). This is 
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not surprising given Niebuhr’s view that our humanness is highly amenable to 
corruption, largely pride based, and it is this which frequently characterises our 
social struggles (Niebuhr, 1941; Niebuhr, 1943; Niebuhr, 2013).  
Niebuhr saw it as folly to think that disinterested reasoning can remedy 
social ills, merely by educating away any ignorance on the part of those who 
might stand in the way of social progress (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Only 
through a contest of power can justice be accomplished (Niebuhr 2013: xxx-
xxxi). “Social inertia” is caused, argues Niebuhr, by “predatory self-interest” 
and this is something that the idealist fails to grasp (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx): 
 
“Pure idealists underestimate the perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties, 
operating as a counter force against the achievements of the wider community” 
(Niebuhr, 1944: 176). 
 
For Niebuhr, it is the corruption inherent in human nature that 
impregnates social relations with challenging roadblocks that resist the 
accomplishment of political justice, and this is all the more so at the level of 
international politics (Niebuhr, 2013). 
In the preface to Moral Man, is implicitly identified with the “moralist” 
or the “educator” and is generally criticised as assuming that “the egoism of the 
individual is being progressively checked” in part by “the development of 
rationality” and in part by “religiously inspired goodwill” through which “social 
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harmony between all the human societies and collectives” can be induced 
(Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). “Moralists” Niebuhr argues: 
 
“disregard the political necessities in the struggle for justice in human society by 
failing to recognise those elements in man’s collective behaviour which belong to the 
order of nature and can never be completely brought under the dominion of reason or 
conscience” (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). 
 
As with “moralists” so it goes with “educators” who Niebuhr criticises 
for inappropriately employing natural science “experimentalism” in the social 
sciences as a means of generating knowledge for the purposes of “moral and 
social pedagogy” (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Chief amongst scholars 
advocating “experimentalism” for Niebuhr was John Dewey (Niebuhr, 2013: 
xxx-xxxi; Niebuhr, 1993: 156; Niebuhr 2008: 80-81). For Niebuhr, Dewey’s 
supposed “abstract and sterile” thought is simply another “rationalism” (Rice, 
1993: 23).  
Niebuhr took up the polemic against the “educator” and liberal 
reformists, for whom Dewey was counted amongst their leaders, and discounted 
them for their failure to understand the importance and centrality of conflict, 
coercion and violence in the shaping of political outcomes (Craig, 2003: 32-33; 
Fox, 1985: 136). For Craig, Niebuhr understood John Dewey’s political thought 
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as “hopelessly idealistic in a world of self-interest and conflict” (Craig, 2003: 
33).  
Williams illustrates how some scholars employ a certain way of arguing 
whereby he establishes certain “types” which represent various belief-systems 
and are moulded so as to be what are in effect over-simplifications of what is 
basic to that tradition (Rice, 1993: 18).  Such a style of arguing permits broad 
brush strokes of grand cultural criticism (Rice, 1993: 18). Niebuhr does indeed 
employ this style of arguing; as Rice suggests Dewey’s pragmatism is a 
casualty of these broad strokes (Rice, 1993: 18-19).  
In Pathos of Liberalism Niebuhr characterises Dewey’s political ethics as 
unable to recognise the insufficiency and limitations upon human beings 
(Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Niebuhr’s Dewey, he implies, drastically overestimates 
the capacity of “reason” to act as a restraining and moderating force upon the 
social conflicts that are inherent in politics (Niebuhr, 1993: 154): for Niebuhr, 
Dewey errs in failing to acknowledge “the subordination of reason to interests” 
(Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Furthermore, as Westbrook argues, Niebuhr’s Dewey 
represents no more than ‘a sunny exponent of the inevitable triumph of human 
intelligence’ (Westbrook, 1991: 525). Such a ‘rosy optimism’ erred for Niebuhr, 
because it ‘neglected and repudiated politics’ as well as the ‘struggle for power’ 
(Westbrook, 1991: 523-524).  
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“The invariable implication of this assumption is that, with a little more time, a little 
more adequate moral and social pedagogy and a generally higher development of 
human intelligence, our social problems will approach solution” (Niebuhr, 2013: 
xxx). 
 
Niebuhr famously declares: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible; man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (Niebuhr 
in: Bingham, 1972: 17).   
Against his own gritty historical overview Niebuhr points to the 
“gradualism” of Dewey” supposedly “rationalist” alternative (Fox, 1985: 136). 
In Niebuhr’s version of Dewey, the pragmatist takes “reason” to propel the 
course of history in a progressive direction (Fox, 1985: 136). Niebuhr’s Dewey 
is a rationalist for whom there is an inherent force within history within the 
historical process itself which advances almost automatically liberal “progress” 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr writes of philosophers who view the sum of the 
whole historical process and think that there is a ‘cumulative’ pattern through 
which human beings reap the rewards of their own accomplishments (Niebuhr, 
1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion when he argues implicitly that 
history itself cannot redeem; such things are, by contrast, the exclusive 
responsibility of The Lord (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). For Niebuhr, human hubris 
and error are manifested in history and are “prompted by the desire” that 
“would keep man’s ends under his control and in his power” (Niebuhr, 1943: 
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331). Indeed, history is “tragic” because there is always an attempt by men to 
take control of their own destiny, to bring it under their own power and to 
“prematurely to complete” the historical process (Niebuhr, 1943: 332). This 
attempt to take control of their destiny arises from an exclusive reliance by the 
self upon reason alone.  
Furthermore, in his famous The Irony of American History, Niebuhr 
specifies how it is the “pretension” of human beings that is a constant 
throughout history (Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This represents the pretension of 
thinking that human destiny can be taken under the control of human beings 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 331-332). For Niebuhr “the whole drama of human history is 
under the scrutiny of a divine judge” and it is the pretensions of human beings 
in taking their destiny under their own control which invites a divine “laughter” 
(Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This echoes the relationship between hubris and nemesis 
in tragedy. The pretensions of individuals/collectives incur hubris, i.e. the error 
of thinking oneself to be godlike or capable of dictating the course of history. 
This hubris is judged by the gods and they choose to impose their wrath upon 
humans to punish them for their hubris. However, unlike in tragedy, Niebuhr 
sees The Lord as a merciful judge who favours human aspiration and who may 
well forgive those who mitigate their pride and who are contrite in recognising 
their vain pretensions (Niebuhr, 1943: 332; Niebuhr, 2008: 155). 
Echoing his earlier arguments that the self in its collective form can 
become a conduit for the transmuted desires and selfishness of the self in its 
 179 
individual form, Niebuhr argues that in devoting itself to the cause of a nation, 
it can become evil (Ashworth, 2014: 235; Niebuhr, 1944a: 9-10) Whereas “the 
children of light” strive to bring self-interest “under the discipline of a higher 
law” (i.e. the law of self-realisation through self-giving) evil “is always the 
assertion of self-interest without regard to the whole” regardless of whether or 
not the whole is understood to be “the immediate community” or “the total 
community of mankind” (Niebuhr, 1944a: 9).  
Niebuhr, thus, provides the answer of needing to restrain the destructive 
potential and indeed evil of the nation-state to his wider question of what to do 
if the self in its collective form beings to sin. At one level it requires an 
awareness of the nation-state’s capacity to do great evil such as in how it can 
command the “devotion” of a collective and thus “may become evil” because it 
ignores the whole in the pursuit of its own self-interest (Niebuhr, 1944a: 9-10).  
It can also do great evil as a result of its inherent lack of self-restraint as 
explained in Moral Man and Immoral Society where Niebuhr’s overarching 
argument can be summarised by Ashworth: 
 
“To Niebuhr the central problem of human societies was that, while 
individuals were capable of moral behaviour because they can sacrifice 
themselves, collectivities and societies of people were not. Rather, groups, 
including states, are amoral entities whose power can only be checked by 
another countervailing power” (Ashworth, 2014: 235). 
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The exercise of self-interested power with no concern for the global 
demos as a whole will find itself likely “checked” by another nation-state(s) that 
puts its own interests ahead of the whole. In the international sphere: 
 
“patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. 
Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser 
loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all 
the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervour 
that the critical attitude of the individual towards the nation and its 
enterprises is almost completely destroyed” (Niebuhr, 1960: 91). 
 
To bring our horizon to bear then, there is in both Niebuhr and Dewey a 
sense in which the position of the global demos, something which represents the 
whole, must be considered by nation-states when devising their own national 
priorities and policies.  
Niebuhr’s argument echoes Dewey’s view that warranted assertions are 
ethical if they advance the interests of “mankind” as a whole. Again, however, 
Dewey provides the ethical and theoretical resources needed to further refine 
this position and to explain how a community of inquirers can proceed towards 
a more inclusive account of the diversity of voices within the global demos who 
may have a differing view upon what are the interests of the whole actually are.  
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In Niebuhr’s view, the whole is best served by transcending the tragic 
ironies of history by bringing an end (to the extent possible) those forms of 
pretension (hubris) which frequently bring about nemesis. But this is, in effect, 
to take one voice, Niebuhr’s own, as entitled to determine the interests of the 
whole. This has the effect of rendering other voices out there in the global 
demos unheard in the dialogue as to what the interests of the whole ought to 
look like.  
 
Section Three: Application to World Politics   
 
In relation to policy, Niebuhr advances is a via media position between 
two poles of “realism” and “idealism.” Indeed, in A Protest Against A 
Dilemma’s Two Horns, Niebuhr rejects using the rather confusing terms of 
international ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ (Niebuhr, 1950: 338-339). Both 
approaches, he writes, create a rationalisation and abstraction of various patterns 
of empirical data; patterns which are excessively rational, i.e. it relies upon what 
is revealed by reason exclusively, and thus represents an inappropriate way to 
properly grasp ‘the tortuous course of human history’ (Niebuhr, 1950: 338). 
Whereas ‘idealists’ point to the need for supranational governance in order to 
escape the possibility of war, ‘realists’ go too far in the opposite direction and 
accept the principle that that war is ‘inevitable.’ The realist notion that the USA 
ought to take military action to defeat the USSR at an opportune time rather 
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than to wait for an attack is in RN’s view deeply problematic (Niebuhr, 1950: 
338). 
Niebuhr, indeed, sets a very high bar for the international agent to reach, 
especially for those who aren’t able to embrace what is revealed through 
Biblical faith. Those international actors for whom there is hope individually, or 
the greater self of society, must acknowledge their sins and repent in order that 
hope of salvation is restored (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). 
 
World politics is not without hope; Niebuhr sees history as a process that 
keeps alive the hope of salvation:  
 
“We do not believe that the human enterprise will have a tragic conclusion; 
but the ground of our hope lies not in human capacity but in divine power 
and mercy, in the character of the ultimate reality, which carries the human 
enterprise” (Niebuhr, 1937: 24). 
 
However, such hope is juxtaposed to the tragic irony of politics and 
international relations which is found throughout human history. 
Niebuhr argues that the language of ‘irony’ is better than that of ‘tragedy’ when 
interpreting politics and by extension international relations (Niebuhr, 1952: 
153). Curiously we could regard this ironist approach as a “comic” 
interpretation of history whereby a measure of humour is generated, albeit a 
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dark humour, as a result of the patterns of repetition and reoccurrence 
throughout the drama of history whenever ironic ‘contrasts and incongruities’ 
are manifested (Niebuhr, 1952: 153). Politics and IR are, like history, defined 
by ironic repeating patters which for Niebuhr both affirm the significance of 
understanding tragedy as well as suggest its limitations (Niebuhr, 1937: 24; 
Niebuhr, 1952: 151-162).  
 
To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear then, we interpret this 
dimension of Niebuhrian thought to indicate how the metra of international 
actors is visible in their tendency to overshoot metra and defy the Gods, who 
eliminate such pretensions through the furies, nemesis and wrath.  
As Wohlforth puts it, Niebuhr sought to advance his realism as something 
that extended beyond international affairs and served “as a general approach to 
the study of politics” (Wohlforth, 2008: 134). Nevertheless, his reflections on 
international relations are situated within his religious framework. We have 
exposed the implications of this framework for his international ethical thought. 
In our hermeneutic interpretation, the significance of hubris in Niebuhrian 
thought is central to his understanding of the normative role of the international 
actor in international relations. This view is also echoed by Tjalve, who makes a 
similar point that for Niebuhr the danger of actions becoming sin and 
occasioning ironic reversals arises not from the vitality and creativity of 
mankind (as Niebuhr identifies in classical tragedy) but rather, first and 
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foremost, from pride (Tjalve, 2008: 66-67). This view, Niebuhr declares, is 
driven by his embrace of Augustinian ideas (Niebuhr, 1986e: chapter 10). 
Similarly to Niebuhrian thought, its Augustinian predecessor locates the source 
of pride within the radical freedom possessed by human beings (Tjalve, 2008: 
66-67). Such pride is exaggerated whenever indeterminate situations are 
seemingly well managed through the exercise of reason. However, as a sceptic 
Niebuhr points out that such knowledge is provisional and does not reflect that 
which is revealed through Biblical faith (Tjalve, 2008: 67). This partial 
blindness exposes how, like in the case of Augustine, it is not bodily impulses 
that bring about misbehaviour but rather the attempt to cope with indeterminate 
situations through self-reliance. This sin is compounded by any pride or 
superbia that such self-reliance encourages (Tjalve, 2008: 67).  
For Niebuhr, the nation-state, especially in its technologically advanced, 
industrialised and modern manifestation, is particularly likely to believe that its 
“eminence” arises from its capacity for self-reliance. There is a psychological 
aspect here insofar as any egoism or greed lying latent within the citizen is 
transmuted into a socially acceptable collective force which takes its political 
objective to be the pursuit of the national interest (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). This 
effect forms into a kind of mesh across the international system where the 
advance of one state’s interests is seen as a loss for another. This force is so 
powerful both within the state and without that the cultivation of rationality – as 
a cultural means of softening egoism – and the encouragement of ‘religiously 
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inspired good will’ and scientific social engineering, merely represent 
misplaced hope in the capacity of human beings to overcome their own natural 
weaknesses (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).  
Niebuhr's international and political thought is to some extent more 
“pessimistic” than his wider Biblical framework. Whereas the self can reach 
salvation and accomplish a great measure of hope in that salvation, the 
Niebuhrian conception of international relations regards conflict between 
collective groups and individuals as inevitable. Further, power can only be 
challenged by power (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi; Ashworth, 2014: 235). Niebuhr uses 
a Marxist example to illustrate that power determines the outcome of political 
events, in particular the power of privileged elites who, in defence of their own 
‘predatory self-interests’, act with great effort and success to preserve the status-
quo, however unjust, in order to preserve their position (Niebuhr, 1960: xxx).  
Niebuhr considered international relations to be defined in part by 
transnational interests of ruling classes who may find in their counterparts of 
other nation-states a shared interest in maintaining their own positions of power 
(Niebuhr, 1936: 36). The industrial worker class, Niebuhr argues, will never 
obtain a greater measure of liberty without obtaining the requisite power needed 
to achieve concrete changes (Niebuhr, 1960: xxxi).  
Niebuhr thus caricatures privileged and powerful elites as furthering their 
own selfish ends (Niebuhr, 1936: 36). Certain social classes, such as the then 
ruling elite in the UK, Niebuhr argues, put their own class interests ahead of the 
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national interest and thus seemingly confirm his pessimistic assumption that 
political actors, especially powerful actors, will act selfishly and without 
normative responsibility (Niebuhr, 1936: 36). Niebuhr's political thought 
therefore begins (at a certain point in his life) with a distinctly class-conscious 
understanding of politics, although he moves away from this position over time 
(Tjalve, 2008: 64-66). This dimension of Niebuhr’s thought is implied when he 
argues that the industrial worker will win freedom from privileged classes if, 
and only if, they acquire real political power to ‘contest the power of the strong’ 
(Niebuhr, 1960: xxxi).  
Niebuhr’s views had grown stronger by the 1940s. The calamity of the 
Second World War highlighted the tragic ironies he would later discuss in the 
1950s. The arrogance of humanity, and in particular the pride/superbia of the 
preceding century, are identified as root causes for the calamity (Niebuhr, 
1944b: 194). Writing towards the end of the war, Niebuhr maintains that 
politics, including that which takes place within international affairs, acts ‘to 
beguile, deflect, and harness collective egoism’ (Niebuhr, 1944b: 195).  
Applying our hermeneutic methodology, the international actor in 
Niebuhrian thought is required to understand how the nation-state is defined by 
its own self-defeating metra insofar as being part of being one unit amongst 
egoistically competitive units creates tensions and oppositions that ultimately 
form themselves into power contests. The best way for the international agent to 
act from an ethical perspective is to restrain the egoism and pride of his own 
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nation-state and thus minimize the tragic ironies that are quite frequent in the 
history of international relations.  
Niebuhr argues that the post-World War Two superpower tensions are 
marked by an uneasy peace generated by the “mutual fear of mutual 
annihilation” in a potential thermonuclear war (Niebuhr, 1963: 6). Although 
Niebuhr acknowledges that there is a material and ideological dimension to the 
power contest between these superpowers, he nonetheless maintains that it is 
primarily the false pride and greed of collectives which underscores this 
competition (Niebuhr, 1963: 6). The superpower contest brought the world to 
the “edge of an abyss”, and Niebuhr feared that both sides were so filled with 
national pride and hubris that in a moment of supreme national peril, they 
would perhaps use “the ultimate weapon in a mood of desperation” (Niebuhr, 
1962: 155; Niebuhr, 1963: 6). Niebuhr thus understood the peril of power as 
well as its ethical utility in securing political ends.  
For Niebuhr, the end of the Cold War would seem to be an impossible 
dream when he writes that the USA must be prepared to endure ‘decades’ and 
even ‘centuries’ of stalemate with an implacable foe (Niebuhr, 1962: 157). For 
Niebuhr, the material, technological and ideological assets of the superpowers 
were sufficient foundations upon which the selfish competition could go on 
indefinitely. For Niebuhr, thus, there would have been no grounds for exiting 
the Cold War standoff so long as human nature and the material circumstances 
of the standoff remained unchanged. 
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Moreover, a heterogeneous supra-nation-state society would struggle to 
hold together (Niebuhr, 1944a: 164-168): 
  
"It may be axiomatic that the less a community is held together by cohesive 
forces in the texture of its life the more must it be held together by power. 
This fact leads to the dismal conclusion that the international community 
lacking these inner cohesive forces, must find its first unity through 
cohesive force to a larger degree than is compatible with the necessities of 
justice. Order will have to be purchased at the price of justice; though it is 
quite obvious that if too much justice is sacrificed to the necessities of order, 
the order will prove too vexatious to last” (Niebuhr, 1944a: 168). 
  
Niebuhr implies in this passage that an increase in international 
cooperation, order and peace, and the development of more shared normative 
values, is at odds with the prevailing practice of international relations: the 
pursuit and exercise of power. Although for Niebuhr the exercise of power is a 
prerequisite for the possibility of shared arrangements, this arrangement must be 
predicated upon good values in order to be ethically legitimate. As great nations 
acquire power over smaller nations, they encounter the gap between the power 
they exercise and the absence of any normative authority upon which the 
exercise of this power ought to rest (Niebuhr, 1944a: 171).  
The relationship between power and the absence of shared social linkages 
and normative connections is illustrated by Niebuhr with reference to the end of 
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British rule in India whereby the removal of a third (imperial) party’s exercise 
of power created a situation in which there could not be a shared constitutional 
arrangement between Hindus and Muslims (Niebuhr, 1948: 385). The absence 
of ‘social tissue’ suggests, to Niebuhr, that any attempt to build legal and 
constitutional supranational systems would be impossible to sustain (Niebuhr, 
1948: 379-380, 383). Even when ‘social tissue’ is found, such as in the ‘self-
evident’ shared norms of all peoples, it ‘does not contain very much specific 
content’ (Niebuhr, 1948: 487).  
Indeed, for Niebuhr: 
  
“While there are halting efforts to create an international mind and 
conscience, capable of coping with this social situation, modern man has 
progressed only a little beyond his fathers in extending his ethical attitudes 
beyond the group to which he is organic and which possesses symbols, vivid 
enough to excite his social sympathies” (Niebuhr 1960: 49). 
 
In other words, humanity’s inability to see beyond our own cultural 
horizons limits the scope for the interpenetration and merging of global cultural 
understandings.  
Niebuhr’s views on international relations are further illustrated in his 
identification of a link between political actors advancing their self-interest and 
the way such actors, whether ‘patriots’ or state officials, become outraged when 
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the honour of their nation is somehow infringed, however petty the offence 
(Niebuhr, 1960: 93). Collectively, the offence is felt throughout the nation and 
the national interest becomes little more than a ‘vicarious selfishness’ whereby 
private egoism is concentrated in a collective form and projected upon other 
nations, thereby creating antagonistic relations (Niebuhr, 1960: 93).  
 
There is a dimension of Niebuhr's thought which holds out the possibility 
of a road map for international relations to push towards a future less defined by 
tragic ironies. Hope for international society can be found in the “insecurities 
and ambiguities of the possible” (Niebuhr, 1948: 388). Indeed, Niebuhr writes: 
 
“Beyond the national (and in a few cases the imperial) community lies 
international chaos, slightly qualified by minimal forms of international 
cooperation” (Niebuhr, 1944a: 153). 
 
To interpret, we have seen how in Niebuhrian thought overshooting the 
metra of things frequently occasions hubris/nemesis and ironic patterns in the 
history of international relations. Now we interpret Niebuhrian thought to imply 
that there is hubris in building hope for even a “thin” international society when 
there appear to be many good reasons to think that the requisite social tissue is 
not strong enough to support such cohesion.  
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In A Protest Against a Dilemma’s Two Horns, Niebuhr resists the 
suggestion that he has any special ‘wisdom’ or means of delivering international 
peace and security (Niebuhr, 1950: 344). This is too modest. If we examine The 
Children of Light, we see that Niebuhr regards humanity as caught between the 
necessity of needing an international community with a greater degree of 
international cooperation than existed in his time, and the difficulty of its 
creation (Niebuhr, 1944a: 187). Such an understanding illustrates Niebuhr’s 
view that a tension exists between the exercise of power and the possibility of 
normative realisation. Does this mean that for Niebuhr Christian ethics must fail 
in the face of power relations within international politics?  
In response to Morgenthau’s claim that Niebuhr supported a view that it 
is impossible to hold up Christian ethics and at the same time be a successful 
politician, Niebuhr argues: 
 
“Morgenthau is concerned, as I am, to dispel the illusions of all forms of 
liberalism, which seek to obscure the fact that the political order must 
concern itself with interest and with power. This concern makes it necessary 
to call attention to the moral ambiguity of the political order and the 
consequent impossibility of making a pure ethic relevant in this realm. But 
if one speaks of the “discrepancy between the commands of Christian 
teachings and the requirements of political success,” one may concede too 
much to the perfectionist versions of Christianity, some of which make so 
much of this discrepancy that the Mennonites, for instance specifically 
 192 
declare the responsibilities of the magistrate to be incompatible with 
Christian life” (Niebuhr 1962: 121). 
 
Niebuhr continues:  
 
“But “Christian teachings” ought to include more than the absolute demands 
of the Sermon on the Mount. A Christian faith which accurately portrays the 
selfishness of men, as well as their capacity for justice, is bound to insist not 
only on the freedom of the conscience of the individual, but also on the right 
of the community to be guarded against the peril of the individual’s greed or 
lust to power” (Niebuhr, 1962: 121). 
 
This is a critically important point insofar as it creates scope for the 
Niebuhrian position to go beyond his more straightforward ethical analysis that 
for the self to do good in practice it must make its behaviour fully consistent 
with what is revealed in the Gospels. As Niebuhr argued, there must be a place 
in heaven for political leaders like Abraham Lincoln (Niebuhr, 1962: 112).  
But this is not intended to describe Niebuhr as a “balance of power” 
realist. Indeed, it was his explicitly stated view that the whole notion of balance 
is precarious:  
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“Every centre of power will seek to improve its position: and every such effort will be 
regarded by the others as an attempt to disturb that equilibrium” (Niebuhr 1944a: 
175). 
 
By rejecting what he views as this inherently unstable form of world 
political order, Niebuhr suggests that the children of light need to “borrow” 
some aspects of the “wisdom” of the children of darkness (Niebuhr, 1944a: 
176). Realism, no more than idealism, fails in its own way; realism is blind, 
Niebuhr argues, to novel and unique elements in world political situations 
(Niebuhr, 1944a: 176).  
In these lengthy quotes, we see that Niebuhr points to how there is 
enough freedom for human beings to be conduits for justice as well as injustice. 
Moreover, we see that Niebuhr’s thought is not a simplistic or one-dimensional 
view of Christian ethics, but rather a sophisticated understanding that 
acknowledges, albeit implicitly, the limitations of implementing the love 
commandment in concert with other concerns for justice. This would seem to 
answer our question in the negative. Niebuhr’s Christian Realism is alert to the 
limits of what is possible whenever the demands of exercising power and 
realising norms are both required. 
Niebuhr argues that arriving at an account of the truth that can be 
understood as final or ultimate is problematic insofar as there are limits to 
human knowledge. Indeed, this search for final truth represents a corrupt 
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ambition to overcome subjectivity through ‘raising precisely what is contingent 
to absolute and unlimited dimensions’ (Niebuhr, 1943: 193): 
 
“[P]ride becomes explicit in the conscious effort to obscure the partiality of 
the perspective from which the truth is apprehended. The explicit character 
of this pride is fully revealed in all cases in which the universalistic note in 
human knowledge becomes the basis of an imperial desire for domination 
over life which does not conform to it” (Niebuhr 1943: 210-211). 
 
Broadly speaking, the Niebuhrian standpoint is consistent with the view 
that it is wise to embrace ‘a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge 
and our power’ (Niebuhr, 1943: 332): 
 
“In one of the greatest books of religious poetry, the book of Job, man 
questions the justice of God in terms of human standards, but is finally 
overwhelmed by the majesty and mystery of existence, and Job confesses 
contritely, ‘I have uttered that I understand not; things too wonderful for me 
which I knew not – wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes’ ” 
(Niebuhr, 1986c: 14). 
 
For Niebuhr, then, tragedy is a ‘view of life’ (Niebuhr, 1937: 156). It 
serves to ‘measure life’ in a manner which reaches beyond ‘some little scheme 
of prudent rationality’ in order to examine more profoundly the ‘forces of 
 195 
human existence’ (Niebuhr, 1937: 165). However, in itself it deepens our 
understanding without providing us with help or hope in the actual process of 
history. All it accomplishes is a dark insight: 
 
‘The really tragic hero of warfare is not the soldier who makes the greatest sacrifice 
but the occasional discerning spirit who plunges into the chaos of war with a full 
understanding of its dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche and an equal 
resolution, either to defy these forces or to submit himself as their tool and victim in 
recognition of his common humanity with those who are unconscious victims’ 
(Niebuhr 1937: 158). 
 
For Niebuhr, a tragic vision brings into focus the terrible dangers of 
hubris and failing to excise it from oneself (Niebuhr, 1937: 166). Niebuhr 
implies that we should not respond to tragedy by searching for a better technical 
solution to evade it in future, but rather ought to turn our critical eye inwardly to 
make ourselves the critical object of our efforts to root out our own hubris and 
to discover how that hubris may even be cloaked as something else (Niebuhr, 
1941: 274).  
 
‘It is the consequences of man’s self-centredness and egotism by which he destroys 
the harmony of existence. The fact that he does this is not an occasion for admiration 
but for pity: “weep for yourselves” remains Christianity’s admonition to all who 
involve themselves in sin and guilt’ (Niebuhr 1937: 166). 
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This may seem poetic; however, Niebuhr is making a moral point 
concerning the need to look inside ourselves and strive to understand the evil 
within, and by implication to be saddened and horrified by it (Niebuhr, 1941: 
274). Critical examination of oneself may well reveal that we are ignorant of 
our own hubris:   
 
‘It is weakness which poses as strength; it is the pride of an inferiority complex. It 
may create but it destroys more than it creates. It involves Europe in carnage for the 
sake of a brief hour of glory. Like Agamemnon, it sacrifices its Iphigenia under the 
illusion that the father who sacrifices a daughter, the nation which sacrifices its sons, 
for the sake of victory, is proving itself unselfish. It forgets, like Agamemnon, that the 
pride of the man and not the unselfishness of the father is the dominant motif in the 
sacrifice’ (Niebuhr, 1937: 166-167). 
 
Thus, for Niebuhr even the pretence of selflessness and sacrifice may be 
little more than hubris in disguise. Indeed, privileged values such as equality, 
liberty, et cetera, may be understood in tragic terms as tools to be exploited by 
hubristic and selfish political actors (Niebuhr, 1963: 16; Niebuhr, 1949: 387-
388).  
In terms of the outcome of these practices, Niebuhr’s religious framework 
integrates his understanding of tragic ironies with his international ethics. 
Although the city of God citizenry would be saved, there is hope of an 
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intermediate stage which moderates the impact of tragic ironies in international 
relations.  
Niebuhr's framework reveals how the self-destructive ‘qualities’ which 
build instances of ‘eminence’ are evident in the moments when social groups 
‘decay’ and are ‘brought low’ by ‘the defect of their own virtues’ (Niebuhr, 
1937: 212). The history of international relations, Niebuhr implies, is littered 
with recurring patterns of hubristic eminence followed by civilisational decline, 
as civilisations find themselves brought down by the very qualities that brought 
about their eminence in the first place (Niebuhr, 1963: 16; Niebuhr, 1949: 387-
388). 
International peace, for Niebuhr, must rest upon a bond (or potential 
bond) between individuals and collectives; and it must come from an 
acceptance of a common fate and suffering. When commenting upon growing 
‘technical interdependency,’ i.e. early globalisation, Niebuhr took it to be very 
important to create new political institutions to make globalisation something 
that all of humanity can benefit from rather than breeds global violence. This is 
quite a hopeful international normative view (Niebuhr, 1943: 325-326).  
Norms which aim to create a measure of political unity in world politics 
may only succeed if pretension is rooted out as much as possible, since: 
 
“to rely upon hubris is foolish and will surely occasion the decline of any civilisation” 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 331-332). 
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Such a position implies the beginnings of a global demos inclusive of 
technical actors. Niebuhr sought to emphasise radical freedom and the reality of 
the moral responsibility exercised by the individual, even amid tragic ironies:  
 
“Even when the historic situation is as tragic as our contemporary one, and 
when a careful estimate of historical possibilities is bound to lead to more 
pessimistic than optimistic conclusions, we have no right to speak of 
‘inevitabilities’ in history. Men are always agents, and not merely the stuff, 
in the historical process. If modern culture has been inclined, at times, to 
overestimate the power of the human will over historical destiny, there is yet 
no reason why we should abdicate the responsibility of that will in this 
tragic hour. It is foolish to substitute the pretensions of omniscience for the 
pretensions of omnipotence” (Niebuhr, 1950: 339). 
 
Thus, even though we might not all embrace The Lord as the true end of 
our lives, this does not mean that nothing can be done to mitigate the tragic 
ironies in things. This via media position helps establish that there remains hope 
that peace is possible. Here we see Niebuhr foregrounding the pretensions of 
Machiavellians, for whom there is an abdication of responsibility. Niebuhr 
implies that (as will all pretension) the cynic’s wisdom is no way to create 
peace. Indeed, it represents a problematic pride that will surely fit neatly into 
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the historical pattern of tragic irony. Responsibility is possible, as is the 
possibility of realising normatively desirable goals: 
 
“Such a course cannot be guaranteed to preserve the peace of the world. No 
guarantee for any policy can be given in our present predicament. But a 
policy is possible which saves us from both illusion and despair” (Niebuhr, 
1950: 344). 
  
For Niebuhr, the exercise of such responsibility can be done in a way that 
extends the cope for international peace: there remains hope that peace is 
possible if normative actors are equipped with the necessary intellectual and 
normative humility to produce a morally improved outcome: 
 
“We would, I think have a better chance of success in our struggle against a 
fanatical foe if we were less sure of our own purity and virtue. The pride 
and self-righteousness of powerful nations are a greater hazard to the 
success of statecraft than the machinations of their foes. If we could 
combine a greater degree of humility with our stubborn resolution, we might 
not only be more successful in holding the dyke against tyranny, but we 
might also gradually establish a genuine sense of community with our foe, 
however small. No matter how stubbornly we resist Russian pressure, we 
should still have a marginal sense of community with the Soviet Union, 
derived from our sense of being involved in a common fate of tragic 
proportions and from a recognition of a common guilt of mutual fear. If 
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community in basic terms is established by various organic forces of 
history, it must finally be preserved by mutual forbearance and forgiveness” 
(Niebuhr, 1949: 388). 
 
In other words, a normativity of inclusion is established in principle as a 
good thing, even if it is the most minimal of bonds.  
 
To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear: the outcome of 
Niebuhrian thought is the latent conception of a proto-demos –  by which we 
mean the beginnings of a shared normative and cultural global (and 
international) society – without the theoretical tools needed to transform this 
society into something “deeper.”  
To equally bring our interpretive methodology to bear: the Niebuhrian 
conception of the practices of mitigation, understood as establishing the bare 
minimum of bonds between those bound up in the tragic ironies of international 
relations, is desirable. These bonds are, as in the case of the Morgenthauian 
position, bound up with a broadly “cosmopolitan” IR view that there is no 
liberation from the tragedy of international relations to be found through 
particularistic-nationalism; rather, it must be found by approaching the 
possibilities of supranational associations in a favourable light.  
As for “the metra of things”, the Niebuhrian position is here interpreted to 
mean that the self is limited by its metra in such a way that while it does indeed 
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have the gift of radical freedom, it is limited in terms of its sight and thus must 
fumble and guess at the truth of things. The predilection of the self to find 
through its own eminence a sense of “self-reliance” is dangerous because it 
leads to the false belief that the self has become master over its own destiny and 
thus can determine the course of its own history and the history of nations. This 
error leads to pretentiousness and in turn the buffeting of our false eminence as 
a species. In this case, the ‘the metra of things’ is enforced not by the furies but 
by The Lord. Our beliefs in our own eminence are exposed to be ‘hubris.’ This 
foregrounds and places into context the preferred ethical values and 
international practices implied by the Niebuhrian standpoint. They then 
potentially serve to mitigate the tragic ironies of international relations. As we 
have argued, the shared bond of knowing that international actors and nation-
states are bound up in structures they cannot escape is the first step towards 
determining the  
Misbehaviour or the poor use of the gift of radical freedom given to 
human beings will drive up the pretension and “self-reliance” of hubristic actors 
as they overshoot the metra of things and thus undermine the tissue needed to 
build deeper integration across international and global relations. Nevertheless, 
a marginal sense of demos is conceived of and allowed for in Niebuhrian 
thought even for those nations caught in power conflicts.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter four: 
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In this chapter we have built an interpretation of Niebuhrian thought which 
emphasises his understanding of the metra of things. Niebuhr frames his 
understanding of the limitations and insufficiencies and measures of the self (in 
its individual and collective forms) using his own Biblical vision of life. 
Nonetheless, such a vision gives him scope to argue that metra is either not well 
known, or it is overshot owning to excessive pride (or some combination 
therein). As such there arises those political actors for whom the pursuit of 
narrow self-interests becomes their primary objectives and these must be 
challenged by an alternative ethical group which hopes to see the world be 
reformed in a way consistent with Christian values of trusting in divine 
deliverance. Niebuhr opposes self-reliance and by implication those sovereign 
states that presume themselves to be the origin of their own eminence. A tragic 
irony is advanced that exposes the pathos of such eminent states. Applied to 
world politics, Niebuhr advocates the need for a balanced approach which 
neither swings too far away from his values, but which can embrace some of the 
virtues of those who are far less committed to the realisation of global society 
defined by shared values, but may have a greater measure of skill than those 










In this chapter, we will continue to bring our horizon to the legacy texts, 
in this case the thought of Hans J. Morgenthau. We do so in order to develop an 
account of his thought which fuses our horizons with our interpretation of the 
horizon of the text, i.e. the horizon which represents answers to implicit 
questions which both arise as a manifestation of the world of the text. 
Our interpretation of Morgenthau’s conception of the self is that it is 
defined by metra primarily in the narrow sense of the term. There is in 
Morgenthau’s thought a sense of the self existing in a state of conflict between 
its own reaction to the existential conditions of its existence and its frustration 
in being unable to bond adequately with other minds. This conflicted, tragic self 
is prone to destructive outwards impulses that serve to further limit it and 
expose the metra of its own ethical being in the broader sense of the term, i.e. 
having limits/measures that it is powerless to change.  
The more seasoned and mature Morgenthau abandons his earlier 
nostalgia for the shared norms of aristocratic European societies in favour of a 
vision of radical participatory democracy that resists the “Jacobinism” of 
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majoritarian rule. His ethics demonstrate the metra of power politics as well as 
idealism and the advancement of a form of international association which can 
extend from a balance of power, if needed, towards a working system of peace, 
i.e. a functionalist model of supranationalism.   
 
Section One: The Metra of the Self   
 
To bring our horizon to bear upon Morgenthau’s conception of the self, 
we interpret there to be an awareness of the measures of human beings as 
capable, even political beings rich with ethics and values. However, they are 
also limited by their animalistic nature, their impulsiveness and the finiteness of 
their lives (Frei, 2001: 185-189; Morgenthau, 1946: 155). The self for 
Morgenthau is defined by an inability to become fully satisfied and thus is 
forever longing to overcome its limitations, its measures, and to take charge of 
its destiny (Morgenthau, 1946: 221-222). Echoing Niebuhr, Morgenthau points 
to the insights of tragedy, such as Icarus, for whom the overstepping of his 
measures is manifested in hubris and melted wings (Morgenthau, 1946: 222).  
Just as there are insights which point towards a limited self, Morgenthau 
explains that there are conceptions of the self as being seemingly unlimited in 
terms of its capabilities and capacities. In Morgenthau’s idiom, the “engineer” is 
at fault in thinking that the knowledge brought by experimentation can 
adequately grasp “the knowing insecurity of the wisdom of man” (Morgenthau, 
 205 
1946: 221-223). Human life “exhausts the possibilities of human existence” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 223). Thus, a wisdom which understands the limitations of 
human potential is, when put into practice, the maximum of what can be done 
through human potential and possibilities (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). The self is, 
therefore, an inherently limited being with only a certain measure of abilities.  
In our interpretation, there is an evolution of Morgenthau’s vision of the 
metra of the self in the broader definition of the term. Indeed, in Scientific Man 
vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau grasps that the self has measures that extend 
only so far in terms of the raw power to overturn the “discord, contradictions 
and conflicts” of life (Morgenthau, 1946: 206). Reason must be employed in 
order to exorcise the lesser evil, yet it proves the self to be powerless as a 
mechanism for the transcending of the metra “inherent in the nature of things” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 206).  
To bring our horizon to bear, we can see that Morgenthau is alert to the 
role of language in being the medium within which rational articulations 
become riddles that the self is powerless to solve. To recap, as we understand 
tragedy, the metra/measures inherent in things is not only that which can be 
overstepped by the tragic hero but also that which he encounters through new 
riddles which cannot be overcome. For Oedipus, it was how to live the life he 
had once enjoyed having discovered that he was the pollution infecting his city. 
For Antigone, it was how to solve the riddle of the circumstances that she faced. 
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In both cases, the central figures in the tragedies commit acts of self-destruction 
against their own sight and lives.  
In our view, Morgenthau’s “tragic sense of life” is congruent with our 
own: 
 
“Man – and here we have to exclude the rationalist – meets in his intellectual 
experience the unceasing struggle between his understanding, on the one hand, and 
the riddles of the world and of his existence in this world, on the other – a struggle 
which offers with each answer new questions, with each victory a new 
disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In this labyrinth of unconnected 
casual connections man discovers many little answers but no answer to the great 
questions of his life, no meaning, no direction” (Morgenthau, 1946: 207). 
 
Morgenthau argues as we do, that the ends of reasoning ultimately build 
into questions that the human mind simply has no means of answering; they are 
beyond us as intellectual beings. Epistemologically, this echoes Dewey’s notion 
that all truth-claims are ultimately limited to fallible warranted beliefs reflecting 
the circumstances and intelligence of the self in its collective form. Indeed, in 
the Purpose of American Politics, Morgenthau agrees with Kelsen’s view that it 
is impossible to have an absolutist or unassailable view of truth where one 
group or individual can claim to have a “monopoly”. As such, Morgenthau 
endorses a fallibilist view of truth-claims (Scheuerman, 2009: 185). 
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Moreover, the epistemological advantages of democracy over other forms 
of political system arise out the plurality of knowledge as well as the dynamics 
of power shifting from minority to majority (at least in a well-functioning 
democracy) (Scheuerman, 2009: 183-184). As in the case of Dewey, the self in 
its collective form must incorporate the insights of the widest demos, so it is in 
Morgenthau that those insights must find their way throughout the state through 
the regular transformation of minorities into majorities and back again.  
Applying our horizon, we can understand how it is that Morgenthau’s 
conception of the self is a tragedian account in our sense of the term. In our 
horizon, Morgenthau’s self is much like Oedipus for whom the resolution of 
riddles through the application of reason leads him to discover that he has been 
a riddle to himself and, indeed, that he has answered the riddle of his own 
identity only to learn the measures and proportions of himself. This is his 
terrible metra. Unable to emotionally cope with the knowledge of himself, he 
thus strikes out his eyes in desperation. The lesson of tragedy remains to 
understand one’s metra or measures and not to overshoot them. The self must, 
therefore, learn its measures (its metra) and act within them. This is exactly 
what Morgenthau sets out to explain through his political realism.  
Morgenthau draws inspiration for this notion of there being a limited self 
from a number of places. As Frei argues, Morgenthau’s debt to Nietzsche is 
now much better understood in contemporary debates (Frei, 2001: 113). 
Morgenthau's thought draws inspiration from Nietzsche’s “will to power”, in 
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particular how there are dynamics within the self which generate externalised 
impulses such as a will to “self-assertion”, as well as the perennial “self-
preservation” (Frei, 2001: 125-127). This, sometimes violent, externalisation of 
the self’s internal dynamics is described as the animus dominandi and is 
manifested as a “dark force” against which the morality of nations must be 
marshalled (Molloy, 2006: 93).  
The self is not just a knowing being; it is also something that can be 
known through reasoning. Morgenthau fashions a view of the self as the centre 
of our world. Indeed, for Morgenthau both factual knowledge and abstract 
theorisations find their origins in the consciousness of the self as it grasps with 
its own inner loneliness and desire to unite with others (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-
629). Without boundless access to the truth of its existence and shaped by its 
inability to unite with others, perhaps through a shared metaphysics, the self in 
conditions of modern existence generates its own social meanings and attempts 
to dominate others through the exercise of power (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). 
For Morgenthau, the self is not just defined by its external metra, i.e. its 
animalistic nature, but also by the metra of the mind and in particular the 
internal conflicts arising within the mind that give rise to destructive impulses.  
There emerges a situation where the individual is confronted with its own 
existence and discovers it to be absurd and frightening. The individual is then 
compelled to seek refuge in a reality that lacks the transcendent quality needed 
to deliver individual spiritual satisfaction. Human desire runs far ahead of what 
 209 
can be achieved in the context of a changed cultural landscape (Frei, 2001: 187; 
Neacsu, 2010: 72; Molloy, 2006: 81).  
 
For Morgenthau, the self is unable to cope, i.e. it has a limited emotional 
capacity to handle and accommodate certain existential possibilities. As such, 
the metra of the self is profoundly cognitive and emotional. Morgenthau 
explores this dimension of the self's metra with reference to existential dread 
and the possibility that life is absurd (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). There is a 
strong echo of Nietzsche in this line of thinking: the dilemma faced by the self 
is to choose to uphold the scared divine metaphysics of The Lord or to “go 
bust” and lose all social meanings (Schacht, 2012: 118).  
None of these arguments suggest a pessimism in Morgenthau; only that if 
we are to make the best of existence then we must learn the constraints of our 
limitations well and thereby push those limits as much as possible. It is perhaps 
ironic, then, that although Morgenthau advocates a view of politics that is called 
“realism” when his theories conceive of reality to be much like the world, that 
is, something made sense of and grasped using the limited tools of human 
intellect. The influence of Nietzsche on Morgenthau can be seen in how he 
identifies the origin of power as a consequence of the impact of the modern 
existential circumstances defined by “the death of God”; that is, the impact that 
the absence of unassailable value claims has upon human beings and in 
particular their solitariness (Molloy, 2006: 85; Neacsu, 2010: 68-69).  
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Gripped by the realisation that truth is constructed and not simply 
discovered in an external reality, the self is filled with a solitude that occasions 
an angry emotional need to dominate others in the absence of genuine bonds of 
affection (Molloy, 2006: 85). That is, the emotional and existentially suffering 
character of human beings creates in the modern world the desire to acquire a 
position of power. In other words, it is not the factual limitations of human 
mind and body which crush our human spirit, but the comprehension of how 
these limitations have prevented us from achieving what we desire as 
individuals or society (Neacsu, 2010: 94; Frei, 2001: 185-189).  
Under the conditions of modern existence where the lodestar of religious 
conviction and faith no longer drives society towards a shared purpose – in 
other words, a universe where the Gods have departed – the norms of a 
particular place and time reflect the exercise of power through the assertion of 
meaning which has been imposed over human societies (Morgenthau, 1946: 
191). Epistemologically, there is an absence of fixed truths concerning the 
world or human life: the observer helps determine “what can be known and how 
it is to be understood” and that whatever “partial truth” of politics is uncovered, 
it must always reflect the observers’ social contingency (Morgenthau, 1962: 36; 
Morgenthau, 1946: 167). 
However, knowledge itself must serve a purpose, and for Morgenthau 
this purpose is about restoring meaning to an otherwise empty universe (under 
skies where the Gods have departed), as well as meeting something very 
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fundamental to our human nature: our emotional need to overcome what might 
otherwise be an absurdity to our human existence. Morgenthau implies that the 
emotional and cognitive metra of the self is such that it cannot cope with the 
vivid reality of the certainty of one’s future mortality (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-
629). The emotionality of the self is manifested forcefully in its reaction to 
sudden realisations and moments of anxiety. Indeed, we can see this in the self’s 
sharp, inescapable and explosive desire to shake off the possibility that life is 
meaningless (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629).  
This is a philosophically sophisticated attempt by Morgenthau to grapple 
with the implications of the metra of the self. However, unlike Nietzsche’s 
peculiar optimism regarding the future role of super-men to build an affirmation 
of life and its enrichment, Morgenthau conceives of the self’s necessary escape 
from the perils of existential dread in a rather tragedian light. Morgenthau, in 
our interpretation, explores the roadmap away from accepting that life is absurd 
and meaningless, and casts it as a tragic instance of the self’s measures being 
met by the human mind, which suffers as a result but ultimately must learn to 
cope with its metra (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629; Schact, 2012: 118). 
Maintaining the meaning of things is, thus, central to Morgenthau’s conception 
of the self in tragedy. Without such meanings, the self will find itself cut adrift 
much like Oedipus, whose actions shredded the conventional meanings of 
words. This left him exposed and compelled into unnatural acts such as striking 
out his own eyes.  
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The metra of the self’s intellectual limits has consequences for social 
scientific knowledge: knowledge of politics is by necessity a reflection of the 
observers’ social contingency (Morgenthau, 1962: 36; Morgenthau, 1946: 167):  
 
“The truth of the social sciences, then, is truth only under the 
particular perspective of the observer, yet under this perspective it is 
truth. And this is the only kind of truth to be had in the social sphere” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 167). 
 
Morgenthau understood the self to be comprised of dimensions that are 
prior to (or are intermingled with) “reasoning faculties,” hence his insight that 
there are intra-self emotional and interest based factors that have downstream 
consequences in framing what is revealed through reason (Morgenthau, 1946: 
155). For Morgenthau, “reality” is a manifestation of an intra-self cognitive 
practice that takes place in the context of how individuals relate to each other 
(Neacsu, 2010: 89). 
 
“Morgenthau subscribes to an individualist ontology in which meaning 
imposition is less a matter of institutional relations, and more one of 
individual relations. In Morgenthau’s account, power is a relational concept, 




In other words, it is from within the self that social meaning finds its 
origin for Morgenthau. Nevertheless, it is also a social matter insofar as the 
power relations between individuals manifest as social interactions which help 
translate the imposition of meaning into something concretised as culture and 
identity, indeed the world itself. Morgenthau’s advocacy of human “activism” 
locates the production and concretisation of instances of power relations as well 
as an intra-self practice that aims to render the self capable of resisting the 
dizzying uncertainties produced by the modern condition (Morgenthau, 1971: 
622). Truth and power are interlinked but both are manifestations of human 
encounters with the limits and extreme edges of the measures of human nature.  
There is a certain solitariness which arises under empty skies (Molloy, 
2006: 85; Neacsu, 2010: 68-69). Such solitude reflects the boundaries between 
human minds, which prevent the formation of bonds with others and induce 
such frustration as to prompt a destructive will to dominate others (Molloy, 
2006: 85). This destructive impulse aims to recreate by force a bond that has 
been lost by the death of God.  
The emotional and existentially suffering character of human beings is 
linked in modern circumstances to the origin of the desire to acquire a position 
of power. This need is found deep within our flawed human character as a direct 
consequence of our human metra. Moreover, it is not the factual measures of the 
human mind which crush our human spirit but, tragically, the comprehension of 
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how these limitations have impacted us by preventing us achieving what we 
desire as individuals or society (Neacsu, 2010: 94; Frei, 2001: 185-189).  
In Thought And Action In Politics, Morgenthau argues that to achieve a 
certain level of consciousness, human life must live “in the presence of death” 
and suffer the realisation that all meaning is transitory and has no basis beyond 
itself ontologically (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). There is no essence or reality 
behind which socially determined meanings draw their existence; what we have 
accomplished through constituting meaning is the possibility for life within its 
measures (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). However, too much reflection strips us 
of such vitality (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). Endless reflection pushes us 
deeper into riddles we have no way to answer. 
To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret Morgenthau to have a keen 
awareness of the metra of the self and to grasp how human measures have a 
defining impact upon human “nature.” At the extremities of our measures, the 
human mind encounters possibilities that it struggles to shake off emotionally. 
This creates, for Morgenthau, a kind of domino effect that builds from a 
frustrated individualised desire for power over the other into a fully realised 
nationalistic universalism. On the stage of world politics such destructive 
human impulses have come to define international power contests, in turn 
producing global conflicts and the atomic bomb.  
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This impulse to construct meaning out of nothing is thus understood as an 
act of desperation by the self as it grapples with its metra and its need to 
construct for itself, through the production of its own meanings, its own ethical 
lodestar. Nietzsche sees the self’s escape from the perils of existential dread 
through the affirmation of life and its enrichment (Schacht, 2012: 118). 
Morgenthau agrees up to a point: what is revealed through reason can become a 
wisdom of sorts which emphasises the need for our actions to be consistent with 
our measures.  
Reason, however, remains subordinate to the primacy of “interest and 
emotions.” Interests, and the power relations implied by them, are like 
emotions: something that shapes the faculties of reasoning rather than the other 
way around. Thus, what is obtained through such faculties is a corrupted reason 
that bends to the will of our nature and therefore cannot be relied upon to 
deliver on its own a transformation of politics along ethical lines:  
 
“Those interests and emotional preferences are perhaps not a priori in 
the same sense in which philosophers like to think of the categories of 
our reasoning as a priori. But they are a priori with respect to the 
processes of reason which we apply to the social sphere. In other 
words, those interests and emotions are already determined when we 




Section Two: Ethical and Political Imperatives 
 
International power relations have a discursive impact by imposing 
meaning upon the international system. That is, the same dynamics which occur 
at the inter-individual level are also the same dynamics occurring at the 
statesman/inter-national level. Morgenthau's ontological view leads him to 
identify the reality of actuality as a tabla rasa and any attempt to project a world 
onto that actuality is an act of (useful) myth making (Neacsu, 2010: 76). Such 
meaning imposition or myth making requires international actors to craft 
possibilities for the emergence of common meanings, a “stable ground” upon 
which norms can be built (Neacsu, 2010: 165). Contingent ethical identities, 
however, are relativised understandings and Morgenthau initially found it hard 
to establish his ethical/political directionality:  
 
“In 1960 as in 1930, Morgenthau is not interested in the specific 
content of ultimate values, as this content will always depend on the 
particular circumstances of time and place” (Frei, 2001: 214). 
 
Far from a timeless transcendental reality, we can only ever have a 
construction of a particular time or place, firmly within the hermeneutical circle 
and without the possibility of theory-independence (Frei, 2001: 214-215). The 
setting of the social concrete is, however, not at all like the material used to 
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build buildings. The stuff of the social can always be re-concretized and 
transformed into a new configuration.  
Just as Nietzsche understood the salience of the tragic aspects of life, i.e. 
those aspects of life for which there can be no amelioration, so it would seem 
that Morgenthau understood the limits of human abilities in a similar manner 
(Frei, 2001: 187). But it was not an uncritical dialogue: against Nietzsche, 
Morgenthau argues that there are time-bound, socially determined values which 
ought to be realised (Frei, 2001: 166-167). Morgenthau does not stand “beyond 
good or evil”; rather he affirms and embraces the cultural/historical and ethical 
circumstances within which he locates his values. 
These values are reference points throughout history that can be used to 
guide political actors towards an understanding of what is good in 
Morgenthau’s judgement (Frei, 2001: 167). Frei defines these values as “liberal 
in the classical, European sense of the term” (Frei, 2001: 170). Frei is quite right 
to argue that Morgenthau’s ethics reflect his experience in the Weimar 
Republic, as excellently and pithily described in this passage: 
 
“Law and order, a secure existence: the further these goals receded from 
Morgenthau’s grasp, the more he cherished them. Given both his Jewish background 
and his deep longing for security, he found an almost natural refuge in that 
specifically Bourgeois and distinctly liberal political tradition of securing the rights of 
man and his claim to a peaceful life” (Frei, 2001: 172). 
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To bring our hermeneutic approach to bear – that is, to bring our horizon 
into an interpretative dialogue with Morgenthau’s standpoint – we interpret this 
“liberal” ethos as being shaped by his experience of witnessing his home 
country turn away from such guiding values towards the evil of anti-Semitic 
politics, which were in ascendency at the time in Germany. As a Jew, 
Morgenthau’s ethical view could not have resisted being shaped by the horror of 
witnessing the trampling of personal freedoms and rights for all of Germany’s 
Jews. Indeed, as Frei argues, Morgenthau came to understand with brutal clarity 
that the sphere of politics and the subordination of the self by another is in itself 
an “evil” thing (Frei, 2001: 173).  
The ethics of Morgenthau’s position thus point to the imperative of 
advancing liberal values which can be established through dialectic and reason 
to a certain extent. Such reasoning must, however, understand the measures of 
the self and take care not to overstep them. Reason can, nonetheless, provide an 
opportunity to push beyond naturalistic representationalism and put the scholar, 
and the self, in a position to understand the tragic nature of human life:  
 
“[T]hat man is a political animal is true forever; the truth of the natural sciences are 
true only until other truths have supplanted them. The key to those laws of man is not 
in the facts from whose uniformity the sciences derive their laws. It is in the insights 
and the wisdom by which more-than-scientific man elevates his experiences into the 
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universal laws of human nature. It is he who, by doing so, establishes himself as the 
representative of true reason, while nothing-but-science man appears as the true 
dogmatist who universalizes cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them 
to realms not accessible to them. It is also the former who proves himself to be the 
true ‘realist’; for it is he who does justice to the true nature of things” (Morgenthau, 
1946: 220). 
 
Morgenthau’s thesis here is that reason has great potential to grasp the 
“true” nature of things while rejecting the naturalist social scientist’s account of 
things. Reason is a resource to be relied upon in order to establish ethical and 
political imperatives because reason can grasp the “truth” of the nature of 
things. It is this faith in the power of reason that defines Morgenthau's ethics as 
much as his firm conviction that reason must learn its measures otherwise it 
lends itself to idealism or utopianism and, by extension, hubris.  
Whereas Aristotle advances acceptance of the justice of metra, i.e. 
Katharsis, Morgenthau’s use of metra is strategic as it exposes the value of 
phronesis (Frei, 2001: 185-189). 
Morgenthau identifies there to be a certain part of politics which is 
defined by a will to dominate and establish the power of one person over 
another (Morgenthau, 1945a: 14). Although this tendency is seen to be 
particularly amplified in the conditions of the modern nation state, where there 
is a particular energy to the will to dominate, this impulse for power exists 
throughout time and history (Morgenthau, 1945a: 15): 
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“There is no escape from evil of power regardless of what one does. Whenever we act 
with reference to our fellowmen, we must sin and we must still sin when we refuse to 
act; for the refusal to be involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the 
obligations to do one’s duty”. (Morgenthau, 1945a: 17). 
 
To bring our horizon to bear, Morgenthau here evokes the tragic 
complexities of the ethical dimension of politics and by implication the 
incapability of the self to solve the riddle of these complexities. The tragic agon 
in this passage repudiates the resolution of the riddle of the ethical complexities 
of politics. Any truth-claim to there being answers to such types of riddles must 
be provisional as there remains always the proportion of the measures of things, 
which Nietzsche describes as the “inescapable” aspects of life arising from the 
“elemental” aspects of human experiences (Morgenthau, 1946: 206; Nietzsche 
in Frei, 2001: 185, 187). As such, the self is left with only a limited opportunity 
for ethical success: 
 
“Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and 
ethics into harmony. We have no choice between power and the common good. To 
act successfully - that is, according to the rules of the political art - is political 
wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act 
nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least 
evil one is moral judgement” (Morgenthau, 1945a: 18). 
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To bring our horizon to bear once more, the metra of the self comes to be 
manifested in the inability of the political agent to act in a way that evades the 
exercise of power – something which Morgenthau considers to be, in part at 
least, evil. Exposing and revealing the agons throughout political life therefore 
acts in a way to advance a ‘modus vivendi’ which may be deployed 
instrumentally to minimise evil wherever it is found, even if such an enterprise 
is “uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical” (Morgenthau, 1945a: 18).  
In couching his ethical and political imperatives in epistemological terms, 
Morgenthau grasps the extent to which knowledge revealed through reason 
carries with it all the possibilities of ethical life, but also generates a plurality of 
ethical views. There is simply no way to engage in universalising absolute 
claims without ignoring the diversity and value of ethical contributions and 
insights. This orients us towards a relativized view whereby the political actor, 
his own faculty of reason directed by the determinations of social contingency, 
represents an important dimension to Morgenthau’s ethical and political 
thought.  
Indeed, while Morgenthau identifies the role that theoretical reflection 
has played throughout the ages, such accomplishments – in terms of intellectual 
contributions – take place in the context of a relativised understanding of their 
truth (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). Although this might be said to offer truth and 
wisdom “regardless of time and place,” Morgenthau very much embraced the 
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notion of standortgebunden – and thus theoretical claims are contingent upon 
the historical, political, and cultural circumstances of a particular time (Behr, 
2010: 214-216; Morgenthau, 1962: 45).  
Such accomplishments did not lack value, however, and Morgenthau 
aims to use a process of triangulation to distil the truths that can be extracted 
from these diverse insights and thinkers (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). The theorist 
may well identify discernible patterns throughout diverse historical 
circumstances and so build up a picture or “store” of “general truths” 
(Morgenthau, 1962: 45). Nevertheless, such a situation never escapes from the 
“historic-political hermeneutics” of Morgenthau’s standpoint. Indeed, it must be 
recalled that the purpose of theory for Morgenthau is to bring meaning and 
order to “a mass of phenomena that without it would remain disconnected and 
unintelligible” (Behr, 2010: 214; Morgenthau, 2006: 3; Morgenthau, 1962: 45). 
That is, the interpretation of world politics takes place at the societal level and 
hence can never escape its historical and social contingencies.  
Any interpretation of the truths of political or ethical life must be 
revealed by reason. And reason reveals not only a plurality of values but also 
the metra/measures of each position arising from the metra /measures of each 
intellectual tradition. 
Morgenthau understood the extent to which the prospects for peace, or at 
the very least international political order, requires the adoption of a “check” 
upon the self’s more destructive impulses (Molloy, 2006: 93). In our horizon, 
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Morgenthau understood the ethical need to appropriate the metra of the self and 
to redeploy such metra between groups. As Morgenthau passionately argues, it 
is the separating out of the parts of governmental power into different branches 
or responsibilities that keep each other in check that serves as the best way to 
protect the interests of all groups from any one of them acquiring ascendency 
over the other (Morgenthau, 2006: 181-184). In our horizon, Morgenthau grasps 
that the metra of the self, in its collective form, leads it down the path of 
potential selfishness. Consequently, creating a form of government where the 
interests of all groups share responsibility for the exercise of power must be of 
considerable ethical import for the preservation of a legitimate order at the level 
of the domestic sphere.  
However, Morgenthau, again correctly in our view, grasps how it is that 
such a balance may be fruitful for international peace if maintained at the level 
of international politics. Morgenthau’s “balance of power” is, to a significant 
extent, a societal norm designed to preserve the peace between nation-states 
corrupted by nationalistic universalism (Little, 2007: 119). A profound concern 
for ethics finds expression, moreover, in the mature Morgenthau’s view that a 
radical participatory democracy is needed in order to prevent the decline of 
American democracy (Scheuerman, 2009: 173-174). As Scheuerman states, 
scholars have tended to “neglect” Morgenthau’s democratic reflections 
(Scheuerman, 2009: 179).  
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Our analysis of Morgenthau’s reluctance to incorporate the demos into 
the decision-making processes is correct only insofar as we examine mid-
Morgenthau, i.e. that period where Morgenthau arrives in north America and 
comes into confrontation with what might be considered “historical optimism.” 
However, as political events unfold, in particular the Indochina conflict, mid-
Morgenthau realism evolves into mature-Morgenthau. The mature Morgenthau, 
starting with the Purpose of American Politics, moves to identify a well-
functioning democracy with the notion that political wisdom is not monopolised 
by political majorities (Scheuerman, 2009: 183). As Scheuerman correctly 
argues, for Morgenthau the representative democratic system maintains the link 
between the demos and the government, as well as the conference of authority 
and legitimacy, but without degenerating into the majoritarian nightmare of 
Jacobinism whereby the majority is mistaken for the “vox dei” (Scheuerman, 
2009: 184): 
 
“While democracy requires that the will of the people limit the freedom of 
the government, it also requires that the freedom of the popular will be 
limited. A popular will not so limited becomes the tyranny of the majority 
which destroys the freedom of political competition and thus uses the 
powers of the government to prevent a new majority from forming and to 




To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret this development to mean that 
Morgenthau came to stress that there is an epistemological metra associated 
with a majoritarian democracy that comes to see itself as having a great measure 
of legitimacy when, in fact, from an epistemological point of view, political 
knowledge remains fallible. Morgenthau well understood this point. Indeed, his 
grasping of the metra of Jacobin-style majoritarianism maps onto his view that 
the cause of the nation, to the masses of universalist nationalists, was indeed the 
advancement of justice within world politics (Morgenthau, 2006: 12).  
The values Morgenthau invokes in judging which ethical claims can be 
considered just are bound to his understanding of what is ethically permissible 
in world politics. In turn, what is possible ethically must be understood in 
relation to our conception of human nature (Morgenthau, 1946: 204-208; Frei, 
2001: 215). If there are “moral laws which govern the universe,” humanity 
cannot know what they are (Morgenthau, 1960a: 11). Such an epistemological 
view allows Morgenthau to marshal our limited knowledge as an appeal to 
embrace the value of insecurity.  
What we can know, by contrast, is how to judge ethical truth claims with 
reference to an enriched and hermeneutically enhanced understanding of human 
life (Morgenthau, 1946: 204-208). In this passage from Scientific Man we can 
see what such an understanding would look like:  
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“If, however, the world is conceived as the scene of a tragic struggle 
between good and evil, reason and passion, the mere advice to follow 
the commands of reason will not measure up to the nature of the 
problems to be solved. Without recognition of these tragic antinomies 
of human existence, the counsel of reason becomes the counsel of 
unreason; the promise of success turns into the certainty of failure; the 
goodness of the virtuous unmasks itself as the self-righteous egoism 
of the hypocrite; and education is reduced to the 'objective' 
communication of facts, unable to distinguish between right and 
wrong, good and evil, true and false” (Morgenthau, 1946: 209). 
The implied presence of our human limitations is evident throughout this 
quote; we must act as best we can using reason, but we must use reason well 
and acknowledge the “tragic” dimension of life.  
Morgenthau continues this line of reasoning by arguing that the cultural 
inheritance he draws upon arises from what is true about the conditions of 
human life (Morgenthau, 1946: 209). Morgenthau implies that normative 
dilemmas are accounted for by his conception of human beings; if the warrant 
of a normative view is unknowable, then we must assume that there is a 
possibility of it being false. Thus, the scholar is forced into a position of doubt 
where a best guess or approximation as to what is true is the best we can hope 
for (Morgenthau, 1962: 14-15; Frei, 2001: 215).  
Morgenthau conceives of the 'lust for power' as a 'ubiquitous empirical 
fact' which is 'perennial,' and to deny this fact is to deny 'the very condition of 
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human existence in this world' (Morgenthau, 1946: 201). Morgenthau points to 
the impossibility of avoiding evil in Scientific Man. Similarly, in The Decline 
of Democratic Politics he points to how human beings incur 'sin' simply through 
acting. If left unrestrained, this becomes a greater evil:   
 
“Man cannot help sinning when he acts in relation to his fellow man; 
he may be able to minimize that sinfulness of social action, but he 
cannot escape it. For no social action can be completely free of the 
taint of egoism which, as selfishness, pride, or self-deception, seeks 
for the actor more than is his due” (Morgenthau, 1962: 319). 
 
The international political actor is 'dazzled by the pride of power' such 
that 'they take truth for error, and vice versa, and make ready with unsuspecting 
confidence to jump into the abyss as if it were the consummation of their 
dreams' (Morgenthau, 1962: 326). This is consistent with Morgenthau's earlier 
view that:  
 
"There is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one 
does. Whenever we act with reference to our fellow men, we must 
sin, and we must still sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be 
involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the 
obligation of one's duties. No ivory tower is remote enough to offer 
protection against the guilt in which the actor and the bystander, the 
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oppressor and the oppressed, the murderer and his victim are 
inextricably enmeshed. Political ethics is indeed the ethics of doing 
evil” (Morgenthau, 1946: 201-202). 
 
Indeed, Morgenthau then argues that the “last resort” of any individual 
determined to create a more normative international order must be to opt for 
actions which incur the 'least evil' (Morgenthau, 1946: 202). The wise 
international normative agent, Morgenthau implies, is one who is reconciled to 
the truth that there is an “enduring presence of evil in all political action” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 202). 
In Scientific Man, Morgenthau argues that it is possible to master the 
insecurity of mankind, although he doesn’t clarify exactly what this means 
beyond a general sense of epistemological caution (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). A 
more generous interpretation would be that Morgenthau understood the 
importance of grasping the measures/metra of things and having the wisdom to 
act within these measures. That said, Morgenthau appears to imply that it is 
possible to test the boundaries of such measures to the greatest extent possible 
when he states that tragic “wisdom” is “the fulfilment of human possibilities” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 223). It is clear, however, that central to Morgenthau’s 
thinking is the epistemological relationship between the self, and the fallible 
knowledge it can create in order to grasp the best way to proceed in unique 
situations. This, in our horizon, is in a different idiom, congruent with Dewey's 
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thesis that knowledge must reflect the metra of the self and indeed must be 
consistent with metra if it is to be useful in an indeterminate reality/situation.  
Morgenthau takes Dewey to be naïve enough to think that expert opinion 
can dissolve all our societal problems (Morgenthau, 1946: 30). As we have 
shown, however, Dewey makes the end of his inquiries the production of 
knowledge which favours adaptation to our situations. It is not the means 
through which we determine the future course of events; there are no means to 
achieve such a feat as far as Dewey is concerned. Dewey understands the 
metra/measures of the self as well as Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and maintains 
that to employ our measures fully and create the best knowledge possible still 
represents no more than a best guess. The quote that Morgenthau uses in order 
to explain away the Deweyan position is one where Dewey regrets the 
orientation of intellectual energy towards developing techniques which cause 
terrible suffering rather than being put to more productive use (Morgenthau, 
1946: 30). This is not Dewey the historical optimist speaking; it is Dewey the 
regretful. Again, this is hardly something with which Morgenthau or Niebuhr 
would have disagreed. 
Morgenthau’s actual target is what could be called Enlightenment 
Rationalism. For Morgenthau, this has become a fundamental part of Western 
society, helping to shape the temperament and character of the modern age 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 1, 30). The notion that all social and political problems can 
be resolved through the application of reason is for Morgenthau deeply 
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overstated (Morgenthau, 1946: 1, 30). Expertise in a particular field is not in 
itself the instrument through which ideal outcomes can be realised in practice 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 28, 30, 219-223). Social engineering errs in its assumption 
that the methodology of the natural sciences supply the intellectual 
instrumentality necessary to realise our normative ideals (Morgenthau, 1946: 1-
2, 27-31, 71, 219-220). Hence, the flaw of Scientific Man – Morgenthau’s name 
for the Enlightenment Rationalist/Scientist Rationalist – is his failure to 
comprehend adequately the limitations of the self in terms of the scope of its 
intellectual possibilities. Only the capability and willingness to comprehend 
these limitations, and then act upon this comprehension, can create realistic 
prospects for the realisation of norms in international practice. 
Morgenthau's caricature takes Dewey’s position to be hubristic insofar as 
there is a perceived over-emphasis on the potential of human beings to employ 
their intellectual resources to resolve moral problems. Yet this is done without 
considering the wider context of Dewey’s thought, thereby leaving the reader 
with the impression that Dewey naively assumes that a great many moral 
problems could be solved if intellectual energies were to be redirected 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 30). And yet Morgenthau also affirms the triumph of 
intellectual accomplishment, in particular the value of political philosophy.  
By categorising Dewey as the engineer, moreover, Morgenthau 
misrepresents the overarching vision of Dewey’s thought regarding the 
possibilities inherent in world politics by implying that they are either unsolved 
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or yet to be solved “rationally and with finality, once the right formula is 







Section Three: Application to World Politics 
 
The mid-Morgenthau identifies the intuition of and the perspective of the 
“statesman,” as the international actor/agent for whom the responsibility falls 
for advancing the wisdom of tragedy as he understood it, a wisdom of insecurity 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221). The Statesman, argues Morgenthau, is uniquely 
placed to comprehend, as well as to undergo, the unique experience of 
experiencing social life in its contingent dimensions (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-
221). By grasping the “common lot of all mankind” and thus establishing a 
measure of understanding about its complexities and similarities, the Statesman 
has a finger on the pulse of world politics and moreover can be in a position to 
“create a new society” (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221).  
For the mid-Morgenthau the Statesman can grasp, by undergoing the 
experience of international relations, how “the contingencies of the social 
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world” become concretized in practice and thus become as if “eternal laws” 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221).  
Statesmen, however, remain men insofar as they are as much at risk of 
overshooting their metra and thus bringing themselves to the mercy of the furies 
because of an absence of moderation or the blindness of passion; that is, the 
hubris of an Alexander or a Napoleon can easily turn to nemesis (Morgenthau, 
1946: 156). And this is clearly demonstrated in the universalism of nationalistic 
movements which establish an indefensible association between their own 
nationalised normativity as the true values of actuality applicable to all nations 
and all times:  
 
“The light-hearted equation between a particular nationalism and the 
counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin 
of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the biblical prophets 
have warned rules and ruled. That equation is also politically 
pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortions in judgement 
that, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and 
civilisations - in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself” 
(Morgenthau, 2006: 12-13). 
 
For Morgenthau, the modern nation-state has no moral high ground from 
which to judge the actions of other states. Indeed, in The Decline of Democratic 
Politics, Morgenthau argues that whatever moral judgements are made between 
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nations, to issue moral praise and condemnation with earnestness is 
“preposterous” (Morgenthau, 1962: 280). Such moral self-righteousness reveals 
itself as ignorance and a “corruption to which moral judgements on matters 
political are particularly prone” (Morgenthau, 1962: 281). Moreover, there are 
only “narrow limits” with which nations “are able to comply with abstract moral 
standards” (Morgenthau, 1962: 281). Great efforts must be made, implies 
Morgenthau, to maximise the realisation of normative ideals, and indeed on an 
empirical level Morgenthau understood that statesmen often took decisions 
which fell short of a fully expedient foreign policy with few moral limitations 
(Morgenthau. 1948: 79; Morgenthau. 1960: 234). Morgenthau argued that 
morality is “vital” in the political sphere because it limits the choice of ends and 
means available to decision makers as well as “delineating the legitimate sphere 
of a particular branch of action altogether” (Morgenthau, 1962: 325), i.e. took 
certain choices off the table of viable ethical options. Morgenthau is implying 
that there is scope for international ethics and that this scope can go a certain 
way towards building international norms which accept the employment of 
domineering power and yet work within these international practices in order to 
minimise evil to as small a level as possible.  
Morgenthau has been misunderstood and in part this is because of the 
extent to which his earlier thought, the mid-Morgenthau, came to dominate how 
American political science understood realism; rationalist, non-normative, 
empiricist and essentially consistent with equally understood scholars such as 
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Machiavelli and Hobbes (Murray, 1996: 84). In Murray’s view, the 
Machiavellian-Hobbesian view is one which identifies sovereign states as in a 
state of endless competition and where relative power gains are free to be 
pursued regardless of the amorality that such a policy implies (Murray, 1996: 
84-85). Indeed, the Machiavellian or Hobbesian image of Morgenthau had by 
the end of the twentieth century become “conventional wisdom” (Murray, 1996: 
84). Such an image has been repudiated, as we have argued in the literature 
review.  
To bring our horizon to bear, and as we have argued in this chapter, 
Morgenthau understood the ends of reasoning as constituting metra which we 
cannot overcome. His understanding, as ours, is one of there being measures 
that limit the intellectual capability of human beings, this view of metra is 
marshalled against those approaches, which in Morgenthau’s view, sought to 
build theories without consideration of the intellectual limitations of the self, 
advanced a thesis of utopianism. Indeed, in The Machiavellian Utopia 
Morgenthau repudiates the utopianism of both idealists, by which he means 
“scientific man,” as well as Machiavellians which are equally culpable of 
ignoring the metra of the self and the intellectual:  
 
“if it is utopian to assume that a rational system of thought by its own 
inner force can transform the conditions of man, it is no less utopian 
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to expect that a stable, peaceful society can be built upon power 
alone” (Morgenthau, 1945b: 145). 
 
The statesmen, as well as the tragedian, can understand the metra of the 
self in the broad sense of the term, and can act in a manner which is consistent 
with that understanding (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). The statesman/tragedian 
acknowledges that there are limits to what is obtainable given the metra of the 
self (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). The utopian, either in “the vestments of a 
scientific age” or those who fetishize power as the means to achieve peace, fail 
to learn “the knowing insecurity of the wisdom of man” (Morgenthau, 1945b: 
145; Morgenthau, 1946: 222-223).  
Morgenthau's international ethics are achieved by statesmen who are able 
to rise above the supreme wickedness of human beings and adopt merely a 
limited wickedness; a willingness to conduct evil in such a way that the 'moral' 
agent becomes less ‘beast’ like (Morgenthau, 1946: 201-203). Indeed, as Good 
argues, for Morgenthau: “Diplomacy itself becomes a kind of norm” (Good, 
1960: 610). Citing Politics Among Nations, Good argues that Morgenthau 
understood “diplomacy” in light of the national interest to be a process of 
moderating and accounting for the interests of other nations when attempting to 
build an international order (Good, 1960: 610). Diplomacy must not advance 
domestic values but rather must aim to balance interests-defined-as-power 
within an associational society (Good, 1960: 610).  
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Raskin describes Morgenthau's position, moreover, as forever attempting 
to apply prudence to concrete situations, such as interventionism, and in doing 
so to discover careful duties on the part of statesmen or where abstract 
formulations had prompted disastrous moral consequences (Raskin, 1984: 88-
94). Therefore, we can infer that it is a prudent, careful and dutiful Statesman 
who is the central normative agent in the international sphere for Morgenthau.  
In an international relations context, this involves the balancing of national 
powers in order to secure equilibrium (Little, 2007: 123-124). International 
peace can be accomplished through statesmanship (Morgenthau, 1946: 219-
223). As Little argues, Morgenthau’s implied international society is evident in 
his vision of the balance of power (Little, 2007: 122-124).  
There is something strikingly existential about the self in Morgenthau’s 
thought. What we mean by this is that the self is confronted with its own 
existence and the conditions of its own existence in the context of not being able 
to grasp its actuality. The illusion of truth of things in an absolute sense is 
shattered by the sudden absurdity of claiming to have certain meanings when in 
fact the self, and the nations, have no loadstar to which their lives direct their 
actions and give it meaning. The more poetic point is that nations meet under an 
“empty sky from which the Gods have departed”  
As we argued in the earlier section in this chapter, the self, externalises 
the destructive internal frustrations that drive it towards power-conflicts. In the 
absence of the Gods, the self feels the need to make itself the ends of its own 
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existence, and in a collective form, the nation emerges as the objective end of 
political life and its ideology becomes understood as if it was universally 
correct. Morgenthau lamented this vision of pathos that dominated the 
landscape of world politics. Indeed, mid-Morgenthau sought to introduce the 
practice of balancing power between nations which took the form of a check, 
one upon another. Indeed, as Little persuasively argues, there is a normative and 
societal dimension to this international practice: sharing their role as 
international statesmen with the norms of the society to which they belong, 
nations strive to prevent the annihilation of humanity by means of 
thermonuclear warfare through an associational balance of power where all 
have a role in its maintenance (Little, 2007: 122-124). This implies the 
existence of ethical and political imperatives within mid-Morgenthau’s view of 
world politics that are necessary in order to advance the possibilities for peace.  
Falk distinguishes between Morgenthau, for whom the national interest 
must have normative primacy, and the position of McCone, for whom the 
national interest may be pursued by whatever expedient means necessary; 
Morgenthau's ethical position resists making policy accountable to the value of 
expediency or the pursuit of interests normatively uninhibited by considerations 
of the means to a particular political end (Falk, 1984: 80). In Scientific Man, 
Morgenthau repudiates the view that the end always justifies the means by 
arguing that if this were the case then all means would become legitimate 
regardless of their excesses (Morgenthau, 1946: 185-186). Moreover, good 
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intentions are not a sufficient enough reason to excuse blunders as, in this 
context, a blunder represents a failure to uphold the ethics of responsibility to 
those people who must suffer the consequences of such mistakes (Morgenthau, 
1946: 185-186).  
In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau further distances himself such an 
expedient realpolitik by stressing the desirability of supranational norms which 
enable the possibilities for peace and justice at the level of world politics 
(Morgenthau, 1960a: 248). The notion of supranational norms as a means of 
checking the nation-state’s perpetual desire to fulfil its expansive power-over 
impulses, is inspired by Morgenthau’s nostalgia for the existence of such norms 
in European history.   
European history illustrated how supranational norms can come about 
through societal integration and where:  
 
“The individual members of this society, therefore, felt themselves to 
be personally responsible for compliance with those moral rules of 
conduct; for it was to them as rational human beings, as individuals, 
that this moral code was addressed” (Morgenthau 1960: 248). 
 
Restraint on the part of nation-states, Morgenthau implies, must rest upon 
some kind of shared cultural similarity or identity which can, as it did in the 
past, serve a moral end (Morgenthau, 1960a: 248-255). Although Morgenthau is 
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keenly aware of the metaphysical contingencies implied by historic norms, and 
thus in their absence there is little to stop particular nations from assuming that 
their account of the truth of things is the actuality of things in an absolute sense, 
there is no reason to think that supranational norms as a concept could not 
provide some means of advancing Morgenthau’s political and ethical 
imperatives (Graebner, 1984: 76; Morgenthau, 1960a: 259; Molloy, 2006: 93).  
However, Morgenthau had put great stock in the notion that the 
certainties which had existed prior to the advent of modernity, which were 
defined within the context of European cultural norms, had been totally 
shattered and could no longer issue the assurance that the hopes and aspirations 
of the self as it had (Neacsu, 2010: 72). Supranationalism thus would thus have 
to rest upon something other than historical norms which could not be 
reinvented.  
Morgenthau’s answer has a distinctively Deweyan flavour to it: the 
advent of supranational organisations is driven by the needs of humanity, what 
we have called the global demos, as well as rising awareness amongst the 
international community of the inadequacy of the nation-state to deliver upon 
those needs (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11). Conceiving of a battle between 
nationalism and functionalism, a battle which will determine in Morgenthau’s 
view “the fate of the word” is all the more essential given the atomic arsenals 
available to the modern nation-state (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11).  
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“According to Professor Mitrany, an international community must grow from the 
satisfaction of common needs shared by members of different nations. International agencies, 
serving peoples all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very 
fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations, and actions. 
Ultimately, if such international agencies were numerous enough and served the most 
important wants of most people of the earth, the loyalties to these institutions and to the 
international community of which they would be the agencies would supersede the loyalties 
to the separate national societies and their institutions” (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11). 
 
As Scheuerman argues, Morgenthau describes “with ever-heightened 
enthusiasm” the functionalist theory of David Mitrany, a theory which 
Morgenthau took to offer a unique prospect for “international reform” and the 
re-construction of an international society (Scheuerman, 2010: 263).  
Morgenthau endorsed Mitrany’s vision that competence over a technical 
area linked to a specific activity or function could be elevated to a supranational 
institution and thus could “generate new supranational forms of social practice, 
shared norms, and complexes of shared interests” and thus lay the “building 
blocks” of a new form of “global governance” (Scheuerman, 2010: 263). 
Morgenthau implies that his interpretation of international politics 
escapes from the narrow and parochial views and argues that there are political 
and ethical imperatives in world politics must be to establish normatively 
infused social institutions which effectively restrains “the conscience of the 
actors on the international scene” (Morgenthau, 1960a: 258). Such norms must 
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be supranational and must orient international actors towards wise choices 
which work to maintain and regulate an associational balance of power in such 
a way that a “lesser evil” can be accomplished (Little, 2007: 123-124). As 
Morgenthau argues the aim of the associational balance of power is “to maintain 
the stability of the system” all the while maintaining “the elements” that go into 
it (Morgenthau 1960: 169). As Little argues, Morgenthau's view is that “he is 
effectively identifying the benign future with an associational balance of power 
and the malign future with an adversarial balance of power” (Little, 2007: 127). 
Certainly, this societal check on the vice of universal nationalisms is at the heart 
of Morgenthau’s drive to build world peace and indeed to promote a world 
which facilitates the opportunity for his type of anti-Jacobinist democracy. 
Other examples that certain norms which are appropriate for the 
international sphere are outlined in Politics Among Nations where Morgenthau 
argues that as a prudent matter it is better for there to be a norm of accepting 
that a perfect balance of power is implausible because of human 
imperfectability and the likelihood of mistakes and blunders as well as 
miscalculations (Morgenthau, 1960a: 210). A further norm then follows, it is 
better to maximise power to create a space for the possibility of error that might 
produce a disadvantage (Morgenthau, 1960a: 210).  
Against the nationalistic universalism which has transformed the 
particularity of its own sovereign state into a globally threatening ideology, as 
was witnessed by Morgenthau in the heights of the Cold War, Morgenthau 
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sought system transformation (Lebow, 2003: 242-246). Morgenthau sought to 
promote the organisation of politics which meshed the sovereign state level and 
the supranational level and is fuelled by the reconceptualisation of the national 
interest by leaders of vision (Lebow, 2003: 245). In an international relations 
context, this involves the balancing of national powers in order to secure 
equilibrium (Little, 2007: 123-124). And indeed, there is much hope that 
international peace can be accomplished through statesmanship (Morgenthau, 
1946: 219-223). 
In the context of Morgenthau’s view that it is within the self that human 
activism helps evades metaphysical shock, the enlightened statesman, we infer 
becomes a representative of the irrational need for activism (Morgenthau, 1971: 
622). For Neacsu, Morgenthau highlights the role of the Statesman in creating 
the possibilities for the emergence of common meanings, hence a “stable 
ground” upon which norms can be built (Neacsu, 2010: 165). Thus, it is through 
this activism that the very practice of IR can discursively sooth the need within 
the self to have a measure of social meaning. That is, the same dynamics which 
occur at the level of the self are also the same dynamic occurring at the level of 
world politics.  
Indeed, in Scientific Man we can see how Morgenthau interpreted the 




“National unification and democratic liberation, instead of doing away with 
the only remaining causes of war, intensified international antagonisms and 
made the broad masses of the people active participants in them. The unified 
nations, instead of being deprived of an incentive for war, now had the 
cohesion and emotional impetus necessary for policies of conquest, colonial 
and otherwise. International disputes, which formerly had been largely 
rivalries of princes and an aristocratic pastime, now became controversies 
between nations, where the interests of the peoples themselves appeared to 
be at stake and in which the peoples themselves had the opportunity to play 
a determining part” (Morgenthau, 1946: 67). 
 
However, if we bring our hermeneutic understanding to bear upon 
Morgenthau thought, we interpret there to be a strong sense of the metra of 
Jacobian/majoritarian democracies, but also the metra of authoritarian 
governments. Certainly, Morgenthau explained the calamities of the twentieth 
century as a long-term consequence of the decline of aristocratic society, but 
nowhere does he advocate abandoning democracy of excluding the demos from 
the political process. Nostalgia for European supranational norms does not in 
itself imply an anti-democratic standpoint (Scheuerman, 2009: 176-177).  
It would seem that Morgenthau understood that a poorly-functioning 
democracy is of limited value in advancing his political and ethical imperatives:  
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“First, the recruitment of government and especially foreign policy officials 
from the entire population mean that foreign affairs was subsequently 
pursued by practitioners whose values were as heterogeneous as this of 
society at large. Moral and political pluralism demolished the relatively 
uniform normative outlook on which much of international society had 
depended” (Morgenthau in: Scheuerman, 2009: 177). 
 
A well-functioning democracy would embrace the representative 
dimension of democracy whereby the demos would confer upon persons the 
power of the state and enable that government to act for the benefit of those 
whom they represented (Scheurerman, 2009: 184) 
In Politics Among Nations, in a section entitled the “Destruction of 
International Morality” Morgenthau displays an implicit concern by 
contextualising the historical fact of the replacement of aristocratic foreign 
policy makers with ones that could be appointed from any class, or by election, 
with a wider explanation concerning the decline of international morality 
(Morgenthau, 2006: 256-256). Morgenthau juxtaposes the modern “individual 
statesman” - for whom there is a measure of restraint in terms of his conscience 
- with a description of the electorate - or in our terms the demos - as having 
virtually “no moral convictions of a supranational character at all” 
(Morgenthau, 2006: 256). Thus, it would seem that Morgenthau’s position is 
anti-democratic. It is not at all. His view is an anti-Jacobin/majoritarian and one 
that is in support of a system of government that is representative rather than an 
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elected dictatorship governed through opinion polls, plebiscites and a 
repudiation of minorities. 
Morgenthau analysis of the demos states explicitly that there can be a 
moral character to a nation’s international cultural identity as a result of good 
leadership (Morgenthau, 2006: 256). The principle here represented is that the 
demos is not in a position to exercise moral responsibility in terms of 
international affairs directly and thus a representative system of government is 
needed so as to (a) avoid Jacobinism and (b) and to give the representative the 
space to practice her craft:  
 
“Moral rules operate within the conscience of individual men. Government 
by clearly identifiable men, who can be held personally accountable for 
their acts, is therefore the precondition for the existence of an effective 
system of international ethics. Where responsibility for government is 
widely distributed among a great number of individuals with different 
conceptions as to what is morally required in international affairs, or with no 
such conceptions at all, international morality as an effective system of 
restraints upon international policy becomes impossible” (Morgenthau, 
2006: 257). 
 
This anti-Jacobinism is also anti-nationalism; the answer becomes the 
need above all else to advance the representative system of government so as to 
act as a check upon the self’s tendency for destruction in modern conditions. 
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Writing in 1978 Morgenthau acknowledges the impact that modern forms of 
communications has had an effect upon undermining the ideology which had 
tried unsuccessfully to justify USA intervention in Indochina (Morgenthau, 
1978: 122). Morgenthau implies that incongruence between the ideological 
identity of the USA and the realities of the Vietnam War helped undermine the 
justifications for that conflict (Morgenthau, 1978: 123). In this we see how the 
hubris of militarist intervention supporters could be undermined through 







Conclusion to Chapter: 
 
In this chapter we brought our horizon to bear and built an interpretation of 
Morgenthau which emphasises the very great extent to which he grasps the 
metra/measures of things, such as the self, but also the limits upon majoritarian 
rule. He conceives of ethics and normativity as checks upon the exercise of 
power, that is to mobilise those ethical aspects of world politics and democracy 
which limit and constrain the worst impulses of political ambition and lack of 
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moderation. Morgenthau conceives of the need to build a working system of 
peace which aims to manage the interests of the global demos through 
institutional reform and the shifting of power away from the corruptible 
sovereign-states and towards supranational organisations which hold the 
potential to put those states into check. Morgenthau offers IR an account of the 
tragic nature of world politics that echoes our interpretation of Dewey: the 
importance of a wisdom of insecurity that arises from an awareness of the metra 
of things and the implications of such measures. In our interpretation 
Morgenthau conceives of his thought as an answer to the question of how to 
manage the implications of the self’s limitations and metra. He succeeds and 





Chapter Six: Towards an Alternative Understanding of the Tragic Nature 
of World Politics 
 
Introduction: Nature of the Dialogue between Niebuhr/Morgenthau and 
Dewey  
 
The dialogue has taken place within the horizon of the interpreter, and 
has concerned itself with enriching this horizon through an examination of (a) 
the metra of the self (b) the political and ethical imperatives of the various 
approaches and (c) the application of the approach to world politics.  
In general, we have interpreted as we have gone along insofar as we have 
built up an interpretation of each theme by grasping them one at a time in light 
of the previous interpretation. We did this, in this manner, in order to illustrate 
how our interpretation came about, we sought instead of contrasting the themes 
of the thesis against each other we focused upon the scholars in question one at 
a time. This permitted us to answer the research question directly: Dewey could 
be interpreted as applying the metra of things to his approach as well as to retain 
his commitment to inclusivity, dialogue and pragmatism. Niebuhr could be 
interpreted in light of the previous chapter, and then Morgenthau. The extent to 
which the Deweyan approach differed (or not) from the Classical Realists 
became visible as the dialogue unfolded. In this section we will illustrate what 
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the outcome of that dialogue is. To put that another way, what is the end result 






















Section One: the Deweyan Assimilation of Morgenthau and Niebuhr  
 
It is our thesis that Dewey’s understanding of the metra of things does 
indeed develop an alternative understanding of tragedy up to a certain point. 
There are lots of overlaps between Morgenthau, Dewey and Niebuhr. For 
example, all three acknowledge the metra of the self in their own theories. This 
is a narrow and broad definition of metra/measures in all three standpoints. That 
being said the scope of the potential for hubris is greater in Niebuhr than in 
Morgenthau and Dewey. For Niebuhr, pretention and eminence are sufficient to 
indicate that the metra of things has been breached. For Morgenthau, the 
breaching of the metra of things is something that indicates the onset of self-
mutilation. Whereas for Dewey the overshooting of metra simply requires there 
to be a reappraisal of the situation so as to avoid negative consequences in the 
future. In all three of these cases the narrow conception of metra/measures is 
involved.  
In the broader definition all three suggest epistemological and ethical 
modesty insofar as when confronted by measures that are beyond the self’s 
capacity to manage or master or indeed overshoot, there is a need to recognise 
the limitations of the self and its intellect. As such all three scholars embrace 
notions of truth that are consistent with the intellectual metra/measures of the 
self. In the case of ethical and political imperatives, the positions of all three are 
to address the metra of things that are embedded within the situations that 
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confront them. It is incumbent upon the collective self and the individual to act 
in a manner that acknowledges the metra/measures of things in all its actions 
and thus make choices which are consistent with these measures. Moreover, all 
three suggest that where the broader definition of the metra of things applies, 
the implications of these measures must be managed as best we can.  
When it comes to the application of these standpoints to world politics, 
we find that they differ somewhat in emphasis but not in their understanding of 
the metra of things. Niebuhr suggests that the standpoint of the children of light 
is moderated so as to better manage the children of darkness on the stage of 
world politics. For Morgenthau, it is to put into check the consequences of the 
metra of the self which is manifested as power-conflicts in all politics either by 
balancing the power of nations, or by building domestic and international 
institutions that act as constraints. In the case of Dewey, the exercise of 
intelligence as conceived of within a global dialogue between those who make 
up the widest possible demos serves to pool our knowledge and in turn to 
produce effective means of dynamic adaption to a constantly evolving situation.  
In sum, our horizon has become increasingly enriched by this dialogue 
and as such puts the interpreter in a position to answer the research question. At 
a certain level, in spite of their vastly different internal logics, all three scholars 
display a great concern with the metra of things and thus they all can be 
interpreted, following from our own interpretation of the nature of tragedy, as 
tragedian understandings. The pre-existing heritage of the tragedian approaches 
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from the Classical Realists, do neatly assemble into the flexible pragmatism of 
John Dewey. However, the conceptions of the self which are developed by 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr become in Dewey hypotheses as to how the mind part 
of the body-mind might be organised. Dewey pulls back from making general 
statements regarding the nature of the mind in favour of an understanding which 
reflects its construction. 
Dewey’s conception of the self is as we have argued a product of 
adaptive practices that lead us towards a mutable and contingent socially 
constitutive mind. Dewey understood the distinction between a mind that can be 
explained as a constitutive consequence of communal and community socio-
historical practices and the internal “rational” nature of a certain type of 
subjectivist mind which may or may not come into being (Brandom, 2011: 
110). In this sense, Dewey is more alert to the metra of the theorist for whom 
radical contingency is the best way to explain how so many “minds” or “selves” 
can be constituted across such a diversity in space and time. Concurrently 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr do something similar in both conceiving of meaning 
to arise out of the existential crisis that follows from the grasping of our own 
finite and relative nature. However, Dewey does not develop an account of the 
disturbance to the self that is caused by our existential awareness or how it has 
an impact upon our agential judgements or failings. His thesis implies that such 
disturbances can become part of a dialogue as to their origins and nature.  
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When it comes to political and ethical imperatives, the situated 
intelligence of John Dewey can assimilate the concerns and positions of 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr by putting them into the context of a dialogue 
concerning how to best adapt to situations which continue to be defined by the 
metra of things. As there is always an understanding of the consequences of 
overshooting the metra in all three approaches, Dewey offers a means of 
integrating a plurality of ethical and political stances into a contingent situated 
non-dogmatic set of warranted beliefs that can be “tested” against the capacity 
of the self to adapt to the situation that they are in that time and place 
suffering/undergoing/experiencing. Sometimes this may require holding to 
account the tragic ironies of the eminent and proud, sometimes it will mean 
balancing power or building democratic movements which aim to put a check 
upon majoritarian (Jacobinist) rule. Deweyanism can take a posture of a situated 
ethical and political stance all the while stressing that such stances exist within 
the measures and metra of a tragic existence.  
In our view, Dewey’s Classical Pragmatism enables the accomplishment 
of the task of learning the measures of things and in turn to offer a modest 
conception of knowledge which pools the insights of the widest demos. The 
insights of Morgenthau and Niebuhr can easily be added to such a dialogue and 
can even occupy an important place as experts in their fields. In our horizon, all 
three provide a shared concern with the metra of things and how the self can 
cope or manage a world that is defined by metra.  
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This may not be a synthesis of the three positions, it is perhaps an 
assimilation of the Morgenthau/Niebuhrian tragedian accounts into the Classical 
Pragmatism of John Dewey. The tragedian alternative that we proffer in this 
thesis is one that is outwardly our understanding/interpretation of Dewey with 
the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian positions incorporated into the 
epistemological and ethical/political dialogues through which the metra of 
things is managed, in the context of a forever evolving situation, and through 
the employment of situated intelligence.  
The promise of our dialogue has been that such an assimilation is 
possible and a shared front can be envisaged by a “Tragic Deweyanism” that 
further bridges the gap between the realist and international political thought 
traditions.  
The outcome of such an approach is not to achieve some rationally 
arrived at dialectically shaped absolute knowledge, and thus to measure human 
choices against such a criterion; rather, it is to keep the conversation alive and 
to create contingent modest knowledge that is flexible and can be easily 
discarded if it no longer is best able to manage the ongoing evolutions of our 
situations.  
Dewey’s theory of knowledge maps onto our own tragedian conception 
of the self being unable to resolve the riddles of things once those riddles reach 
a point whereby we lack, because of our metra/measures as human beings, the 
capacity or ability to resolve such questions. Oedipus cannot answer the riddle 
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of returning to his normal life having learned the answer to the riddle of his own 
identity.  Antigone is unable to answer the riddle of how to perform both her 
familial and patriotic duties owing to their contradictions. Some riddles can be 
answered because we lack the means to answer them.  
By drawing together our tragedian horizon with the understanding of 
metra (and how to manage metra) embedded within the three scholars with 
whom we have a dialogue, we are in a position to provide IR with a tragic 
Deweyanism.  
Our approach is a “tragic” Deweyanism insofar as it is an interpretation 
of Dewey’s thought as consistent with an understanding of the metra of things, 
in terms of the self (and its intellectual limitations), our ethical and political 
imperatives (as in tension and limited) and the application of these imperatives 
in world politics (as oriented away from individualism towards collectivist 
epistemological dialogue). This understanding of the metra of things is 
embedded throughout Dewey’s thought. Now we will employ our interpretation 
of his thought to construct an alternative understanding of the “tragic” nature of 
world politics that builds from our reading of Morgenthau/Niebuhr. 
To recap: our understanding of “tragedy” as an account of how there are 
measures inherent in all things and that if these measures are overstepped it 
results in hubris. Moreover, there are certain measures that the self, in both its 
individual and collectivist forms, lacks the power to overstep even if it wanted 
to. n Dewey, these measures must be managed in the best way possible and 
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such an effort can be best achieved by pooling the insights of the widest 
possible demos through dialogical engagement. Moreover, Dewey also grasps 
the importance of these measures as they form the bed rock of his understanding 
of all aspects of his thought: what we call the metra of things.  
In this chapter we will develop our tragic Deweyan standpoint: we 
employ our interpretation of Dewey as a resource to build a tragic 
understanding of world politics and suggest the instrumental means through 
which such tragedy can be managed through attentiveness to the impact of the 
metra of things as part of a broad process of inquiry within and throughout the 
global demos.  
Methodologically, what we do in this chapter is to employ our 
broadened/more enriched horizon as a result of our dialogue with the heritage 
texts. Our enlarged horizon has become enriched through a fusion with the 
meaning of the heritage texts. Following Gadamer we have fused our horizon 
with our interpretation of the horizon of meanings within the legacy texts. We 
remind the reader that in order to give greater clarity to how our horizon is 
shaped, we employ certain tragedian concepts to help us in interpreting the 
legacy texts.  
We set out in the methodology chapter an illustration of this “base” to our 
horizon established through deliberately privileging certain concepts in our 
interpretations. Principally amongst these was the narrow and broader 
definitions of metra.  
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To further recap: in the chapter on Dewey we made an interpretation of 
his thought which led us to have the beginnings of an answer to our research 
question. We made an interpretation of Dewey’s thought in which the Deweyan 
standpoint is understood to be alert to the metra of things in both its narrow and 
broader senses. In our interpretation, the Deweyan style of inquiry suggests a 
form of world politics whereby a dialogue which pools diverse insights can be 
brought together across the global demos in order to address the problems of 
mankind. In our interpretation such a style of inquiry is consistent with an 
awareness of the metra of things and thus aims to manage them in a manner 
consistent with the principle of inclusivity. Because of its consistency with 
metra, which we put into a tragedian framework, we advance an interpretation 
of Dewey’s approach to world politics that presents it as a tragedian approach.   
In the subsequent two chapters we put our understanding of Dewey’s 
thought into a dialogue of horizons with the Niebuhrian and then 
Morgenthauian standpoints. What this revealed was that in the case of Niebuhr, 
his understanding of the metra of things is restricted by his religious views that 
leave him unable to grasp how it is that his own account of the tragic ironies of 
things is unable to open up dialogues between differing parts of the global 
demos which may have a different account of the metra of things than his own 
Christian version. We conclude by arguing that Dewey’s style of inquiry offers 
a means through which those who are self-giving might learn how to 
comprehend and adapt to the metra of things and thus advance the Niebuhrian 
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goal of building a world community that overturns the children of darkness and 
creates a common bond between nation-states which can achieve a shared 
awareness of their own tragic fate.  
In the chapter on Morgenthau, we put Dewey into dialogue with 
Morgenthau by means of bringing our horizon, which has come to understand 
Dewey in a certain way, to bear upon Morgenthau’s standpoint and thus 
enabling us to make an interpretation of his thought. In our interpretation 
Morgenthau does indeed understand the metra of things, and indeed, puts his 
political realism to the task of managing metra through a mixture of 
associational balance of power and by advocating a functionalist model of 
world politics. We agree that these are the best ways to manage the metra of 
world politics up to a certain extent, however, Dewey is better able to advance a 
functionalist model of world politics because he provides a form of inquiry that 
reaches out to all those parts of the global demos which would participate in 
supranational institutions and thus goes beyond the boundaries of international 
politics in order to be more inclusive of the insights of those who might stand to 
benefit from sectorial supra-nationalisation. This also serves to engage in a 





Section Two: Tragic Deweyanism: The Advantages of Metra-focused 
Theory Relative to Hubris-focused Accounts of Tragedy 
 
As we have demonstrated in our interpretation, Niebuhr captures the 
extent to which the self is capable of exercising its freedom in a manner which 
leads it to ignore the just measures inherent things. Our tragic Deweyanism 
embraces this sense of “tragic pathos” and seizes upon the impact of 
overstepping our measures and thus put ourselves into terrible suffering. By 
pathos we mean to express that which is pathetic about human beings in how 
they fail to exercise self-restraint in order to keep themselves within what they 
learn to be the measures of things.  
The tragic self is forever caught, as Morgenthau argues, within a tension 
between scholars for whom the measure of accomplishment on the part of 
human beings is not defined by the measure of the self as a limited being and 
thus is forever in a position of resistance against such hopefulness (Frei, 2001: 
186; Rengger, 2012: 56). The tragic self is in a position to understand its own 
metra, and thus to understand the metra of others: intellectuals and optimistic 
scholars regarding the scope of human accomplishment are thus subject to 
critical scrutiny (Frei, 2001: 184). Moreover, the tragic self is unwilling to 
accept that the vast accomplishments of the natural sciences in their own fields 
can be replicated within the social sciences (Frei, 2001: 181, 186). Tragedians 
 260 
fully acknowledge the ontological differences of the natural and social spheres 
and thus require different methodological approaches. 
Exclusive reliance upon what is revealed by reason alone does not 
translate into an automatic means of individual or collective salvation from our 
difficult situations: there is more revealed to us that what reason reveals alone 
(Morgenthau, 1946: 220). Oedipus in his ignorance oversteps the measures of 
things, and incurs the wrath of the furies: but his fate is compounded by his 
false faith in the capacity of reason to deliver salvation to his people and to 
advance his greatness.  
Tragedy encourages is a strong awareness of where the measures of 
things are, to get a grip upon those measures, and to respect the craft of grasping 
such measures. As the tragic self engages in a practice of grasping the nature 
and meaning of these measures in terms of consequences, it also learns the craft 
of managing such metra. Such a craft is advanced a great deal through pooling 
the insights of the global demos: metra as a meta-theoretical concept is a 
universal feature of all worlds as it is an intrinsic element of all objects of 
perception: for the tragic self, all things have their measures/metra. Cognitively, 
without the measures of things, there cannot be a world: metra is a part of the 
very process of world-constituting that the self performs through social-
linguistic practices.  
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In order to best understand the metra of things, and to have the broadest 
understanding of its manifestation, it is necessary to have an open mind, as well 
as to be sensitive to all those things which are revealed to the self either through 
reason or any other source of revelation. Only with the broadest sense of 
grasping the insights of the widest number of people can the measures/the metra 
of things be managed.  
Following our interpretation of Dewey’s self as defined by its 
measures/metra, and thus only able to produce warranted assertions, or 
knowledge claims of limited authority we are in a position to claim that this 
understanding of the self is tragedian insofar as such a self would be in the end 
only partially understood given the limited scope of understanding or grasping 
that the self is capable of achieving. In our horizon this can be easily added to a 
tragedian account of the self as a limited being that is at the mercy of forces that 
are beyond its capacity to control.  
Our tragic Deweyanism, can render both the Morgenthau and Niebuhr 
accounts of the self into theoretical and hypothetical resources which can be put 
to use within inquiry into the nature of the self and its choices/actions. The 
warrant of these hypotheses thus becomes measured by the utility of them to aid 
in the constitution of a new equilibrium. Indeed, in the context of 
experimentalism and dialogical engagement/inquiry, the 
Morgenthau/Niebuhrian views that the self that it is prone to abuse its freedom, 
or to manifest its own internal tensions as external destructive impulses may 
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well represent very useful hypotheses in explaining the nature of world politics. 
However, such hypotheses would also stand as open to revision if they were 
revealed to no longer be an adequately useful approach for the self’s adaption to 
the metra of things.  
Following such insights, the tragic self is in a position to grasp what its 
situational and dialogically inclusivity-enhanced insights are and thus what his 
ethical and political imperatives really ought to be in this circumstance. In our 
iteration, a situational response is the best response as it reflects the plastic and 
forever changing nature/metra of things. Sometimes a meta-theoretical restraint 
upon reason will be required (Lebow, 2012: 70), sometimes a dilution of 
“grandiose and universalist ambitions” (Mayall, 2012: 15). Indeed, tragedy 
implicitly warns against a one-size-fits-all response and offers a situational ethic 
that fits the constantly evolving situation.  
However, our approach differs from IR approaches to tragedy, such as 
Lebow’s, which can be largely a critique of hubris (Lebow and Erskine, 2012: 
8-9). Such hubris is illustrated in how the Athenians in their dialogue with the 
Melians: the Athenian overstepping of the metra of conventions results in their 
hubris and eventual downfall (Lebow, 2003: 124, 160, 161). Lebow’s thesis, 
therefore, concerns itself with advancing an ethos, an ethos of prudence, which 
represents an “antidote” to hubris (Lebow, 2003: 308).  
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In our view, this orients his thesis away from the centrality of metra to 
tragedy. Instead of advancing an account of tragedy which establishes the 
importance of the archaic use of metra, in both its narrow and broader forms, 
within the tragedian narrative, Lebow is content to understand that which is 
breached to be convention (nomos) rather than measures (metra). Lebow 
understands, following Deutsch, that respecting nomos is much like pulling up a 
red light in an automobile without being made to do so by anything other than 
convention (Lebow, 2003: 326). In the overstepping of such conventions, 
Lebow argues a hegemonic nation fills up with hubris (Lebow, 2003: 310). 
Therefore, when Lebow maintains that “common sense, restraint, self-control, 
prudence and balanced judgement, and for women chastity” is the antidote to 
hubris, he appears to be implying that this ethos as a way of bringing a 
hegemonic nation away from the brink of tragedy (Lebow, 2003: 366). 
Applying our horizon, we interpret this to mean that the question, which 
Lebow is answering as a manifestation of his thought, is to find a means of 
advocating for those conventions to which a hegemon might benefit in terms of 
how it manages the system of states. Lebow even states that these could be: the 
convention of observing constraints established by international law, 
institutional obligations, norms of consultation and policy by consensus among 
close allies” as well as the norms of advancing a more democratic world 
(Lebow, 2003: 310). However, it seems to me that tragedy is performing a 
different intellectual feat than council hegemonic nations as to how they can 
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perpetuate conventions that might well advance their interests. Tragedy, in our 
interpretation, is about illustrating the importance of understanding the 
measures of things and managing them in the best way possible. It is an 
affirmation of measures (of metra), and not as Lebow sees it, a critique of the 
hubris that arises out of the ignoring of useful social and political conventions. 
If tragedy does anything it also exposes how the strong, such as Creon, or 
Oedipus, can be brought low by the furies as easily as anyone else. The lesson 
of tragedies is directed at the audience, the demos, and not at characters as they 
endlessly play out the same script over and over again on the stage. There is no 
social learning of the characters of the play, but the audience can indeed learn 
from their fates the importance of grasping the measures of things: metra which 
may include, but does not confine itself exclusively to, nomos. 
In our interpretation the demos is expansive, it is in its broadest category 
truly global and contains within it a vast array of diverse voices and traditions. 
In the context of globalisation, and when viewed through a tragedian (metra 
focused) lens, the boundaries of the demos run only as far as the intellectual 
limits of the self in its global collective manifestation. As in our view, tragedy 
encourages the audience, which we take to be allegorical to the widest possible 
demos, i.e. the global demos, to grasp the importance of knowing as best one 
can the measures (metra) of things. Tragedy also implies a collectivist and 
dialogical dimension to this exercise insofar as it is in dialogue that the potential 
for the audience/demos to learn its tragic “lessons” is established. The ethical, 
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and indeed, political imperatives which arise out of such lessons are naturally 
questions of instrumentality: how do we implement what we have learned? How 
do we understand the metra? How do we manage it even though we are limited 
beings? 
Perhaps the most significant difference is the embrace of radicalism on 
the part of tragic Deweyanism if the situation calls for it. Prudence isn’t always 
the answer in the sea if it turns to storms.  
In Thought And Action In Politics, Morgenthau argues that any 
theoretical postulates demand “confirmation” if they are to avoid to “a 
dogmatism that equates theoretical propositions with factual knowledge and 
sticks with the former in the face of factual evidence to the contrary” 
(Morgenthau, 1971: 617). We interpret this to mean that dogmatism is, as it is 
with Dewey, of little advantage if it is unable to be supported by the outcome of 
investigative inquiry. Like Dewey, Morgenthau understood the self to need to 
belong to a community of inquirers if it is to establish warranted beliefs.  
Moral consciousness is consistent with the very nature of the self 
(Morgenthau, 1962: 366). Normativity is inherent in the self as much as its 
capacity to formulate social meanings. This fusion of nature and normativity 
thus puts Morgenthau in a position to associate what are concrete facts with the 
normative intra-self social meaning constructing process. The self is caught in a 
tension between the need to serve its own interests - as well as to undermine 
metaphysical shock - and as well as the wider obligation to act in an “unselfish” 
 266 
way and to “not sacrifice the interests of others” to one’s own (Morgenthau, 
1946: 191). This impulse to protect the best interests of others is something 
which Morgenthau felt was of great concern and he lamented the failure of 
sovereign states to live up to their ideals (Lebow, 2003: 253-255). We must act 
to protect each other from ourselves, to put each other in check, and to 
acknowledge that the self is the best moral resource through which the self’s 
destructive behaviour can be managed. Morgenthau’s ethical and political 
imperatives, therefore, create societal norms that are effective enough to bring 
about peace even between superpowers.  
There is a curious optimism to Morgenthau’s thought whereby the 
reoccurring “perennially” and “eternal” manifestation of certain patterns of life 
lead to lessons learned over time (Morgenthau, 1962: 3). Morgenthau is quick 
to point towards the lesion of tensions between the legacy of historical political 
ideas and the understanding of the consequences occasioned by common 
experiences of political life in a certain period of time (Morgenthau, 1962: 3). 
Moreover, Morgenthau takes 'political philosophy' and by implication his own 
(international) political thought, to be caught up within the tensions of historical 
ideas and contemporary manifestations insofar that “awareness” of what is 
understood to be true in politics, Morgenthau implies, is built upon shifting 
sands (Morgenthau, 1962: 4). For Morgenthau, the epoch of when timeless 
truths concerning human existence has ended, we are seemingly forever thrown 
into the shifting sands of relativized understandings (Frei, 2001: 14-17). 
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Nevertheless, in spite of these shifting sands, Morgenthau maintains that is 
possible to peer beyond the “ephemeral” truths of international relations and 
identify the underlying laws and patterns, in the sense of long term concretized 
social facts, and thus we are able to learn over time.  
For Morgenthau, the “store of objective general truths' is uncovered by 
the monument of political thought over the ages, and the construction of this 
thought overtime comes to a greater “awareness” of political truth (Morgenthau, 
1962: 45). Nevertheless, even if our awareness is higher than before, untangling 
the social reality of the present from the theoretical truths of the past is no easier 
for modern man than it was at any point in the history of thought. The metra of 
human nature, however, means that any account of truth must be a 'politicised' 
manifestation of the lust for power; it strives to turn thought into tools of power 
acquisition that render the very practice of thinking/reflectivity into a corruption 
or 'sinful' display of human vice (Morgenthau, 1959: 129). These truths, 
nevertheless, are more than the power relations that arise from our intra-subject, 
they are also a manifestation of the inter-subject social level of reflectivity and 
for the Social Scientist the vantage point is the accomplishment of thought at 
the social level rather than the arbitrariness of individuated standpoint: 
 
“Either it will be tempted to overcome the limits of its relativistic 
assumption, whose nihilistic consequences it is unable to face, by 
taking flight in a subjective dogmatism that identifies the perspective 
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and preferences of the observer with objective general truth - thus 
becoming the ideology of a particular view of society, reflecting 
particular social interests -  or else it will travel the relativistic road to 
the end and surrender the very concept of objective, general truth, 
concluding from the subjectivity of its own insights that there is 
nothing but opinion and that one opinion is as good as another 
provided society does not object to it” (Morgenthau, 1959: 129). 
 
Therefore, it is the vantage point of the scholar which cuts across the 
shifting sands of our relativised contingencies and pluralities; the arbitrariness 
of politics as simply opinionated disagreement is eschewed in lieu of the social 
level scholarly reflections that are manifested as the accomplishment of the 
contribution of thought throughout the ages. Nevertheless, this thought has 
undergone a vast shift as a result of the departure of the “Gods” from the sky 
and by extension the inability of the self to create unity with others in our 
current conditions (Morgenthau, 1971: 628-632). As such, the metaphysical 
dilemma faced by modern man is something that makes incumbent upon the 
scholar a certain need to make sense of the world that is otherwise 
“disconnected” and “unintelligible” (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46).  
Just as the monuments to thought have enriched our theoretical 
understandings, so the process of reinterpretation continues and through the 
practices of ordering and signifying, a new interpretation of the otherwise 
“disconnected and unintelligible” is built (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46). And for 
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Morgenthau this renewed interpretation is arbitrated and judged solely by the 
value that any theory is valuable so long as it is useful in deepening our 
understanding of our study (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46). Therefore, when 
Morgenthau argues that the modern impulse to bring about “reality” by bringing 
into meaningful contact groups of human beings, a move which serves their 
corrupt needs, he is implicitly arguing that this is a useful interpretation for us 
because it deepens our understanding and enriches our interpretation 
(Morgenthau, 1971: 628-632):  
 
“In history man meets himself, and in his encounter with history he 
encounters again, magnified into super human proportions the 
fallibility of his own intellectual understanding and moral judgments 
that prevents him from completely understanding and adequately 
judging both history and himself” (Morgenthau 1962: 15). 
 
By turning towards thought, in this case history but also other disciplines, 
Morgenthau interprets into being a more nuanced understanding, in this case 
regarding human intellectual limitations, than would have been possible without 
that monument of scholarly accomplishment. Therefore, the monument of 
thought is a useful tool to understand international relations because it enriches 
our interpretations. It allows us to escape our arbitrary opinions but it falls short 
 270 
of establishing various meanings and simplifications produced at the social 
level as the reality of an actuality that is theory-independent. 
The great advantage of our approach is that it answers these questions 
and it does so in a way that represents an advance upon hubris-oriented 
tragedian approaches in the study of world politics. Whereas these approaches, 
principally Lebow, are concerned to establish benign and indeed ethically 
warranted forms of hegemony, tragedy in our view is concerned with 
encouraging the audience/demos to learn the metra of things in their lives and to 
manage them as best they can. 
Moreover, we conceive of tragedy as understanding the social and 
collective nature of human beings. Our metra may not come from within but 
indeed it may come from a society where the powerful fail to understand how 
they are producing metra that binds others and thus leads them into measures 
from which there is no escape from tragedy.  
Tragic Deweyanism is not only better able to grasp a wider conception of 
the measure of things than pre-existing IR tragedians, it also provides 
situational ethical and political imperatives which are responsive to the 
changing circumstances of and the dynamic evolution of our worlds.  
Our alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world politics 
advances a conception of the self, in its collective form, as able to generate an 
effective adaptation between itself and the external world that it constitutes 
through attempting to grasp the actuality of things. As Dewey argues, such 
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grasping is an ethical and normative action insofar as it aims to create useful 
knowledge which can be put to use as any account of the world would be: to 
serve the interests of the collective that engages in the production of that world. 
Morgenthau is wrong to characterise a faith in experimentalism as a form of 
alchemy which unrealistically channels intellectual energy into societal change 
(Frei, 2001: 186). Dewey’s employment of experimentalism drives the self in 
the direction of establishing an account of the world as well as mechanisms 
designed to cope with this world in a scientific manner, but this is simply an 
attempt to be more precise and nuanced about the measures of things.  
In Scientific Man, the ‘decay’ of the Western world is said thus to be: 
 
“represented most typically by the belief in the power of science to solve all 
problems and, more particularly, all political problems which confront man 
in the modern age” (Morgenthau, 1946: v-vi). 
Scientific Man is dogmatic in his insistence that science has the capacity to 
resolve all political and social matters if only they were put into the idiom of 
reason and science: “solving” such matters would seem to be possible in a 
similar way to how problems are solved in disciplines such as Physics or 
Mathematics (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). The mood and temper of Scientific Man is 
an attitude of “confidence in the power of reason” (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). 
Scientific Man sees problems arise out of the “limitations of knowledge” and 
“insufficiencies of technical achievement” and thus sees the resolutions of these 
 272 
problems as accomplished by means of “the progressive development of theory 
and practice” (Morgenthau, 1946: 215). A medicine can be created to treat even 
the most protracted problems such as the difficulties in realising international 
peace (Morgenthau, 1946: 216). Scientistic Man reimagines the world by 
rendering all things into two camps where “reason, goodness, and right” is 
juxtaposed to “ignorance, evil, and wrong,” with the former having the strength 
to wrestle the course of history away from a pessimistic, towards an optimistic, 
outcome (Frei, 2001: 186; Morgenthau, 1946: 218).  
Scientific Man’s ontological assumptions about politics and the nature of 
man lead himself (with time) into self-mutilation (Morgenthau, 1946: 215-221): 
 
“An age, in particular, whose powers and vistas have been multiplied 
by science is liable to forget for a moment this perennial human 
tragedy and to exalt in the engineer a new man whose powers equal 
his aspirations and who masters human destiny as he masters a 
machine” (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). 
 
Morgenthau implies that this self-mutilation represents a nemesis to liberalist 
faith in Enlightenment Rationalism, and indeed he goes on to point towards how 
the “old hubris” of Icarus has resurfaced in this age of science and thus creates a 
pathos which occasions a fall from success and triumph (Morgenthau, 1946: 
222). This nemesis for Morgenthau has already arrived, and it has arrived in the 
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form of a mood or temper of the age to rival scientistic triumphalism: the 
despair that arises from the repeated failure of science to “solve” political and 
social problems (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Moreover, such a temper is nothing 
new, as for Morgenthau it represents a characteristic of thought throughout 
history (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Man’s quest, as manifested in his thought, 
represents a desire to recapture the “innocence” and “security” it has lost as a 
result of its evolving into something beyond simply an animal (Morgenthau, 
1946: 1). Scientific Man simply misconstrues the “nature of politics” as well as 
that of “political action” and thus exposes its bankruptcy in the very moment of 
its “triumph in theory and in practice,” i.e. in the “political and military 
catastrophes” of the nineteen thirties and forties (Morgenthau, 1946: 5-6). Self-
mutilation indeed. 
Niebuhr echoes this vision of the pathos of Scientific Man in his own 
conception of the manifestation of irony within the general patterns of history 
(Niebuhr, 2008: 154). At the heart of Niebuhr’s conception of the historical 
process (as will be argued in a subsequent chapter) is a uniquely Niebuhrian 
conception of metra (Niebuhr, 2008: 154). Niebuhr aims to establish that his 
analysis of history is more sophisticated than any alternatives which might be 
available: using the idiom of tragedy and not naturalism exclusively (Niebuhr, 
2008: 152).  
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Methodologically, Niebuhr concedes to interpretivism that a historical 
analysis can never escape subjectivism into an objective conception of history 
(Niebuhr, 2008: 152). Niebuhr argues that his interpretation is a better one 
because it eschews arbitrary judgments, acknowledges and eliminates obvious 
biases, and illumines rather than diminishes our historical comprehension 
(Niebuhr, 2008: 152). Niebuhr seems to hold that history can be comprehended 
in a sophisticated manner only by rejecting the authority of historians who see 
their accounts as true and correct interpretations. Niebuhr argues that this is to 
overstate what is possible and to commit the error of thinking that a subjective 
and limited view can represent a true and correct interpretation. This type of 
historian, as well as the Enlightenment Rationalist, for Niebuhr, both represent 
examples of what Morgenthau calls the “old hubris.” 
What Niebuhr sees when he interprets the overarching stretch of human 
history are certain patterns which for Niebuhr are congruent with his religiously 
inspired view that human eminence and hubris occasion an ironic nemesis or 
downfall (Niebuhr, 2008). In The Irony of American History, Niebuhr specifies 
how it is the “pretension” of the human being that is a constant throughout 
history (Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This represents the pretension of thinking that 
human destiny can be taken under the control of human beings (Niebuhr, 1943: 
331-332). For Niebuhr “the whole drama of human history is under the scrutiny 
of a divine judge” and it is the pretensions of human beings in taking their 
destiny under their own control which invites a divine “laughter” (Niebuhr, 
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2008: 155). Niebuhr conceives of Scientific Man as identifying with the 
“cumulative” pattern of human accomplishment with the unfolding of history 
itself (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion and sees in 
such hubris an implicit “desire” that “would keep man’s ends” - that is to say, 
his destiny - firmly “under his control and in his power” (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). 
Indeed, Scientific Man aims to “prematurely to complete” the historical process 
(Niebuhr, 1943: 332). If mankind proceeds down a path of self-reliance then a 
‘false centre’ to life is constructed and thus a failure to trust in divine 
deliverance (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158). 
For Niebuhr, this is an allegory for how history unfolds: there is a divine 
law and structure to human life which acts to restrain attempts from humans to 
become self-reliant and thus build a false centre: 
 
“The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial defiance of 
the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible character of His 
wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of history” (Niebuhr, 
1986b: 24). 
 
By “idolatries of history” Niebuhr is referring to self-reliance and 
eminence, something which fosters pride and thus invites the justified judgment 
(Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986b: 24-25): 
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“Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one 
side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature 
and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature 
aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic 
aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. 
They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and 
civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not 
by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues” (Niebuhr, 1937: 
212). 
 
The connection between eminence and being brought low is for Niebuhr 
a pattern of ironic reversals throughout human history, and such a pattern is 
given a Christian form (Niebuhr, 2008: 157): 
 
“The Biblical view of human nature and destiny moves within the 
framework of irony with remarkable consistency. Adam and Eve are 
expelled from the Garden of Eden because the first pair allowed “the 
serpent” to insinuate that, if only they would defy the limits which God had 
set even for his most unique creature, man, they would be like God. All 
subsequent human actions are infected with a pretentious denial of human 
limits” (Niebuhr, 2008: 158-159). 
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Humans exercise in their freedom the capacity to overstate their stature 
and thus cultivate pride in their eminence; this is what Niebuhr calls “original 
sin” (Tjalve, 2008: 63).  
One of Niebuhr’s polemic battles is with a catch-all notion of modern 
optimism, that an optimism concerning the upwards progress of history is 
inevitable and good. Niebuhr’s opposition stems from his own conviction that 
human life and history is profoundly shaped by dimensions which are beliefs 
central to his own faith, and what he calls his ‘historic religion’ (Niebuhr, 
1986c: 13). Niebuhr sees tragedies arise amidst the presence of sin, something 
associated with evil (Niebuhr, 1937: x). For Niebuhr, evil is something to be 
overcome even if it is something that is part of the universe (Niebuhr, 1986c: 
15). 
Whereas Niebuhr evokes the idiom of sin, evil and tragedy, his historical 
optimists evoke the possibilities of human eminence and intelligence and skills. 
For Niebuhr, historical optimists think that there are good grounds to believe 
that ‘egoism’ in the individual, as well as egoism amplified enormously through 
collectives, can be somehow overcome through the power of reason or through 
growing religious sentiment. For Niebuhr, historical optimists err in their 
optimistic beliefs that intellectual enterprises are sufficiently capable of acting 
as instruments through which the delivery of normative progress in politics and 
international relations can take place (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). 
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For Niebuhr, the ‘moralist’ and the ‘educator’ are both interchangeable 
parts of historical optimism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxii). They represent 
idealistic rationalism which overlooks the cold realities of IR which are poorly 
understood (Niebuhr, 1959: 116). A critique of moralism is found when 
Niebuhr writes in 1959 that: 
 
“The educational enterprise for this nation, in short, must include a thorough 
re-examination of the problems of political morality, which will help the 
new generation to understand that any consideration of power and interest in 
analysing the peace within a nation and among the nations need not be a 
cynical defiance of the moral order but can well be what responsible 
statesmanship has always been: an effort to coerce competitive and 
contradictory human aspirations and interests into some kind of tolerable 
order and justice. Such a task is a highly moral one” (Niebuhr, 1959: 116). 
 
That “moral order” for Niebuhr is one that acknowledges the tragic irony 
inherent in the historical process. Using the idiom of tragedy Niebuhr 
acknowledges the metra of human beings but also their capacity as moral beings 
to put the welfare and interests of others ahead of their own (Ashworth, 2014: 
235). As such there is the possibility that the self can act in such a way that it 
can avoid overshooting its metra. By contrast collectives, such as nations, lack 
that level of self-restraint and thus overshoot metra, commit the sin of hubris 
and invite the retribution of the highest authority be that Zeus (in tragedy) or 
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The Lord (in Christianity). As the individual can exercise greater self-restraint 
than the nation it is thus that individuals are more trustworthy. Such restraint 
that cannot easily be put upon nations/collectives which can for practical 
matters, Niebuhr implies, be restrained only by critical loyalty (Niebuhr, 1960: 
89). Such criticality is necessary in order that a “moral order” is maintained at 
the level of International Relations because the consequences of not maintaining 
it are to unleash the impact of hubristic “patriotism” in the international sphere: 
 
“patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. 
Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser 
loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all 
the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervour 
that the critical attitude of the individual towards the nation and its 
enterprises is almost completely destroyed” (Niebuhr, 1960: 91). 
 
In this, Niebuhr identifies how pride in national accomplishment is 
pretension and thus a hubris which fits into the historical pattern of “tragic 
irony” that the Niebuhrian standpoint maintains. The exercise of collective 
intelligence to further the national interest represents a pretension and creates 
the conditions of pride within that collective; the nation develops an 
exaggerated sense of its own entitlement and is righteous in defence of that 
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interest that results in the overshooting of the metra of things (Niebuhr, 1993: 
154-155; Niebuhr, 1960: xxix).  
In the case of the USA, Niebuhr was concerned that the self-idolatry, i.e. 
excessive pride, would prove a more fundamental threat to national wellbeing 
than Soviet Communism (Tjalve, 2008: 76). Niebuhr’s thought thus identifies 
the wisdom of rooting out hubris where possible by “a repentant attitude 
towards false completions of life” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 235). That is to respect the 
metra of things and encourage the collective or nation to do the same. RN’s 
thought employs the idiom of tragedy in such a way to make this very point: 
 
“God is the ultimate source of that indestructible order in the world against 
which man’s pride and self-will beat in vain. Here Christian faith, drawing 
its conceptions of divine justice from the teaching of the Old Testament 
prophets, reveal similarities with the interpretations of the Greek tragedies, 
in which the power of Zeus is conceived of as the final order and power 
which ultimately defeats all lesser majesties and forces which are arrayed 
against it. All lesser sources of power, which seek proudly to usurp the 
positions of Zeus, are finally brought low” (Niebuhr, 1986: 24). 
 
Such lesser forces include the nation, which in a moment of self-idolatry 
incurs a terrible nemesis: 
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“The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial defiance of 
the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible character of His 
wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of history” 
(Niebuhr, 1986: 24). 
 
The defiance of the divine by the ‘idolatrous pretensions’ of individuals 
and collectives, who make themselves the final source and ends of life, think of 
themselves as more magnificent than any divinity (Niebuhr, 1986: 24). For 
Niebuhr, to mistake oneself as divine, is found when politics contrives to 
embolden a nation to embrace an exaggerated sense of its own accomplishment 
or “eminence” (Niebuhr, 1937: 212). The “tragic irony” of history plays out, 
thus, within the history of IR; the eminence of civilisations, their very strengths 
become their internal vulnerabilities, and nemesis - and laughter - is occasioned 
as the divine judges and undermines such pretensions and thus exposes their 
eminence to be, in truth, hubris (Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986: 24-25):  
 
“Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one 
side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature 
and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature 
aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic 
aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. 
They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and 
civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not 
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by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues” (Niebuhr, 1937: 
212). 
  
Applying our hermeneutic approach, we can make an interpretation based 
on the dialogue between Niebuhr and Morgenthau here that with the idiom of 
tragedy that he employs, Niebuhr is able to correctly identify the “tragic irony” 
in the historical process where the metra of things are frequently overshot and in 
turn nemesis frequently follows. Niebuhr finds the distress within the self as it 
is lost within the conditions of its existence and thus must strive to understand 
life as best that it can: the idiom of reason and science is insufficient in reaching 
an understanding of human life that can promote its welfare and interests. By 
contrast such an idiom only serves to create practices that amplify the “tragic 
irony” of the historical process. The idiom of tragedy by contrast allows us to 
best understand life and to adequately respect the metra of things and the 
implication of overshooting them.  
Is this what is at fault with Dewey’s political thought, namely, that 
although he is, as Hook argues, deeply committed to a “tragic sense of life” he 
nonetheless overestimates what can be delivered ethically at the international 
level through the employment of social intelligence and its commensurate 
capacity to mitigate the exercise of political power? (Rogers, 2009: 81-82; 
Hook, 1974: 9-10; Howlett and Cohan, 2016: 132). Dewey affirms the 
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epistemological implications of metra, but does he fail to grasp the emotional 
and existential implications?  
To bring our horizon to bear, Dewey can well understand the self to be an 
emotional and intelligent being without needing to make hypothetical 
statements as to the true nature of the mind. As we suggested above, Dewey can 
incorporate the Morgenthauian hypothesis and hold this accountable to the 
value of usefulness from an epistemological and ethical point of view. 
Morgenthau’s expert contribution, such as that as Niebuhr, would thus, become 
part of the dialogue within the widest possible demos as to the source of human 
beings more destructive dimensions and could no doubt provide dialectical 
input on the matter amongst a plurality of understandings.  
The implications of this failure to adequately comprehend the 
implications of metra is seen throughout his thought for example in his 
reluctance to affirm the need in certain cases for employing the institution of 
war in international politics as well as his sympathy of pacificism (Howlett and 
Cohan, 2016: 132). We use the term sympathy because Dewey did indeed 
support the use of organized violence and supported the allied war efforts in 
both World War One and World War Two, nevertheless, he would have found it 
very difficult to endorse the abhorrent (but perhaps necessary) use of a policy of 
M.A.D in post-World War Two international politics. We assert this because 
Dewey lacked a grasp of the truly tragic nature of human beings and how the 
disruption caused by existential shock had propelled by a means of 
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concretisation the abhorrent totalitarian ideologies of the mid-century into a 
means of coping with the possibility that there is an absurdity to life. Indeed, in 
the aftermath of World War One Dewey retreated from an earlier view that 
war/international organized violence could provide an instrument for the 
promotion of a more democratic world (Cochran, 2010: 319-320). Dewey’s 
approach does acknowledge that the eschewal of the institution of war from 
international politics is possible so long as there is the underlying support of the 
global demos (Cochran, 2010: 332), however it is unable to adequately explain 
why such support is necessary: surely the argument for the outlawry of war is 














Section three: Advantages of Tragic Deweyanism 
 
Tragic Deweyanism has a broader understanding of the metra of things it 
also can assimilate the narrower definition employed by Saxonhouse’s use of 
the term to mean limits (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1262). The Pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus explained how it is that even the Sun must not overstep 
the limits, what he refers to as metra or “measures”, placed upon his movements 
as to do so would trigger intervention from the furies (Saxonhouse, 1988: 
1262).  
Tragic Deweyanism finds an echo in ancient Greek culture and provides a 
significant evolution upon the idea of metra and its relationship with coping 
with an existence which necessitate learning the measures of things as well as 
punishes those who cannot. Indeed, in Some Thoughts on the Archaic Use of 
Metron, Raymond Prier (1976) argues that the Homeric use of the notion of 
“measures” evolves through Hesiod and Heraclitus to be noetic rather than 
material as well as to evoke a sense of “completion” (Prier, 1976: 163-165). 
Prier points to how in the case of Theognis the social actor is described as 
holding onto “measures” and “the measure of the ability to cope” (Prier, 1976: 
165). The term is later employed by Salon to describe how a human being has a 
measured sense of completion of his life (Prier, 1976: 164). Metra is perceived 
within the mind as “measures” that cannot be measured using a ruler or stick as 
some sort of structure embedded within things which is directly experienced 
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and only partially grasped (Prier, 1976: 164). Referring to Hesiod’s metra of 
“the loud-roaring sea” Prier contends that:  
 
“there are seaways men know, underlying dynamics and directions they experience. 
There is, therefore, a strong indication that the experience of these structures, that is, 
their revelation to man, must be lodged in nous or some other partially defined area of 
cognition” (Prier, 1976: 164). 
 
Prier maintains, we think correctly, that the nous (mind) perceives metra 
as something “immediate and experiential” (Prier, 1976: 164). Thus, it is within 
the mind that the self comes to understand the “measure of all things” (Prier, 
1976: 169). The measure/metra of things is not, thus, an exogenously located 
extant structure which binds human beings, it is rather an instrumental concept 
that serves to alert the self to the actuality of its own knowledge of things as 
well as the potential for its own hubris and ignorance.  
This is consistent with Tragic Deweyanism which itself establishes the 
way to cope with the existential limitations of the self and the need to pool 
talents in a collective manner not just to cope with what are known problems 
that require solutions, but also the wisdom of insecurity to understand that there 
are structures that go beyond our metra and that these may well have a 
profoundly negative effect upon our lives even if they were previously unknown 
or the risk associated with them was unknown.  
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The metra is central to tragedian thought as it sits central to the dramatic 
narrative and the discourse insofar as without metra the remainder of the drama 
would make little sense. Indeed, Sophocles represents human beings are simply 
being unable intellectually to discover a discourse that corresponds to the 
actuality of their reality in some ultimate sense (Euben, 1990: 27). Moreover, 
this illustrates of the metra of human beings: the ways of speaking and acting 
that the tragic heroes are represented as having engendered both the eminence 
and accomplishments of that hero and as well serve to bring that hero into a 
terrible “nemesis” (Euben, 1990: 30). This does not however result in a 
demonstration of irony for its own sake, or a pessimistic lament for human 
intellectual limitations. The metra of things, however, can to a certain extent be 
managed, as this following passage indicates:  
 
“Characters in the plays are trapped in webs partially of their own partially of their own 
inadvertent devising, which also, in the best of circumstances, empower them. Bound by and 
to their “character” and their history, they are limited in their capacities of perception and 
reflection, attached to particular blindnesses in which they have no small stake. Yet they (and 
the audience perhaps more so) are able to see their blindness and so draw upon and extend 
the modes of discourse and practices that would otherwise simply ensnare them” (Euben, 
1990: 30). 
 
What this passage indicates is that alertness to the metra embedded in the 
outcomes of modes of dialogical interactions and modes of practices embedded 
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within the identity of tragic hero, engenders the imperative of being open to new 
and alternative ways of speaking and acting which may well prove to be more 
justified than those which arise from a partial view of the world. Our Tragic 
Deweyanism repudiates dogmatism is prepared always to reorganise and 
embrace new ways of thinking and acting (discourses and policy) to meet an 
existence which is too vast and complex to control using the methodologies of 
reasoning and natural science. Our approach acknowledges the vulnerability of 
assuming that our current horizon or sight is sufficiently advanced that it can 
adequately mirror nature without fault and in actuality. Our Tragic Deweyanism 
assumes that our sight is limited and our views provisional. Like the audience to 
a Sophoclean play, Tragic Deweyanism has learned from tragedy, and has 
become part of the hermeneutic experience of those plays itself through its 
embrace of metra.  
The metra of things cannot be overcome, however, even if it is well 
managed. The fate of tragic heroes reflects the limits of discourses and actions 
to bring about the realisation of human wants/needs. Metra is also found in the 
very practices and discourses of the tragic hero: they produce both achievement 





Section Three: Possible Objections Regarding the Introduction of 
Deweyanism into the Realist Tradition  
 
Can Deweyanism be understood as defined by pathos rather than 
tragedy? Morgenthau and Niebuhr interpreted Dewey’s thought as problematic 
insofar as it was seen to be consistent with what they understood to be a self-
mutilating scientific man. The dialogue in this thesis has advanced/enriched our 
horizon and has added to it the interpretation that Dewey’s thought is consistent 
with our own understanding of tragedy and in particular the metra of things in 
both the narrow and broad categories. We also build an interpretation of 
Morgenthau’s metra-focused account of the tragedy of world politics which we 
think provides us with a vision of the tragic nature of world politics which 
continues to have import for contemporary debates concerning the ethical and 
normative dialogue between the realist tradition and the tradition of 
international political thought.  
In this chapter, we argue that Dewey’s understanding of the metra of 
things does not in itself result in a tragic vision of world politics. Nevertheless, 
it ought to provide a rich theoretical and ethical resource that can be 
complimentary to as well as add to the tragic vision of world politics that 
modern debates in the discipline of IR has inherited from Morgenthau. In our 
complementary approach, Dewey deepens and enriches our tragic vision by 
introducing a form of inquiry which aims to not only grasp in detail the metra of 
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things but also how to constitute knowledge which can be put to use adaptively 
towards the tragic situation of world politics.  
However, in order to make this argument we must also demonstrate 
whether it is the case that our Classical Realists were right in their view that, 
generally speaking, Dewey’s thought was defined by an overly rosy optimistic 
reading of history? If this is the case, then there are no grounds for thinking that 
a complementary approach would have any import as far as building a more 
normative realist approach. In this section we reject entirely the notion that 
adding Deweyan thought to realism would undermine its tragic sense of life.  
As we have argued in earlier chapters, Morgenthau and Niebuhr had a 
sceptical view of the intellectual landscape of the mid-century USA. John 
Dewey, as a leading Classical Pragmatist, that is, a living representative of a 
philosophical tradition which found its origins in the New World, stood out to 
them as a perfect example of the historical optimist for whom the passage of 
time can be measured with the success of the whole human enterprise. Dewey 
the voice of US liberalism would have come across to both Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr as a naturalist for whom the methods of the natural sciences can be 
employed in order to help advance the progress of the nation in a liberal light. 
And indeed, this is correct, Dewey was a liberal and a naturalist,  
It was not hard for them to attribute to Dewey the label of “historical 
optimist” as they viewed much of his thought as little more than a scientistic 
naïve attempt to harness human “intelligence” for liberal and democratic ends. 
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Dewey seemed to be a perfect example of such naivety, a typical example of the 
mid-century US “liberal” scholar who put great hope in the idea that human 
“intelligence” could unlock great improvements to mankind as a whole 
(Niebuhr, 1993: 153-154, 156).  
For Niebuhr “intelligence" does not represent a medicine to treat social 
problems, far from it, it does not in itself generate the persuasive force needed 
to create a social and political transformation that Niebuhr felt was needed 
(Niebuhr, 1993: 155-156). The light of reason alone, that is the product of 
practices that employed “intelligence,” is not sufficiently powerful a force alone 
to incite privileged groups to act against their material interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 
155-156). Although, as we have argued, Dewey’s use of the notion of 
intelligence and it is not without its employment of reason, it is also an 
assessment that the self must make full use of its measures in order to maximise 
the best adaptation to the situation with which it confronts.  
However, Dewey does indeed stress that the employment of the 
intelligence of the self in its collective form can be harnessed through the state 
for the sake of social planning and control (Dewey, 1998j: 367). The 
marshalling of expertise and “all available resources of knowledge” towards the 
shared goal of social planning represents the instrumentality that modern 
societies need in order to replicate in human affairs the same kind of success 
that intelligence could deliver in the natural sciences (Dewey, 1998j: 367).  
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For Niebuhr, this is a manifestation of the notion that all that is required 
for social science is to catch up with the success of natural science - the so 
called “cultural lag” argument - is problematic because it puts far too much faith 
in what could be called the power of persuasion (Niebuhr, 1993: 156-157). 
Niebuhr’s argument is that Dewey can only bring about the advancement of the 
application of intelligence to society if it is able to persuade vested interests to 
set aside their privileged positions and to willingly agree to participate in some 
kind of collectivism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi).  
Morgenthau agrees, the power of persuasion, including that which 
employs the “instruments of science,” is not a sufficient force to make big 
societal and political improvements alone (Morgenthau, 1972: 2). Morgenthau 
even located the source of this naivety in the Victorian ideal that the spread of 
the instruments of science throughout scholarship represents a step towards 
“progress” (Morgenthau, 1972: 46). Dewey was, to both Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau, an excellent example of this kind of naivety.  
Niebuhr saw it as folly to think that disinterested reasoning can remedy 
social ills and global ethical and normative dilemmas, merely by educating 
away any ignorance on the part of those who might stand in the way of social 
progress (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Only through the contest of power can 
justice be accomplished (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). “Social inertia” is caused, 
argues Niebuhr, by “our predatory self-interest” that translates into group 
competitiveness; Dewey’s supposed failure to acknowledge such predatory 
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forces leads Niebuhr to be highly sceptical of his pragmatism (Niebuhr, 2013: 
xxx). For Niebuhr, it is the corruption inherent in human nature that 
impregnates social relations with challenging roadblocks that resist the 
accomplishment of political justice, and this is all the more so at the level of 
international politics (Niebuhr, 2013).   
Indeed, Dewey’s view, in fact, is that “entrenched predatory self-
interests” do get in the way of the marshalling of intelligence in the manner in 
which he wishes (Dewey, 1998j: 367). But such a statement, however, is 
matched by both Niebuhr and Morgenthau both of whom, as we argued in 
previous chapters, sought to put in check the selfishness of the self either 
through embracing the standpoint of a moderated children of light (Niebuhr), or 
by putting in place the institutions or nations to balance it on the world stage 
(Morgenthau).  
Moreover, the form of inquiry that Dewey advocates is inclusive of the 
widest possible gathering of participants, the widest possible demos, and thus 
aims to put into dialogue all those who stand to reach a just outcome. To 
bandwagon with a part of the global demos is to introduce injustice and thus 
cannot represent the greatest degree of insights. Leaving out sections of the 
global demos can only lead to problems that militate against successful adaption 
to situations. This may require conflict with predators but again this is not a 
position that creates disagreement between Dewey and Morgenthau or Dewey 
and Niebuhr.  
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When Morgenthau writes in Scientific Man a temper of the age is undue 
faith in science he signals out Dewey as a typical example (Morgenthau, 1946: 
1, 30, 219-223). The heart of Morgenthau’s criticism of Dewey is that the 
Pragmatist is representative of “the engineer” for whom the formulation of 
rational solutions to social problems can be found and realised as a form of 
social engineering (Morgenthau, 1946: 1-2, 4, 27-31, 71, 219-220). Dewey is 
accused of rendering politics a residue of a pre-rational era by attempting to 
substitute politics for applied intelligence armed with the equipment of 
scientific instruments (Morgenthau, 1946: 28). It is sufficient here to state that 
for Morgenthau, Dewey is an excellent example of the kind of Enlightenment 
rationalism that he finds so problematic.  
Niebuhr positions his thought in opposition to rationalism, in particular 
the kind of rationalism which affirms the transformative potential of “impartial 
and scientific inquiry” which can be put towards grasping and improving upon 
“the means and ends of social policy” (Niebuhr, 1993: 156). Consider this 
description in Moral Man and Immoral Society:  
 
“While this hope of the educators, which in America finds its most 
telling presentation in the educational philosophy of John Dewey, has 
some justification, political redemption through education is not as 
easily achieved as the educators assume” (Niebuhr, 2013: 303). 
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Echoing Marxism, Niebuhr argues that the “predatory self-interest” of 
powerful groups will forever work to prevent the establishment of a more 
equitable distribution of power within a society (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). 
Thus, Niebuhr finds it unlikely that the faith that scientific rationalists have in 
the connection between improving education and skills and the outcome of a 
steadily improving society can transform any society where self-interested 
groups have already bedded down (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi).  
Social groups, as they exercise their power, as they promote their interests, 
exist in conflicting relations and thus the notion that, were a scientific diagnosis 
of social problems to be made, and prescriptions offered up as medicine, would 
be unconvincing; there is little incentive for dominant groups to take the bitter 
pill: 
 
“social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational suasion alone, as the 
educator and the social scientist usually believe. Conflict is inevitable, and in this 
conflict power must be challenged by power. That fact is not recognized by most 
of the educators, and only very grudgingly admitted by most of the social 
scientists” (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi). 
 
Niebuhr’s Dewey is such an educator that conceives of politics as the scene 
of dialogue and persuasion, where superior reasoning is the medicine for social 
ills: i.e. a naive approach that fails to capture the importance of power relations. 
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Furthermore, as Westbrook argues, Niebuhr’s Dewey represents no more than 
“a sunny exponent of the inevitable triumph of human intelligence” 
(Westbrook, 1991: 525). Such a “rosy optimism” erred for Niebuhr, because it 
“neglected and repudiated politics” as well as the “struggle for power” 
(Westbrook, 1991: 523-524).  
Dewey simply does not understand how it is that power relations shape the 
political and historical outcomes of struggles and is highly naive to think that 
individuals and groups can be persuaded to act contrary to their best interests. 
To think that such a solution to questions of social justice is for Niebuhr to think 
that historical and social matters can be resolved as if they were of the same 
substance as natural phenomena (Niebuhr, 2008: 80-81). Moreover, this 
approach obscures a truth about history, namely that human beings are part of 
the unfolding of history also create it through their agency (Niebuhr, 2008: 
156). This is the very agency as the site of sin as well as virtue for Niebuhr. The 
failure to associate the self with its potential for sin leads, Niebuhr implies, 
Dewey down a path where it is reasonable to expect rational solutions to 
problems that are essentially zero-sum material interest conflicts (Niebuhr, 
2013: xxxi). For Niebuhr: 
 
“The invariable implication of this assumption is that, with a little 
more time, a little more adequate moral and social pedagogy and a 
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generally higher development of human intelligence, our social 
problems will approach solution” (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). 
 
For Niebuhr, this is Dewey’s “gradualism” and it very much clashes with 
his own much more gritty conception of history (Fox, 1985: 136). Niebuhr’s 
Dewey takes reason as exercised in the form of “intelligence” to propel the 
course of history in a progressive direction (Fox, 1985: 136; Niebuhr, 1993: 
153-154; Niebuhr, 1941: 117). Niebuhr’s Dewey associates the progress of 
reason with the progress of history itself (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr writes 
of philosophers who view the sum of the whole historical process and think that 
there is a ‘cumulative’ pattern through which human beings reap the rewards of 
their own accomplishments (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this 
notion; history itself cannot redeem that can only be done by The Lord. For 
Niebuhr, human error is manifested in history and is “prompted by the desire” 
that “would keep man’s ends under his control and in his power” (Niebuhr, 
1943: 331). Niebuhr implies that mankind’s attempt to reach a point in history 
where its destiny is totally under its control is unfortunate and something that 
will easily be undone as a result of their hubris (Niebuhr, 1943: 332). 
Understanding that social justice must involve conflict is something that 
Niebuhr suggests is right and necessary in his thought and not at all present 
amongst the so called “educator” (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi). In the context of broad 
cultural criticism, Dewey is held out as an archetypal example of “historical 
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optimism” (Rice, 1993: 23-24). The role of education and of teaching privileged 
groups to act in a way that is consistent with social justice is vastly overstated 
for Niebuhr, and this is particularly true of John Dewey (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-
xxxi).  
Niebuhr took up the polemic against the “educator” and liberal 
reformists, for whom Dewey was counted amongst their leaders, and discounted 
them for their failure to understand the importance and centrality of conflict, 
coercion and violence in the shaping of political outcomes (Craig, 2003: 32-33; 
Fox, 1985: 136). For Craig, Niebuhr understood John Dewey’s political thought 
as “hopelessly idealistic in a world of self-interest and conflict” (Craig, 2003: 
33). 
For Niebuhr, Dewey’s Pragmatism has certain fundamental 
characteristics (Rice, 1993: 18-19). This is not surprising, as Niebuhr’s means 
comprehending thought throughout history was to discover what was at the 
heart of - and what was basic about - a certain way of thinking (Rice, 1993: 18): 
Williams illustrates how this way of establishing ‘types’ of various belief-
systems involved foregrounding of what is basic, if necessary involving over-
simplifications, in order to permit the possibility of broad and grand cultural 
criticism (Rice, 1993: 18).  
However, in his review of Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, Ernest 
Nagel writes: 
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“He makes telling though familiar criticisms of the shallow optimism 
and the tidy rationalism of what is essentially the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment; and he scores heavily against those who place a 
fatuous and sentimental reliance on mere “appeals to reason” for 
solving the problems of men. But he obtains a crushing victory over 
“scientism” only by using the debater’s trick of so exaggerating the 
claims of empirical rationalism that even to its proponents the views 
demolished are legitimate subjects for ridicule” (Nagel, 1947: 907). 
 
Nagel points to Morgenthau’s debater’s trick of exaggerating an 
opponent’s argument in order to make his own vision, however radical, seem a 
moderate and sensible position. Indeed, Morgenthau’s “scientism” is very broad 
and perhaps lacks a coherent identity (Morgenthau, 1946: 4). For Nagel, 
“Scientism” is Morgenthau’s name for “the philosophy of modern empirical 
rationalism” (Nagel, 1947: 906). But from the perspective of the 1940s, a 
“modern empirical rationalism” is a very general category: Carnap’s Logical-
Empiricism, Wittgenstein’s Tractus, Peirce’s “Pragmaticism” etcetera: these 
distinctions are lost on the Morgenthau of Scientific Man. Morgenthau’s 
perhaps excessive generalisation identifies prima facie similarities with vast 
swathes of Western thought but in doing so totally sweeps away the differences, 
nuances and sophistication of these standpoints: 
 
 300 
“Whatever different philosophic, economic, and political beliefs people may 
hold, they are united in the conviction that science is able, at least potentially, 
to solve all the problems of man. In this view, the problems of society and 
nature are essentially identical and the solution of social problems depends 
upon the quantitative extension of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
social sphere. This is the common ground on which Jeremy Bentham and 
Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer and John Dewey take their stand” (Morgenthau, 
1946: 4). 
 
Our defence of Dewey against Morgenthau is that we must distinguish 
between Dewey’s faith in the collective self’s capacity to exercise the full 
measure/metra of its intelligence, and his faith in the role of science/reason in 
generating inevitable social change. As we have seen, Dewey understood the 
metra of any truth-claim, and thus advanced a fallibilist conception whatever 
reason/intelligence reveals to the collective self. His employment of the 
instruments of science is only warranted so long as they are held accountable to 
the principle of usefulness to society. Indeed, as we have argued, this is how 
Dewey conceives of how we determine the warrant of any truth claim.  
Dewey’s thought belongs to a different sort of “enlightenment” than the 
one Morgenthau critiques.  
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Superficially there is the appearance of “scientism” in Deweyan thought 
as well as the use of the concepts of “intelligence” and “control” that can seem 
to be less sophisticated a position than it is at a glance. However, it is a 
substantial error to leave unacknowledged the nuances in Dewey’s thought. 
Morgenthau advances his line of attack against standpoints such as J. S. Mill, 
for whom there are epistemological and ethical possibilities that methodological 
individualism could in any way produce social laws that could be put at use in 
social problems (Nagel, 1947: 907; Putnam, 2004: 99-100). The serious 
empirical study of social problems ought to mean nothing more than an attempt 
to practice situated intelligence, and not as an advocation of some sort of 
scientism (Putnam, 2004: 10-11, 100).  
As we argued in chapter one, Dewey’s conception of the self’s 
experience and understanding of the externality of the world is constituted 
through the collective self’s capacity to marshal its intelligence into the 
production of warranted beliefs. There is a direct interaction between the 
collective self and its situation that necessitates the dynamic adaptation of the 
collective self to the situation that it experiences. Such a mutable and contingent 
and indeed moderate account of the self’s measures relative to those 
measures/metra of thing that cannot be grasped or mastered create a sense of 
democratic epistemological impulse to combine in dialogue the insights of the 
widest possible demos (Dewey, 1958; Dewey, 2002; Putnam, 2004: 103-105). 
Such adaptation does not discriminate between insights but is inclusive of all 
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who produce them within the dialogues through which the collective self makes 
sense of and manages its tragic circumstances. To artificially reject knowledge 
because of its “non-scientific” quality stands in contrast with Dewey’s thesis as 
inclusive to all warranted beliefs and democratically inclusive of all participants 
in the ethical and epistemological dialogue that constitute them.  
Morgenthau’s objections to enlightenment “naturalism” simply do not 
apply to Dewey’s naturalism (Morgenthau, 1946: 220). What counts as 
legitimate knowledge cannot be delimited to those things which cannot be 
expressed in the idiom of science or reason. What is required - all the while 
acknowledging the value of natural scientific accomplishments is to celebrate 
and acknowledge the legitimacy of other understandings about human life that 
are not accountable to enlightenment naturalist methodological values and 
normativity (Morgenthau, 1946: 220). This, Niebuhr and Morgenthau would be 
surprised to learn, is a position they share with Dewey. 
Notions of metra/measures cannot be expressed in the idiom of 
positivism, but as we have demonstrated, they are central to Dewey’s reflections 
as the notion explains, in our interpretation, many aspects of Dewey’s overall 
thought. Because of his vision of knowledge in this inclusive sense is for 
Dewey the most warranted way to understand the potential usefulness, it is not 
unsurprising how it is that he conceives of democracy in epistemological terms 
(Putnam, 2004: 104). Every citizen has a dialogical role to play to bring their 
unique insights into dialogue with the expert and through the process of 
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deliberate democracy and the widescale dissemination of critical thinking skills 
through a reformed education system, every citizen would learn to think for 
herself as well as to know “when to seek expert knowledge” (Putnam, 2004: 
150).  
To bring our horizon to bear, Dewey’s thought is consistent in it rejection 
of an optimistic reading of history just as the case with Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr. The notion that Dewey represents a scientistic approach does not do 
justice to the nuances of his thought. We see no barrier from an epistemological 
or ethical standpoint to why our alternative Deweyan approach could not 













Section One: introduction to conclusion 
 
In the literature review we identified three gaps in the IR/IPT/realist 
literatures and these were that (a) pragmatism as it is understood in IR suffers 
from an optimistic understanding of history and that the application of a tragic 
vision of politics would address this shortfall: (b) that the existing tragedian 
approaches in contemporary IR either focus upon hubris as the central concept 
of tragedy or in general advance a view of tragedy that conceives of the metra 
of things as something to be transcended through social learning. We found 
there to be a need to revive the tragedy and IR debate through a centring upon 
the notion of metra/measures which in many cases cannot be overcome. (c) And 
importantly we found there to be a need to develop and deepen a realist ethical 
standpoint which could be up-front and centred within IPT.  
Our dialogue between these three scholars therefore was designed to 
address these gaps in the literature simultaneously. An alternative understanding 
of the tragic nature of world politics was developed and this is an approach 
which both applies tragedy to pragmatism all the while extending the scope and 




Section Two: Distinctive and Original Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The central problems that we identified in the literature review were that 
within IPT there is a general view of realism as not at all a normative or ethical 
approach to world politics. Such a repudiation has taken place amid the 
development of IPT approaches such as Cochran’s Pragmatism which is an 
approach which advanced notions such as inclusivity and dialogue as well as a 
tragedy in IR debate. In our view Cochran’s pragmatism lacked a tragic sense of 
life, and contemporary IR theorists who have engaged with tragedy have 
underplayed the importance of the role that the concept of metra plays in 
tragedy. We therefore advocated a dialogue between various approaches which 
supported pragmatism, inclusivity and dialogue on the one hand (Dewey) and 
realists which engaged seriously with tragedy on the other (Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr). It was our hope that a dialogue between these three important thinkers 
would produce an approach which embraced both an understanding of the metra 
of things as well as the notions of inclusivity, dialogue and pragmatism that 
have been so important in IPT. Such an approach would thus be within the 
boundaries of IPT and would also represent a development of realism by 
drawing upon the insights and understandings of Morgenthau and Niebuhr in a 
dialogical manner.  
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Our research question (to what extent can Deweyan pragmatism, in 
particular Dewey’s understanding of the “metra” of things, provide an 
alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the “tragic” nature of IR?) was 
designed in order to facilitate the critical analysis underscoring the dialogue 
between the three scholars. If an alternative could be created through this 
dialogue then a metra-focused account of tragedy would be in contrast to the 
tragic understanding of IR found in Classical Realism. If an alternative could 
not be produced by means of this dialogue then it would suggest that this 
avenue of advancing and deepening realism as a normative approach would not 
be fruitful. As it happened, the dialogue did indeed produce, to a certain extent, 
an understanding of IR which was simultaneously consistent with the metra of 
things as well as retaining those aspects of pragmatism needed in order for the 
approach to be considered within the boundaries of IPT: inclusivity and 
dialogue. The extent to which it does not represent an alternative is as a result of 
the surprising similarities between Morgenthau and Dewey regarding their use 
of the metra of things in their approaches.  
This Tragic Deweyanism is an original contribution insofar as the 
confluence of the concept of metra with our dialogue between the three scholars 
has not been attempted in the literature. It is significant because as an approach 
it has the potential to engage in IPT debates from within the boundaries of the 
field all the while retaining the realist grasp of (metra-centred) tragedy that IPT 
approaches need to avoid overly optimistic readings of history.  
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Central to our contribution is the dialogue between the three scholars and 
in particular our employment of the concept of metra to help explain how all 
three in their own ways apply the concept within their thought and in doing so 
provide answers to the question of how to manage the metra of things. This 
shared understanding of the metra of things as well as similar political and 
ethical imperatives is surprising for those who think of Classical Realism and 
Classical Pragmatism as quite different approaches within world politics. Our 
dialogue between these three scholars exposed how similar the contributions of 
Dewey and Morgenthau are when viewed through the lens of metra.  
To the extent that an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the 
“tragic” nature of IR was created we found the Deweyan understanding of the 
metra of things sufficiently elastic and plastic that it was able to assimilate the 
Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian positions as hypothetical models to be examined 
within the context of a wider global dialogue amongst the global demos. To an 
extent this does provide an alternative tragic understanding that is distinctive 
from Classical Realism’s understanding of the tragic nature of International 
Relations. However, we also found that owing to the similarities between the 
metra of things as embedded within the thought of John Dewey and the 
Classical Realists, we are limited in our claim that this alternative represents a 
sharp departure. It is perhaps better understood as an evolution of the Classical 
Realist position to become more attuned to the importance of the concept of 
global dialogical inquiry.  
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Section Three: How we Achieved this Original and Significant 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
In this thesis, we selected three scholars who met our requirements of (a) 
realists who have engaged with tragedy, who are untouched by the tragedy and 
IR debate, but also have developed ethical and normative thought and (b) 
pragmatic theory which advances inclusivity and dialogue. The reason for 
choosing Dewey over alternative pragmatists was because his approach was 
mentioned in relation to tragedy in Deweyan studies. It made sense therefore to 
include him as our pragmatist. We chose Morgenthau and Niebuhr because they 
were both realists who engaged with tragedy in a time that was untouched by 
the contemporary tragedy and IR debate. They also had profound ethical and 
normative contributions for the field of IR.  
We took inspiration from Hans-George Gadamer to create a methodology 
which enabled us to facilitate the dialogue between the three scholars. We 
maintained a view that is consistent with the dimension of Gadamer’s thought 
which stresses how reality is constituted in and through language. In order to 
maintain consistency with this position we were forced to reject Gadamer’s 
unorthodox essentialism. Nevertheless, our methodological position remains 
consistent with hermeneutics that largely reflects Gadamer’s philosophy. Our 
main research instrument throughout the thesis, is the fusion of horizons. This a 
concept in which an interpreter can bring to bear one’s own horizon upon 
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another in such a way that our own horizon is forever shaped by the interaction. 
In order to illustrate how our horizon became increasingly enriched over time, 
we developed a tragedian horizon which stressed the importance of a number of 
tragedian concepts. During the dialogue we primarily drew upon the concept of 
metra in order to advance our interpretation (although the other concepts such as 
hubris and agon were applied infrequently). We distinguished between a narrow 
and broad understanding of metra in order to illustrate the distinction between 
measures that could be overstepped and those that could not be.  
Our dialogue began with Dewey’s thought and we developed an account 
of Dewey through interpretation that exposed the very great extent to which his 
thought was shaped by a conception of the metra of things. We stressed the 
importance of dialogue and inclusivity in this chapter. In the following chapter, 
we further enriched our horizon by adding Niebuhrian insights and contribution 
to it and further developing the similarities and tensions between our 
interpretation of Dewey and that of Niebuhr. In the following chapter, we did 
the same thing with regards to Morgenthau. In the final chapter, we answered 
the research question by developing the end result of our horizon’s enrichment: 
a tragic Deweyanism which could assimilate insights from Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr all the while retaining the aspects of Pragmatism that we consider 
important if the approach is to be located within the boundaries of IPT. We then 
followed up this chapter with a few discussions regarding any objections that 
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might be made towards including Deweyan thought in realism as well as to 
suggest some of the advantages of tragic Deweyanism in general.  
 
Section Four: Significance for the Field of IR 
 
Our research does offer IR a theoretical means to bridge the gap between 
realism and pragmatism as well as to illustrate how a tragedian understanding 
that centres upon a notion of measures can create analytical opportunities to 
build new approaches and new synthesis. Realism has long been considered to 
be outside the boundaries of IPT for reasons that we spelled out in the literature 
review. This ought not to be the case with a Tragic Deweyanism that stresses 
the measures of things that can be grasped and managed as much as possible 
and done so in an inclusivist and collectivist manner (inquiry through dialogue) 
but it also grasps the epistemological complexities which go with such an 
understanding of measures. We can only be sure of a partial and 
historically/culturally contingent understanding of such things.  Our warranted 
knowledge, our justified beliefs, they all remain bound to the limitations and 
insufficiencies of the self which remains locked into an existence which it 
cannot control and which will eventually overwhelm it in full knowledge of its 
own personal extinction.  
This tragic self is one shaped by its measures and the measures of its 
contingent situation. Tragic Deweyanism grasps both this tragic dimension of 
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life as well as to retain its epistemological view that the self in its collective 
form can pool its intellectual resources through dialogue and in the pursuit of 
inquiry in order to best manage the metra of things. It seems to me that IPT 
would benefit greatly from such an approach as its very purpose is to redesign 
international practices so as to extend inclusion to all groups. 
Moreover, for the tradition of realism, engaging with notions of 
inclusivity and dialogue more fully could help produce a means of further 
restraining the worst impulses of human beings by creating supranational values 
and institutions which serve to maximise the measure of constraints upon the 
worst impulses of nation-states and their leaders/majorities. In assimilating 
insights from Classical Realism, Tragic Deweyanism retains those insights and 
can put them to use in the right situations at the right times. This also 
rejuvenates these insights and puts them to use in debates within IPT in a way 
that they would otherwise not be welcome. Especially if the approach had 
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